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Chapter 1
Motivation and Overview
A growing literature suggests that national borders remain important despite policy
change and transport improvements because they capture the effects of informal and
cultural barriers that can affect international exchange considerably. This doctoral thesis
attempts to advance this literature by addressing and answering three research questions
that analyse whether cultural proximity and bilateral trust affects international trade
and factor mobility. More precisely, it first analyses whether culturally rooted bilateral
trust affect international trade or migration. Second, it examines whether this effect is
particularly important for the location choices of potential female migrants. Finally, it
analyses whether other cultural factors, such as religious similarity of country pairs, affect
international migration flows.
The first question is addressed in Chapter 2. International trade is often characterised
by asymmetric information that may lead to opportunistic behaviour. To prevent this
type of behaviour, contracts define the obligations of all implied parties. However, con-
tracts are by nature incomplete as it is too costly to take into account or even know all
contingencies when establishing them. Furthermore, it can be difficult to negotiate, mon-
itor and enforce contracts, especially in international trade where commercial partners
are established in different jurisdictions. As a result, profitable trade opportunities might
1
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not be realised, unless the parties trust each other. Similarly, trust may have an impact
on the decision to migrate to a foreign country. In the absence of important barriers to
migration, individuals only move to a foreign country if the expected migration benefits
exceed the expected migration costs. However, forming such expectations is difficult, as
would-be migrants are generally not fully aware of the social, political, institutional and
cultural environments that prevail in host countries. In such a context, their decision to
migrate may rely on the trust they have in the citizens of potential destination countries,
which is referred to as “source-to-destination” (StD) trust, if it changes the way expecta-
tions about the costs and benefits of moving abroad are formed. Likewise, the trust that
citizens from the destination country grant citizens from the source country, referred to
as “destination-to-source” (DtS) trust, may play a role in the migration decision. For
instance, it may affect immigration policies towards specific countries or regions.
The relationship between bilateral trust and trade has already been analysed by Guiso,
Sapienza and Zingales (2009; henceforth GSZ). They estimate a gravity model of trade
with an indicator of bilateral trust provided by the Eurobarometer surveys as a regressor
in addition to the traditional determinants included in trade models. This indicator mea-
sures the trust that citizens of a country importing goods have in an average citizen of
their partner country (DtS trust). As GSZ suspect this trust measure to be endogeneous,
they aim to isolate its exogenous variation with two indicators of the cultural proximity
of country pairs, a measure of physical dissimilarities between the ‘representative’ indi-
viduals in two countries (called “somatic distance”) and a measure of religious similarity.
Estimating the gravity model using an instrumental variables (IV) approach, they find
coefficients that suggest DtS trust has a statistically and economically important causal
effect on bilateral trade across countries. However, these IV estimates are more than
five times larger than their insignificant ordinary least squares (OLS) counterparts, and
GSZ acknowledge that religious similarity and somatic distance may affect international
trade through cultural and institutional channels differently than bilateral trust. This
3questions the validity of their identification strategy and therefore of their IV results.
Nevertheless, they conclude that the positive and significant IV coefficient on DtS trust
is evidence that cultural proximity is an important determinant of international trade,
and this without performing further sensitivity analysis.
Chapter 2 aims to fill this gap first by attempting to replicate the results of GSZ and
second by performing a thorough sensitivity analysis. To do this, religious similarity is
not used as an instrumental variable for DtS trust because it is very likely to affect trade
directly or through other channels other than bilateral trust. Instead, it is included in
the trade equation at the second stage. The exogenous variation of DtS trust is captured
with eight alternative indicators of somatic distance, exploiting the notion that individuals
who look less alike tend to trust each other less. As all these indicators are equally valid
and strong instruments, it should not matter for consistent second-stage estimates which
one is chosen to instrument bilateral trust with. However, in the context of international
trade, the coefficient on DtS trust is only significant when instrumented with the indicator
employed by GSZ. Otherwise, that is, when using any other and equally valid somatic
distance indicator as the instrument, this significance disappears and the magnitude
of the coefficient on bilateral trust decreases and even becomes negative. A similar
result is observed when estimating the reduced-form equation of the dependent variable
where the endogenous trust variable is replaced by its instrument. When regressing
international trade alternatively on the different measures of somatic distance in addition
to the other control variables, the estimation only yields a significant coefficient on the
somatic distance indicator used by GSZ. The absence of significant coefficients on all
other indicators casts doubt on the existence of the relationship between bilateral trade
and trust. Overall, the lack of the robustness of the IV results and the insignificant
coefficients on somatic distance in the reduced-from equation contradict the conclusion
made by GSZ. In other words, no significant relationship between bilateral trust and
international trade is found when performing a thorough sensitivity analysis.
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To analyse the relationship between bilateral trust and international migration in
Chapter 2, a structural equation is derived from a random utility maximisation (RUM)
model where individuals only migrate if the utility of moving abroad is greater than
the utility of staying at home. Migrants are assumed to be systematically different from
people staying at home, thereby accounting for heterogeneity within the source countries.
This also relaxes the strong assumption of the independence of irrelevant alternatives
that gives rise to proportional substitution patterns. The derived equation regresses
international migration flows alternatively on StD and DtS trust in addition to traditional
control variables such as geographic distance, common language and common colonial
history. The OLS coefficients on StD and DtS trust are never statistically different
from zero. Neither are the IV coefficients where bilateral trust is instrumented with the
different measures of somatic distance. Moreover, somatic distance is never significantly
different from zero in the reduced-form equation of international migration. In other
words, there is no evidence that StD or DtS trust affect a potential migrants’ location
choices.
In Chapter 2, migration flows are not classified by gender. This is only appropriate
if female and male migration patterns are equally affected by bilateral trust. Yet, this
condition is not necessarily satisfied. On the contrary, the trust in citizens of potential
destination countries might be particularly important for the location decisions of women
while being negligible for those of men. This is because migration is a risky decision and
it has been repeatedly shown in experimental economics that women tend to be more
more risk-averse than men. Moreover, women seem to suffer more stress when moving
abroad than do men. The hypothesis is investigated in Chapter 3, where the theoretical
model again allows migrants to systematically differ from individuals who decide to stay
in their home country. The structural equation derived from this model now regresses fe-
male migration flows on StD trust in addition to traditional determinants of international
migration. It is log-linearised and estimated using two-stage least-squares approaches in
5order to address potential endogeneity biases. This linearisation, however, has two main
drawbacks. First, taking the logarithm drops all observations that report zero migra-
tion, leading to a loss of information and, therefore, to potentially severe biases. Second,
log-linearisation is only appropriate when the data used in the analysis is homoscedas-
tic, a property that is rarely satisfied in data on international migration. Therefore, the
structural equation is also estimated in its multiplicative form using a Poisson Pseudo
Maximum Likelihood (PPML) approach, which yields consistent coefficients in the pres-
ence of heteroscedasticity and zero outcome observations. Finally, the coefficients on StD
trust are estimated using an ordered logit model that allows the inclusion of observations
reporting negative migration flows. The estimation results are not robust across the dif-
ferent estimation approaches. Overall, there is little evidence that bilateral trust matters
in the location choices of female migrants. Regressing only male migration flows on StD
trust does not yield significant coefficients on StD trust either. These results are consis-
tent with the ones presented in Chapter 2 and therefore contribute to the robustness of
the findings presented there.
Chapter 4 addresses the last question, that is, whether religious similarity of country
pairs fosters international migration flows. These flows depend on many factors, such as
the expected income in the host country or physical moving costs. In addition to such
monetary factors, both the benefits and costs of international migration can be of a social
or psychological nature. For instance, assimilation costs very much depend on how sim-
ilar the linguistic and cultural backgrounds of the source and destination countries are.
Speaking the host country’s language and being familiar with its formal and informal
behavioural rules should facilitate the integration process. To account for this, scholars
generally verify whether two countries have the same official language, share a national
border, have a common history and/or have a common institutional background. Addi-
tionally, religious similarity might foster international migration by promoting cultural
proximity between country pairs. Religion shapes cultural traditions, influences prevail-
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ing morals and values, and is often a central element in the formation of individual and
social identities. Moving to a country with a familiar religious background might also
mitigate migration costs by providing newcomers with religious networks that help them
find housing and employment, or provide them with places where they can interact with
people who are born or who have already settled in the destination country. Finally, reli-
gious networks provide newcomers with psychological and spiritual support. International
migration is often described as a destabilising process that causes anxiety and feelings
of intensified insecurity. In such situations, religious identification was shown to play a
particularly important role in the well-being of immigrants. Yet, immigrant networks
established in destination countries might also provide newcomers with such services.
This could decrease the importance of being familiar with the religious background of
the destination country for immigrants who have access to such networks. Equivalently,
religious similarity might be particularly important for immigrants coming from new
source countries who only have limited access to such a diaspora. Chapter 4 therefore
not only analyses whether religious similarity between country pairs affects international
migration but also investigates whether this effect depends on the size of immigrant com-
munities existing in the destination country. To perform this analysis, the location choice
problem is again derived from a RUM model where stayers are assumed to be different
from migrants. Additionally, the theoretical model allows alternative destinations to be
perceived as close substitutes by migrants. To tackle potential mis-specifications caused
by heteroscedasticity, endogeneity and/or sample selection, the equation derived from the
theoretical model is estimated using PPML, an IV version of PPML and an ordered logit
model. These estimations all yield significantly positive coefficients on religious similar-
ity. The Poisson estimates suggest that migration flows are 136 percent higher between
countries sharing the majority religion than between countries with different religious
backgrounds. As expected, the estimation results also find a significant coefficient on the
interaction between religious similarity and diaspora, providing evidence in favour of the
7hypothesis that religious similarity is particularly important for individuals moving to
countries with only a few established compatriots.
Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes, outlines open questions and suggest further research
possibilities.
Chapters 2 to 4 are all organised similarly. They are composed of an introduction, a
summary of the related literature, a presentation of the model, the empirical strategy and
the data, an outline of the results and a conclusion. Therefore, although they all build on
each other, they can be read independently of one another. The research paper forming
the basis of Chapter 2 was published in the journal Empirical Economics in February
2015. The other research papers forming this thesis have been discussed and presented
at scientific conferences.
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Chapter 2
Does Bilateral Trust Really Affect
International Trade and Factor
Mobility?
2.1 Introduction
The role of cultural proximity and trust in economic exchange is a long-standing issue
that has attracted renewed interest in the more recent literature. For instance, there
is extensive research on the commonality of language for international trade and factor
mobility. In a widely read contribution, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2009, henceforth
GSZ) alluded to a different role of cultural proximity in international economic exchange
running through trust considerations. They present empirical evidence suggesting that
the higher average trust that citizens of a country importing goods have in citizens of
their partner country, which is referred to as “destination-to-source (DtS) trust”, has a
significant and economically important causal effect on bilateral trade across countries.
To address endogeneity concerns, GSZ aim to isolate the exogenous variation of DtS
trust with two indicators, a measure of physical dissimilarities between the ‘representa-
9
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tive’ individuals in two countries (called “somatic distance”) and a measure of religious
similarity. GSZ acknowledge that these instruments may affect international trade via
cultural and institutional channels other than bilateral trust, questioning the validity of
their identification strategy. Yet, they argue that their positive and significant IV coef-
ficient on DtS trust is evidence that cultural proximity is an important determinant of
international trade, even if the instruments do not satisfy the exclusion restriction.
First, this chapter reconsiders the relationship between bilateral trust and interna-
tional trade flows in an attempt to replicate the results of GSZ by thorough sensitivity
analysis.1 In fact, there is a large degree of freedom when constructing an indicator of
somatic distance that may serve as an instrument for bilateral trust. The robustness
of their IV results is examined by defining seven alternative measures of somatic dis-
tance in addition to the one used by GSZ and by estimating the reduced-form equation
where trade flows are regressed on all explanatory variables and on somatic distance and
religious similarity. As all somatic distance indicators are equally valid and strong in-
struments, it should not matter for consistent IV estimates which indicator is chosen to
instrument bilateral trust with. Using the identification strategy of GSZ and employing
their somatic distance indicator as an instrument, the estimation results suggest that an
increase of one standard deviation in instrumented DtS trust increases aggregated export
flows by 24 percent on average. This basically replicates their original finding. However,
neither the alternative somatic distance measures nor religious similarity are significant
when estimating the reduced-form equation. Moreover, according to Fehr (2009), reli-
gious similarity in particular may violate the exclusion restriction when examining the
relationship between bilateral trust and international trade. When not excluding reli-
1Trade is often characterised by incomplete contracts as it is too costly to take into account or even
know all contingencies when establishing them. Furthermore, it can be difficult to negotiate, monitor
and enforce contracts, especially in international trade where the commercial partners are established in
different jurisdictions (Rodrik, 2000). As a result, profitable trade opportunities might not be realised,
unless the parties trust each other (Akerlof, 1970; Arrow, 1972; Putnam, 1993; Greif, 1993, 2000; Coleman,
1994; Kollock, 1994; Fukuyama, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Paldam, 2000; Dyer and Chu, 2003).
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gious similarity at the second stage of the IV estimation, the coefficient of bilateral trust
becomes insignificant and its magnitude declines considerably, sometimes even becoming
negative, as soon as it is not instrumented with the original indicator used by GSZ. Thus,
although not all of the possible identification problems in the analysis by GSZ can be
solved, the main contribution of this chapter regarding international trade is to show that
the conclusion reached by GSZ cannot be supported using their approach.
The second part of this chapter focuses on the relationship between bilateral trust
and international migration.2 Potentially, trust in the citizens of a host country may
have an impact on the decision to migrate to a foreign country. Generally, individuals
only migrate to a foreign country if the expected migration benefits exceed the expected
migration costs. However, forming such expectations is difficult because migrants are
generally not fully aware of the economic, social, political, institutional and cultural
environment of potential host countries. In such a context, their decision to migrate
may also rely on the trust they generally have in citizens of the destination country.
This bilateral trust, which is referred to as “source-to-destination (StD) trust”, might
change the way expectations about the costs and benefits of moving abroad are formed.
Thus, there is some reason to believe that StD trust may directly affect international
migration by changing its expected net return. Likewise, the trust that citizens from the
destination country grant citizens from the source country (i.e. DtS trust) may play a
role in the migration decision. For instance, it may affect immigration policies towards
specific countries or regions.
To test these hypotheses, a structural equation is derived from a random utility max-
imisation model. This equation is then estimated using the IV strategy suggested by
GSZ, and the robustness of the results are examined using a sensitivity analysis simi-
lar to the one used in the context of international trade. When using any of the eight
2GSZ studied the effect of trust on international capital flows, in addition to trade flows, but did not
consider international labour migration. Future research may attempt replicating the findings of GSZ
with respect to international capital mobility.
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measures of somatic distance as the sole instrument, IV estimation does not yield any
significant and quantitatively important coefficient of bilateral trust.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section gives a brief account
of the literature concerning trust effects on macroeconomic outcomes. Section 3 analyses
the causal effect of bilateral (DtS) trust on international trade, extensively discussing
the empirical model and identification strategy before presenting the results. Section 4
proposes a structural model and similar identification strategy to analyse the effects of
both StD and DtS trust on international migration and presents empirical results. The
last section consists of the conclusion.
2.2 Related Literature
This chapter is part of a growing literature that analyses the role of cultural proximity
and trust in economic outcomes. This section focuses on empirical studies employing
aggregate data and ignores the microeconomic trust literature that is largely based on
experimental data, on which Fehr (2009) provides an excellent survey.
Comparing Italian regions, Putnam (1993) finds that intra-regional trust increases
participation in social activities, facilitates cooperation and improves the effectiveness of
institutions.3 More recently, empirical studies suggest that trust within a region fosters
economic development and growth through its positive effect on total factor productivity
(Bjornskov, 2006), on financial development (Guiso et al., 2004, 2008b), and on the rate
of investment (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001). Algan and Cahuc (2010)
and Tabellini (2010) find a causal effect of inherited and historically determined “general”
trust (proposed by the World Values Surveys) within regions on economic growth. By
contrast, this chapter is concerned with the effects of bilateral (i.e. inter-regional) trust
3On trust and institutions, see also La Porta et al. (1997), Alesina and La Ferrara (2000), Bjornskov
(2006), Tabellini (2008, 2010), Bloom, Sadun and Reenen (2009), and Aghion, Algan, Cahuc, and Shleifer
(2010).
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on the bilateral movement of goods and labour.
The related literature on the role of cultural proximity in international trade and
migration has largely focussed on the role of common language, using various indicators
(e.g. Falck, Heblich, Lameli and Su¨dekum, 2012; Isphording and Otten, 2013; Egger and
Lassmann, 2013; Melitz and Toubal, 2014; Chiswick and Miller, 2015). To examine the
role of bilateral trust (possibly through somatic distance and religious similarity) across
countries in international migration patterns, I follow Bertoli and Moraga (2013) and Or-
tega and Peri (2013), and derive a structural equation from a random utility maximisation
model (see also Roy, 1951; Sjaastad, 1962; Anderson, 1979; Borjas, 1987, 1989). This
approach has also been used recently to examine the determinants of migration flows,
for instance, migration policies (Mayda, 2010; Ortega and Peri, 2013), the variations in
migration flows to the United States over time (Clark, Hatton and Williamson, 2007),
the role of networks in the decision to move abroad (Pedersen, Pytlikova and Smith,
2008; Beine, Docquier and Ozden, 2011), the sorting and selection of potential migrants
(Grogger and Hanson, 2011), the role of climatic factors (Beine and Parsons, 2012), and
the role of similar religious backgrounds in international migration (see Chapter 4).
2.3 Bilateral Trust and International Trade
This section presents the model, the data and the identification strategy employed to
investigate the relationship between DtS trust and international trade flows.
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2.3.1 Trade Equations and Data
The gravity-type specification of trade that includes DtS trust as regressor comes from
GSZ:4
log(exportsdt) = β0 + β1trustdst + X
′
sdγ + λst + λdt + sd,t, (2.1)
where the dependent variable, log(exportsdt), is the natural logarithm of the aggregated
commodity export flows from country s to country d in year t;5 trustdst is the average
DtS trust observed in year t across individuals in country d, which participated in a Euro-
barometer survey, given to citizens in country s, according to the answer to the following
question: “I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in people
from various countries. For each, please tell me whether you have a lot of trust, some
trust, not very much trust, or no trust at all.” It was asked in the years 1970, 1976, 1980,
1983, 1986, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, and 1996, with the sample size increasing over time.6
Analogously to the study byGSZ, the individual answers are coded as 1 (no trust at all), 2
(not very much trust), 3 (some trust) and 4 (a lot of trust). For reasons of comparability,
I follow GSZ and focus on countries that were members of the European Economic Area
before 1997 and Norway. X′sd is a vector of time-invariant bilateral variables that capture
trade costs (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004). It includes dummy variables that take
the value one whenever two countries share a border, an official language or when their le-
gal systems have the same origins.7 Following GSZ, I further include an indicator of press
coverage that measures how many times a partner country was mentioned in the national
4For a short overview of the origin of the gravity model and the corresponding literature, see Anderson
(1979, 2011), Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Baldwin and Taglioni (2006), Head and Mayer (2013a),
and Felbermayr, Grossmann and Kohler (2015).
5Aggregated commodity export flows are taken from the UN Comtrade Database;
http://comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx. Unfortunately, data on trade in services cannot be in-
cluded as it has only been collected since the year 2000. There are no zero trade observations for the
country sample included in the analysis.
6See http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/. In 1996, citizens of 17 European countries were asked to indi-
cate the trust they had in citizens of 25 EU and non-EU countries.
7These dyadic dummy variables come from the CEPII Gravity Dataset generated by Head, Mayer
and Ries (2010, 2013); see www.cepii.fr.
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newspapers,8 a proxy for transportation costs9 and a measure of common linguistic roots,
which can take values between zero and one:10 it is one whenever two countries share an
official language, zero when the two official languages come from different language fam-
ilies, and takes values between zero and one whenever the official languages share some
common nods. Finally, two different measures of geographical distance between country
pairs are employed. First, we use the indicator for geographical distance proposed by
Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995) that was also employed by GSZ. This indicator measures
the (log) distance in kilometres between two capital cities and assumes that the whole
population is concentrated in one geographical point, thereby failing to capture the dis-
tribution of economic activity within a country. This distance measure is only used for
direct comparison with the results of GSZ as Head and Mayer (2002) argue that the in-
clusion of such an unweighted distance measure in a gravity-type equation systematically
inflates the estimated border effect because it overestimates the geographical distances
within a country relative to international distances. Therefore, the second measure of
geographical distance between country pairs employed in this chapter is the one provided
by Mayer and Zignago (2011), which is a population-weighted indicator of distances be-
tween big cities. λst and λdt are time-varying country dummies that account for country-
and time-specific determinants of international trade. According to Baldwin and Taglioni
(2006), these dummies mitigate the bias stemming from the omission of what Anderson
and van Wincoop (2004, 2003) call “multilateral resistance” to trade. The last term in
equation (2.1), sdt, is a mean-zero random variable. The computed standard errors are
8The measure is based on data from www.factiva.com, which collects and archives informations made
available by over 30,000 newspapers, journals, magazines, web pages, etc. on a broad range of contents
from over 200 countries. It is constructed as follows: “In Factiva, we searched the newspaper with the
highest circulation for each country. For each pair of countries i and j, we recorded the number of articles
in the newspaper of countries that mentioned country j or its citizens in the headline. We divided this
number by the number of total news stories on foreign countries” (GSZ; p. 1106).
9I employ the prices of shipping a 1,000 kg unspecified freight type load with no special handling in
June 2011, as provided at http://importexportwizard.com. This measure is based on Giuliano, Spilim-
bergo and Tonon (2006).
10Data are drawn from www.ethnologue.com; also see Lewis, Simons and Fennig (2013).
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robust to heteroscedasticity of unknown and arbitrary form. Moreover, they are clustered
at the country pair which allows the standard errors to be correlated over time within
country pair, but assumes that they are uncorrelated with errors of a different country
pair.
2.3.2 Identification and Instrumental Variables
A particular concern is the potential inconsistency of the OLS estimate of the coefficient
β1 on DtS trust (trustdst). This might be caused by omitted variables and measurement
errors, especially since the variable is based on survey data. GSZ instrument trustdst
with a time-invariant proxy of religious similarity and a time-invariant indicator of so-
matic distance that measures the distance between three anthropometric characteristics
observed in the native populations of two countries: the average height, the prevailing
hair colour, and the average cephalic index, which measures the average width and length
of an individual’s skull. In his experiment, DeBruine (2002) finds that people trust other
people who resemble themselves significantly more. A decrease in somatic distance should
thus increase bilateral trust. The second instrument, religious similarity, measures the
probability that a randomly chosen individual in country d has the same religion as a
randomly chosen individual in country s. As religiously similar individuals may share
common values and beliefs, an increase in the variable may positively affect bilateral
trust.
The employed instruments are time-invariant, whereas the trust measure is not. In
fact, the trust variable varies over time in a non-negligible manner. Figure 2.1 displays
the evolution of DtS trust over time for selected country pairs with comparably high and
low fluctuations. For instance, average Greek to Danish trust fluctuated considerably
over time, with a standard deviation of 0.35 across the various available years (reaching
2.56 on average). The average German to Italian trust and its standard deviation over
time is 2.41 and 0.26, respectively. By contrast, French to Dutch trust (2.94 on average)
2.3. BILATERAL TRUST AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 17
Figure 2.1: Bilateral trust over time in examples of country pairs
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1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Year
France-Netherlands (0.04) Greece-Denmark (0.35)
France-Denmark (0.05) UK-Ireland (0.23)
Ireland-Belgium (0.05) Netherlands-Ireland (0.23)
UK-Belgium (0.05) Germany-Italy (0.26)
Notes: This figure illustrates bilateral trust between country pairs over time with
the highest and lowest standard deviations, given that bilateral trust was observed
over at least six years (Eurobarometer surveys).
and French to Danish trust (2.96 on average) is pretty stable over time; their standard
deviations are only 0.04 and 0.05, respectively.
One advantage of the instrumentation strategy may be seen in the attempt to elicit
the culturally rooted (thus stable) and ideally exogenous component of bilateral trust.
GSZ provide survey evidence from additional questions that separate risk and trust con-
siderations; the correlation patterns of the employed DtS trust variable suggests that it
indeed “reflects the subjective probability that a random person is trustworthy” (GSZ,
p. 1100).
The construction of the instruments, their potential problems and the contribution to
identify the causal effect of DtS trust on international trade flows are discussed next.
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Religious Similarity
The first employed instrument for DtS trust, an indicator for religious similarity, is con-
structed with data from the World Value Surveys presented by Guiso et al. (2003).
They report the national distribution of population by the following religious affilia-
tions: Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, no religious affiliation
and other affiliations. This information is used to compute the probability that two
randomly chosen individuals in two different countries have the same religion. However,
religious similarity may not satisfy the exclusion restriction. First, as Fehr (2009, p. 259)
states: “Common religion not only influences trust, but does many other things as well,
because it is probably associated with more frequent interactions between the two coun-
tries, compared to cases with different religions, and this may well have a direct impact
on trade.” Second, there is reason to believe that religiously similar people share prefer-
ences for certain tradable goods. An obvious example concerns preferences for food. For
instance, a Muslim living in Switzerland might import meat from France (where there is
a large Muslim community) because he or she only eats “halal” meat.
Because potential validity problems are particularly severe when religious similarity is
employed to instrument bilateral trust, specifications in which religious similarity enters
as a control variable in the trade regression rather than being excluded at the second
stage of the IV estimations are preferred.
Somatic Distance
Indicators of somatic distance, used by GSZ as a second instrumental variable for bilateral
trust, can be constructed in many different ways. Four measures are made available in
the online appendix to the paper by GSZ (Guiso et al., 2008a).11 They are constructed
based on four anthropometric indicators: hair colour, cephalic index, height and skin
colour. The first three anthropometric indicators were published by Biasutti (1959). He
11See www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/sapienza/htm/somaticdistance.zip.
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classifies the world into five categories of hair colours: 1 (blond prevails), 2 (mix of blond
and dark), 3 (dark prevails), 4 (sporadic presence of blond), and 5 (exclusively dark). He
further differentiates five categories of average cephalic indexes, going from 71.0 to 86+,
and six categories of height. For illustration, Figure 2.2 reprints the distribution of the
average cephalic index for European regions from Biasutti (1959).
Figure 2.2: Distribution of the average cephalic index in Europe
Source: (Biasutti, 1959, p. 48)
Using today’s borders, the populations of many countries have several of these traits,
in which case GSZ focus on the predominant category and ignore the others. They assign
scores to the different groups of hair colours, cephalic indices, heights and skin colours,
and “compute the somatic distance between two countries as the sum of the absolute
value of the difference in each of these traits” (GSZ, p. 1107). Their constructed four
measures of somatic distance are all computed in the same fashion but are based on
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different combinations of these four physical characteristics. One measure of somatic
distance sums the absolute distance in all four dimensions. The sole measure used in the
estimations of GSZ ignores the difference in skin colour. Another measure is based on
differences in hair colour, height and skin colour. Finally, yet another measure only sums
the absolute differences in hair colour and height.
In this chapter, four additional measures of somatic distance are defined. To do this,
the score of 1 is assigned to the category corresponding to the lowest average cephalic
index (71.0–74.9), 2 to the second category (75.0–78.9), and so on. The six categories
of height defined by Biasutti (1959) are coded the same way, assigning the lowest score
of 1 to the category “157.9 cm or less” and the highest score of 6 to “178 cm or more”.
First, the instructions given by Guiso et al. (2008a, p. 3) are followed exactly in order to
try replicating the single measure of somatic distance used by GSZ. The second measure
is based only on the absolute differences in hair colour and height, as it is hardest to
define which category of cephalic index prevails. The next two measures differ from the
others by allowing a country to fall into two categories and weighting them according to
population density.12 One measure is again based on the three anthropometric indicators
proposed by Biasutti, while the other ignores the differences in cephalic index. The data
on population density comes from two figures: a map with the population density in 1989
provided by the European Environment Agency and one with the population density in
12For some countries, it is very difficult to decide which trait prevails, especially when focusing on the
different categories of cephalic index. For example, in Figure 2.2, northern Germany falls into category 3,
“79.0–82.9”, while the other half of Germany falls into category 4, “83.0–86.9”. Guiso et al. (2008a) do not
indicate how they decide which one of these categories prevails in such situations. I partially succeed in
replicating their somatic distances when I decide visually (based on Figure 2.2) which trait covers a larger
area and assume that it is the dominant characteristic. However, this procedure is somewhat arbitrary,
especially when ignoring the distribution of the population. As the German population is approximately
equally distributed, I would ignore the characteristics of half of the population if I arbitrarily decided
that either category 3 or 4 prevails. To account for this, our two measures of somatic distance allow
a country to be home to two categories of traits, depending on the distribution of the population. In
the case of Germany, I find that the categories of cephalic index 3 (“79.0 - 82.9”) and 4 (“83.0 - 86.9”)
roughly share the German territory and population. Therefore, I decide to assign it the score of 3.5.
This measure is certainly not flawless, but it allows us to further explore the robustness of the results
published in GSZ.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max N
Panel A: International trade and destination-to-source trust
Export flows (from s to d, log) 14.56 14.63 1.64 9.57 17.88 679
DtS trust 2.73 2.72 0.28 1.99 3.65 679
Press coverage 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.31 679
Weighted distance (log) 7.00 7.06 0.55 5.08 8.13 679
Distance between capitals (log) 6.90 7.07 0.69 5.15 8.12 679
Transportation costs (log) 5.19 5.18 0.07 5.08 5.42 679
Common border 0.20 0.00 0.40 0.00 1.00 679
Common language 0.08 0.00 0.28 0.00 1.00 679
Same legal origin 0.31 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00 679
Common linguistic roots 0.63 0.67 0.20 0.00 1.00 679
Religious similarity 0.34 0.33 0.25 0.00 0.87 679
Somatic distance
Available inGuiso et al. (2008a)
- hair colour, height, cephalic index, skin 2.93 3.00 1.37 0.00 6.00 679
- hair colour, height, skin 2.05 2.00 1.29 0.00 5.00 679
- hair colour, height, cephalic index 2.48 2.00 1.20 0.00 5.00 679
- hair colour, height 1.60 2.00 1.08 0.00 4.00 679
Own elaboration, following the instructions in Guiso et al. (2008a)
- hair colour, height, cephalic index 2.35 2.00 1.21 0.00 5.00 679
- hair colour, height 1.48 2.00 0.96 0.00 3.00 679
Own elaboration, allowing for a country to fall into two categories of traits
- hair colour, height, cephalic index 2.15 2.00 1.15 0.00 4.50 679
- hair colour, height 1.47 1.50 1.04 0.00 3.00 679
Panel B: International migration and source-to-destination trust
Gross immigration flows (log) 6.84 6.84 1.87 2.08 12.13 450
StD trust 2.79 2.79 0.30 1.99 3.65 450
Diff. in GDP p.c. (%) 0.34 0.18 0.66 -0.62 3.55 450
Common language 0.09 0.00 0.28 0.00 1.00 450
Weighted distance (log) 6.91 7.01 0.62 5.08 8.13 450
Common border 0.21 0.00 0.41 0.00 1.00 450
Same legal origin 0.32 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 450
Migration stock 1960 (log) 4.86 0.00 5.56 0.00 13.50 450
Religious similarity 0.31 0.32 0.24 0.00 0.87 450
Somatic distance
Available in Guiso et al. (2008a)
- hair colour, height, cephalic index, skin 2.87 3.00 1.40 0.00 6.00 450
- hair colour, height, skin 2.11 2.00 1.34 0.00 5.00 450
- hair colour, height, cephalic index 2.43 3.00 1.18 0.00 5.00 450
- hair colour, height 1.67 2.00 1.09 0.00 4.00 450
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Table 2.1 – cont.
Variable Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max N
Panel B - cont.
Own elaboration, following the instructions in Guiso et al. (2008a)
- hair colour, height, cephalic index 2.35 2.00 1.20 0.00 5.00 450
- hair colour, height 1.56 2.00 0.97 0.00 3.00 450
Own elaboration, allowing for a country to fall into two categories of traits
- hair colour, height, cephalic index 2.10 2.00 1.13 0.00 4.50 450
- hair colour, height 1.51 1.50 1.03 0.00 3.00 450
Panel C: International migration and Destination-to-Source trust
Gross immigration flows (log) 6.84 6.82 1.87 2.08 12.13 463
DtS trust 2.76 2.75 0.30 2.04 3.65 463
Diff. in GDP p.c. (%) 0.38 0.19 0.70 -0.62 3.55 463
Common language 0.09 0.00 0.28 0.00 1.00 463
Weighted distance (log) 6.91 7.01 0.62 5.08 8.13 463
Common border 0.21 0.00 0.40 0.00 1.00 463
Same legal origin 0.33 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 463
Migration stock 1960 (log) 5.04 0.00 5.57 0.00 13.50 463
Religious similarity 0.32 0.32 0.24 0.00 0.87 463
Somatic distance
Available in Guiso et al. (2008a)
- hair colour, height, cephalic index, skin 2.88 3.00 1.40 0.00 6.00 463
- hair colour, height, skin 2.12 2.00 1.34 0.00 5.00 463
- hair colour, height, cephalic index 2.44 3.00 1.19 0.00 5.00 463
- hair colour, height 1.68 2.00 1.09 0.00 4.00 463
Own elaboration, following the instructions in Guiso et al. (2008a)
- hair colour, height, cephalic index 2.37 2.00 1.20 0.00 5.00 463
- hair colour, height 1.57 2.00 0.97 0.00 3.00 463
Own elaboration, allowing for a country to fall into two categories of traits
- hair colour, height, cephalic index 2.11 2.00 1.14 0.00 4.50 463
- hair colour, height 1.52 1.50 1.03 0.00 3.00 463
Notes. This table presents the descriptive statistics of the sample used to estimate the effect of DtS
trust on commodity export flows (Panel A), the impact of StD trust on gross immigration flows (Panel
B), and the effect of DtS trust on gross immigration flows (Panel C). The data sources are described
in sections 2.3.1 and 2.4.1. All samples include observations for European countries over the years for
which I have trust data (1970, 1976, 1980, 1983, 1986, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, and 1996). The number
of observations varies across the panels because of missing data.
2010 made available by the Nordic Center for Spatial Development.13 Not surprisingly,
the somatic distance measures are highly correlated (and I use only one of them at the
same time in each regression). The correlation coefficients between two somatic distance
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measures vary from 0.65 to 0.93.14
Unfortunately, when instrumenting DtS trust only with somatic distance, the exo-
geneity of the instrument cannot be statistically verified. Yet, somatic distance might
also affect international trade via cultural and institutional factors other than trust. To
mitigate this concern, the migration regression includes dyadic variables that could be
correlated with somatic distance, such as geographical distance between countries, com-
mon legal origin and indicators of common language.15 Additionally, somatic distance
should not be highly related to these bilateral variables otherwise it may raise multi-
collinearity issues. To address this concern, the measure of common linguistic roots is
regressed on somatic distance (one indicator per regression) in addition to the other time-
invariant bilateral variables included in the analysis. The results of this regression suggest
that common linguistic roots and somatic distance measures are negatively correlated,
albeit the coefficient on somatic distance is not always significantly different from zero
(see appendix). Moreover, the R2 of these regressions range from 0.55 to 0.58, further
suggesting that multicollinearity is not a problem. Finally, when an endogenous variable
is only instrumented with one variable, Murray (2006) suggests estimating the regression
of interest again, using alternative instruments separately, and observing how the coef-
ficient on the endogenous variable behaves. If this procedure yields estimates that only
vary insignificantly from one another, then the credibility of the instrumental variable is
strengthened. Such a sensitivity analysis can be performed here because there is a large
degree of freedom in constructing a measure of somatic distance. The different indicators
of somatic distance presented above all capture the physical dissimilarities between the
representative individuals in two countries and are constructed in a similar fashion. It
13See Stanners and Bourdeau (1994) or www.eea.europa.eu/publications/92-827-5122-8/page008.html
for the chart on population density in 1989 and Roto (2011) or www.nordregio.se/en/Maps–graphs/ for
the population density in 2010.
14See the appendix for a correlation matrix.
15Regarding the latter, in a sensitivity analysis (section 2.3.4) I also employ other language-related
measures provided by Melitz and Toubal (2014).
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should therefore not matter for consistent results which one of them is used to capture
the exogenous variation of bilateral trust. The main contribution of this chapter is thus
to perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to these alternative measures, thereby shed-
ding light on the economic question of interest: does bilateral trust and, more generally,
cultural proximity affect international trade, according to the approach used by GSZ?
2.3.3 Results
The main results of estimating the trade regression are presented and discussed here. The
descriptive statistics of the samples used to analyse the relationship between international
trade and DtS trust are presented in Panel A of Table 2.1.
Replicating GSZ: OLS Estimates
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 present the results of estimating equation (2.1). In Table 2.2, the
indicator of geographical distance between countries is similar to the one employed by GSZ
(distance between two capital cities). In this case, the estimated coefficients on bilateral
trust are very similar to the ones published in their study.16 However, the coefficient on
geographical distance is barely significant. As already mentioned, this might be the result
of the inadequacy of the unweighted indicator measuring the distance between two capital
cities. Indeed, when replacing it with the outlined population-weighted distance indicator
in Table 2.3, the estimated coefficients on bilateral distance become significant and have
point estimates close to −1, which corresponds to the magnitude generally estimated
in trade regressions based on the gravity model (Mayer and Zignago, 2011, p. 11). In
addition, the estimated border effect decrease, supporting the suggestion made by Head
and Mayer (2002) that measuring geographical distance by the distance between capital
cities inflates the border effect. More importantly, when including a weighted measure of
distance in the specification, the point estimates of the coefficients on DtS trust decrease.
16Compare to Table IV in GSZ (pp. 1116 f.).
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Table 2.2: Determinants of international trade - replicating GSZ
OLS OLS OLS IV-SR IV-S RF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DtS trust 0.37* 0.29 0.28 1.27*** 1.50***
(0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.38) (0.50)
Common language 0.45** 0.26 0.25 0.15 0.17 0.30*
(0.21) (0.16) (0.17) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16)
Distance btw capitals (log) -0.05 -0.26 -0.24 -0.32* -0.30* -0.22
(0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17)
Common border 0.49*** 0.42*** 0.41*** 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.34***
(0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Press coverage 1.37 0.57 0.66 1.57 1.21 0.81
(1.12) (1.11) (1.12) (0.96) (1.05) (1.17)
Transportation costs (log) -4.41** -1.82 -1.82 -0.09 -0.43 -1.43
(1.97) (1.90) (1.85) (1.65) (1.72) (1.82)
Same legal origin 0.45*** 0.39** 0.32** 0.38** 0.34**
(0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.16) (0.15)
Common linguistic roots 0.25 0.17 0.11 0.12
(0.31) (0.27) (0.29) (0.30)
Religious similarity -0.19 0.05
(0.22) (0.16)
Somatic distance (GSZ) -0.09***
(0.03)
Relevance
K-P rk LM statistic 17.91 16.5
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00)
Weak identification
K-P rk Wald statistic 17.05 26.03
Over-identification
Hansen J-statistic 0.780
(p-value) (0.38)
Observations 679 679 679 679 679 679
R-squared 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.97
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of aggregated export flows from country
s to country d (UNComtrade). DtS trust measures the average trust that citizens in importing
country d grant citizens in exporting country s (Eurobarometer surveys). Somatic distance is
the measure used by GSZ that sums the absolute value of the difference in hair colours, heights,
and cephalic indices. All equations include country-year dummies. The Kleibergen-Paap rk
LM and Wald statistics are the robust statistics in case of non-i.i.d. disturbances. Estimated
standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the country pair. Coefficients are
statistically different from zero at the ***1%, **5%, and *10% level. Columns (1) to (3)
present OLS estimates; columns (4) and (5) present IV estimates with somatic distance and
religious similarity as instruments (IV-SR) and with somatic distance as the only instrument
(IV-S), respectively. RF refers to the reduced-form of the dependent variable.
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Table 2.3: Trade regression - using a weighted distance indicator
OLS OLS OLS IV-SR IV-S RF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DtS trust 0.27 0.13 0.13 0.85** 0.96**
(0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.35) (0.47)
Common language 0.38** 0.24** 0.25** 0.25** 0.24** 0.30**
(0.16) (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12)
Weighted distance (log) -0.88*** -1.03*** -1.04*** -0.94*** -0.91*** -0.99***
(0.25) (0.22) (0.23) (0.24) (0.25) (0.23)
Common border 0.29*** 0.24** 0.24** 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.21**
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
Press coverage 0.13 -1.01 -1.06 -0.34 -0.42 -0.80
(1.05) (0.95) (0.96) (0.89) (0.93) (0.98)
Transportation costs (log) 0.42 2.27 2.31 2.48 2.27 2.49
(1.91) (1.66) (1.68) (1.57) (1.68) (1.66)
Same legal origin 0.45*** 0.47*** 0.41*** 0.42*** 0.42***
(0.10) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Common linguistic roots -0.07 -0.11 -0.11 -0.15
(0.32) (0.28) (0.28) (0.31)
Religious similarity -0.06 0.11
(0.19) (0.14)
Somatic distance (GSZ) -0.06*
(0.03)
Relevance
K-P rk LM statistic 16.95 14.65
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00)
Weak identification
K-P rk Wald statistic 16.93 22.99
Over-identification
Hansen J-statistic 0.13
(p-value) (0.72)
Observations 679 679 679 679 679 679
R-squared 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.97
Notes: See notes for Table 2.2
The positive OLS estimates reported in columns (1) to (3) of Table 2.3 are all insignificant.
Notably, whereas GSZ (p. 1105, footnote 4) suggest that it does not matter much which
geographical distance measure is used, our results suggest the opposite.
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Replicating GSZ: IV Estimates
Next, as DtS trust is likely to be correlated with the error term, the IV approach proposed
by GSZ is applied.17 When instrumented with both the measure of religious similarity
and the measure of somatic distance used by GSZ, the coefficient on DtS trust becomes
significant at the 5 percent level (column (4) of Table 2.3). This suggests that an increase
in DtS trust of one standard deviation increases aggregated commodity export flows
on average by 24 percent, which is more than six times the effect predicted by the OLS
estimate. Both instruments enter significantly in the first-stage regression. Bilateral trust
seems to increase with religious similarity and is reduced when physical dissimilarities
between two countries become more important. The p-value of the Kleibergen-Paap rk
LM statistic also suggests that the instruments are jointly significant in the first stage
of the two-stage least-squares (2SLS) regression.18 In addition, the Wald statistic based
on the Kleibergen-Paap rk statistic is larger than 10, indicating a sufficiently strong
correlation between the instruments and DtS trust so that weak identification problems
should not be an issue.19 Finally, the instruments pass the Hansen J-test intended to
verify their exogeneity, that is, that the instruments only affect the dependent variable
via the trust channel.
The standard statistical tests thus suggest that the IV strategy used by GSZ is valid.
17The endogeneity of bilateral trust is verified with a control function approach (see Wooldridge, 2010,
p. 127) and an endogeneity test that is robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity, following Baum, Schaffer
and Stillman (2007). Both tests reject the null hypothesis that bilateral trust is exogenous at conventional
levels.
18The Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic is the efficient first-stage statistic used to verify the relevance
of the instruments when non-i.i.d. disturbances are assumed. Rejection of the null hypothesis suggests
that the model is identified, i.e. that the instruments are relevant.
19In the presence of i.i.d. disturbances, weak identification problems are detected with the Cragg-
Donald F-statistic, which is compared to the critical values published by Stock and Yogo (2005). How-
ever, in case of non-i.i.d. disturbances, the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald statistic is the efficient statistic
(Kleibergen and Paap, 2006; Kleibergen and Schaffer, 2007; Baum et al., 2007). So far, no critical values
have been computed for this statistic, and in practice, it is usually compared to the threshold number of
10 recommended by Staiger and Stock (1997); see also Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002). As a robustness
test, I compute the limited information maximumvlikelihood (LIML) estimates of all our 2SLS regres-
sions and find that the bilateral trust coefficients change only slightly in their size and that the levels
of statistical significance are identical to the IV estimates. The results of this sensitivity analysis are
available in the appendix.
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Nevertheless, at least religious similarity is suspected to affect international trade through
channels other than bilateral trust. This casts doubts on the results presented in column
(4) and also on the over-identification test, as the latter is only reliable when the instru-
ments are valid (Murray, 2006). Therefore, an alternative specification including religious
similarity as a covariate is estimated using an 2SLS approach where the exogenous vari-
ation of bilateral trust is captured with a single instrument, the indicator of somatic
distance used by GSZ. The results of estimating this specification are presented in col-
umn (5). The coefficient on DtS trust increases slightly and the significance is unchanged
compared to column (4).
Reduced-Form Estimates
The reduced-form equation of the dependent variable is “derived by substituting the first-
stage equation into the causal relation of interest” (Angrist and Pischke, 2009, p. 121)20.
The first-stage regression is
trustdst = δ0 + δ1Sds + X
′
sdη + λst + λdt + usdt, (2.2)
where Sds is the indicator of somatic distance between country d and country s, and X
′
sd
contains all time-invariant bilateral exogenous covariates, including the proxy for religious
similarity. Substituting (2.2) into (2.1) and rearranging terms yields
log(exportsdt) = (β0 + β1δ0) + β1δ1Sds + (β1η + γ)X
′
sd + (β1 + 1)λst +
(β1 + 1)λdt + (β1usdt + sdt)
≡ τ0 + τ1Sds + X′sdφ+ λˆst + λˆdt + vsdt. (2.3)
20See Anderson and Rubin (1949), Dufour (2003), and Chernozhukov and Hansen (2008) for a formal
explanation of this alternative test andAngrist and Krueger (1991, 2001) for an application of this method.
See also Baum et al. (2007) for an implementation of the Anderson-Rubin test in Stata. This test verifies
whether the instruments are significant in the reduced-form equation of the dependent variable.
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λˆst and λˆdt are time-varying country dummies, and vsdt is the error term. If the exclusion
restriction is satisfied, then, by assumption, all variables in equation (2.3) are orthogonal
to the error term vsdt. This implies that OLS consistently estimates the coefficients and
that testing whether τ1 ≡ β1δ1 = 0 is an alternative way of testing the hypothesis that
β1 = 0 in equation (2.1). As Angrist and Pischke (2009, p. 213) point out, “if you can’t
see the causal relation of interest in the reduced-form, it’s probably not there”.
Column (6) of Table 2.3 shows the results of estimating the reduced-form (eq. (2.3)).
As expected from the second-stage results, the estimated coefficient on somatic distance
is significant, though only at the 10 percent level. Furthermore, religious similarity is not
partially correlated with international trade. This result suggests that religious similarity
as used by GSZ is not only a potentially invalid but also an irrelevant instrument, in turn
biasing the 2SLS coefficient on bilateral trust (e.g. Murray, 2006; Angrist and Pischke,
2009). This finding supports the choice to estimate alternative specifications that include
the proxy for religious similarity at the second stage of the IV approach and to focus
most of the discussions on these preferred specifications.
(Lack of) Robustness
To examine the robustness of the results reported in Table 2.3, equation (2.1) is esti-
mated again, keeping the same sample and the same explanatory variables. However, as
discussed above, the measure of somatic distance used as instrument for DtS trust varies.
The results of this sensitivity analysis are presented in Table 2.4, which is divided into
four panels.21 Panel A reports the results of estimating the first-stage regression and Panel
B shows the results of estimating the reduced-form equation (2.3). The IV coefficients
with and without religious similarity as explanatory variable are presented in Panels C
and D, respectively. Each panel is composed of eight columns that differ in the indicator
21Only the coefficients on DtS trust, somatic distance, and religious similarity are reported. Complete
tables including the estimates of the coefficients on the control variables are available in the appendix.
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Table 2.4: Trade: Instrumenting bilateral trust with various measures of somatic distance
Guiso et al. (2008a) Replication Pop. Density
HHC HH HHCS HHS HHC HH HHC HH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: First-stage regression
Dependent variable: Destination-to-Source trust
Somatic distance -0.06*** -0.09*** -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.05*** -0.09*** -0.05*** -0.08***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Religious similarity 0.18*** 0.15** 0.20*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.14** 0.15** 0.15**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Panel B: Reduced-form equation of international trade
Dependent variable: Aggregated export flows
Somatic distance -0.06* -0.06 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.06
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
Religious similarity 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.09
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14)
Panel C: Second-stage estimates using somatic distance and religious similarity as instruments
Dependent variable: Aggregated export flows
DtS trust 0.85** 0.69** 0.46 0.35 0.20 0.55 0.55 0.69*
(0.35) (0.34) (0.31) (0.35) (0.36) (0.36) (0.37) (0.36)
Relevance
K-P rk LM statistic 16.95 23.58 19.89 23.33 18.46 20.40 15.27 20.43
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Weak identification
K-P rk Wald statistic 16.93 21.27 19.95 21.30 13.48 21.58 15.74 20.80
Exogeneity
Hansen J-statistic 0.13 0.02 0.06 0.21 0.58 0.01 0.01 0.02
(p-value) (0.72) (0.90) (0.80) (0.65) (0.45) (0.91) (0.91) (0.90)
Panel D: Second-stage estimates using somatic distance as instrument
Dependent variable: Aggregated export flows
DtS trust 0.96** 0.74 0.39 0.17 -0.17 0.49 0.50 0.75
(0.47) (0.51) (0.44) (0.52) (0.57) (0.59) (0.58) (0.58)
Relevance
K-P rk LM statistic 14.65 20.97 17.65 19.93 11.88 16.72 14.74 18.43
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Weak identification
K-P rk Wald statistic 22.99 28.22 27.99 30.45 15.20 27.60 16.50 24.89
R-squared 0.68 0.70 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.70
Observations 679 679 679 679 679 679 679 679
Notes: This table presents the coefficients of estimating the first-stage regression (Panel A), the reduced-form equation of
the dependent variable (Panel B), the IV coefficients of estimating equation (1) when DtS trust is instrumented with both
variables of cultural proximity of country pairs (Panel C) and the IV estimates when instrumenting DtS trust only with
a measure of somatic distance (Panel D). In each column, I use an alternative indicator of somatic distance as instrument
for bilateral trust. In columns (1) to (4), I use the indicators made available by Guiso et al. (2008a), in columns (5) and
(6) the indicators elaborated following the instructions given by them, and in columns (7) and (8) the measures that take
the population density into account. The columns are labelled with the letters H, C and S: H stands for height and hair,
C for cephalic index and S for skin. The coefficients of the control variables (the same as in Table 2.3) are not reported.
Cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, and the coefficients are statistically different from zero at the
***1%, **5% and *10% level.
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of somatic distance employed as instrument for DtS trust. The first four indicators are
the ones made available by Guiso et al. (2008a). Column (1) of Panels B, C and D restate
the most important results presented in Table 2 (columns (6), (4) and (5), respectively),
where the somatic distance measure actually used in GSZ is employed, that is, the sum
of the absolute values of the difference in hair colour, height and cephalic index (HHC)
of two average citizens living in distinct countries. Column (2) is based on a somatic
distance measure that additionally considers the differences in skin colour (HHCS). For
column (3), the differences in the cephalic index (HHS) are ignored. The measure used
for column (4) sums the absolute differences in hair colour and height (HH). For columns
(5) and (6), the measures of somatic distance were constructed following the instructions
given in Guiso et al. (2008a), first, trying to replicate the measure actually used by
GSZ (column (5))22 and second, disregarding the potentially problematic cephalic index.
Finally, the ones used for the last two columns take the distribution of the population
within a country into account, first by accounting for the cephalic index (column (7))
and second by disregarding it (column (8)).
According to Panel A of Table 2.4, the first-stage OLS coefficients on the instrumental
variables are significantly different from zero in every column, and the point estimates
are similar across the various somatic distance measures. Panels C and D present the
statistics that give indications of the validity of the instruments. According to these
statistics, all the instruments are equally relevant, exogenous and strong. Therefore, one
may expect to find similar results in the reduced-form and in the second stage, no matter
which somatic distance measure is used. However, this is not the case. When estimating
the reduced-form equation (2), according to Panel B, the only significant coefficient on
somatic distance is found in column (1), where the original indicator of GSZ is used
as instrument. Consequently, the only IV coefficients on DtS trust that are significant
in Panel D are the ones instrumented with the somatic distance measure employed by
22For several country pairs, I did not manage to do so which may explain the diverging results.
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GSZ. As soon as alternative measures of somatic distance are employed as instruments
(columns (2)–(8)), the significance of the trust coefficients disappears and their magnitude
decreases. Column (5) shows the results using the somatic distance measure that was
constructed following the instructions of GSZ in the attempt to replicate their results and
those in column (1). Although its coefficient is similar to the original indicator at the
first stage (compare columns (1) and (5) in Panel A), it enters positively in the reduced-
form estimate (Panel B). Moreover, the coefficient on instrumented DtS trust is negative
(albeit insignificant) at the second stage (Panel D). This calls for further discussion of
the identification strategy and the main results. This additional sensitivity analysis is
performed in the next section.
2.3.4 Further Sensitivity Analysis and Discussion
To address the concern that somatic distance might be correlated with cultural and
institutional factors that affect international trade (potentially violating the exclusion
restriction), dyadic variables were included in the trade regression and it was verified that
the results do not suffer from multicollinearity. For instance, it is controlled for linguistic
similarities by including an indicator of common official language and a proxy for common
linguistic roots based on the language trees provided by the Ethnologue. However, these
measures might not be sufficient to appropriately control for linguistic similarity in the
context of trade (Isphording and Otten, 2013; Melitz and Toubal, 2014). To address
this issue, the measure of common linguistic roots, which was found to be insignificantly
related to trade, is replaced by three alternative measures of linguistic similarity suggested
by Melitz and Toubal (2014): an indicator of common native language, an indicator
of common spoken language, and an indicator of linguistic proximity between different
native languages.23 These language measures are slightly correlated with the somatic
23Melitz and Toubal (2014) emphasise that a measure of common linguistic roots based on the language
trees provided by the Ethnologue is problematic, as it does not allow the comparison of languages that
belong to different trees.
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distance indicators, but when simultaneously including all four in the trade equation, the
reduced-form and IV estimates are almost identical to the ones presented in Table 2.4,
again suggesting that DtS trust does not affect international trade.24
Table 2.5: Effects of lagged DtS trust on international trade
Guiso et al. (2008a) Replication Pop. D
HHC HH HHCS HHS HHC HH HHC HH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: DtS trust lagged two years
DtS trust 0.79* 0.63 0.25 0.08 -0.35 0.40 0.31 0.60
(0.45) (0.51) (0.44) (0.53) (0.58) (0.60) (0.58) (0.59)
Relevance
K-P rk LM statistic 14.65 20.97 17.65 19.93 11.88 16.72 14.74 18.43
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Weak identification
K-P rk Wald statistic 22.99 28.22 27.99 30.45 15.20 27.60 16.50 24.89
Panel B: DtS trust lagged four years
DtS trust 0.80* 0.72 0.31 0.21 -0.31 0.58 0.39 0.79
(0.44) (0.51) (0.43) (0.53) (0.56) (0.60) (0.58) (0.60)
Relevance
K-P rk LM statistic 14.65 20.97 17.65 19.93 11.88 16.72 14.74 18.43
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Weak identification
K-P rk Wald statistic 22.99 28.22 27.99 30.45 15.2 27.6 16.5 24.89
Observations 679 679 679 679 679 679 679 679
Notes. This table presents the coefficients of regressing international trade on bilateral trust lagged by two years (Panel A)
and by four years (Panel B). In each column, alternative indicators of somatic distance are used as instruments for bilateral
trust. In columns (1) to (4) the indicators employed are the ones made available by Guiso et al. (2008a), columns (5)
and (6) employ indicators elaborated following the instructions given by them, and columns (7) and (8) use the measures
that take the population density into account. The columns are labelled with the letters H, C and S: H stands for height
and hair, C for cephalic index and S for skin. The coefficients of the control variables (the same as in Table 2.3) are not
reported. All estimations include control variables and full sets of source- and country-year fixed effects. Cluster-robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses and the coefficients are statistically different from zero at the ***1%, **5%,
and *10% level.
Another concern may be that bilateral trust across countries does not affect inter-
national trade flows contemporaneously but with a lag. Therefore, the 2SLS procedure
is re-estimated by allowing instrumented trust to affect trade flows two years and four
years later. The results of these estimations are reported in Panel A and Panel B of Ta-
ble 2.5, respectively. Reduced-form estimates and the results in which the various somatic
distance indicators are employed as (sole) instruments are again basically unchanged.
24The regression results and the correlations are reported in the appendix.
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Finally, the sample is enlarged by including non-European countries—such as Switzerland—
for which data availability is sufficient. Even when sticking to the somatic distance in-
dicator used by GSZ, the coefficient on instrumented DtS trust at the second stage is
insignificant, like the OLS estimate (results not reported).
In sum, DtS trust does not remain significant in the trade regression when instru-
mented with alternative measures of somatic distance that are as equally valid as the one
employed by GSZ. According to GSZ (p. 1120), “it is possible that - test of overiden-
tifying restrictions notwithstanding - our instruments are not orthogonal to trade, but
pick up a set of cultural, institutional, and legal connections that facilitate trade flows.
[...] If this is the case, our results suggest the importance of culture-specific factors in
trade relationships”. However, according to our reduced-form estimates, neither religious
similarity nor the alternative somatic distance indicators considered in addition to the
one discussed by GSZ affect trade. In other words, neither bilateral trust nor possible
institutional and cultural factors picked up by their instrumentation strategy seem to
causally affect trade. This result does not change when additional controls are included
in the trade regression or when it is allowed for lags in the trust-trade relationship. Thus,
contrary to their conclusion, no robust evidence is found using the approach suggested
by GSZ, namely that bilateral trust and/or cultural proximity—apart from common lan-
guage indicators—causally affect international trade.
2.4 Bilateral Trust and International Migration
As stated in the introduction, there are reasons to suspect that bilateral trust affects
international migration. StD trust might influence the way expectations about the costs
and benefits of moving abroad are shaped while DtS trust may, for example, affect im-
migration policies in the destination countries. The econometric model used is similar
to (2.1), with migration flows rather than trade flows as the dependent variable, but less
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standard. Therefore, the estimated equation is derived in a structural way by presenting
a Roy model that heavily draws on recent contributions by Ortega and Peri (2013) and
Bertoli and Moraga (2013).
2.4.1 Structural Model and Data
Consider an individual i born in country s. Suppose that the utility from staying in s,
denoted by U iss, and moving to country d 6= s, U isd, can be additively decomposed into a
component that is common for all individuals in country s (Vss, Vsd), and a component
that is location- and individual-specific (θiss, θ
i
sd):
U isj = Vsj + θ
i
sj, j ∈ {d, s}. (2.4)
Suppose that we do not observe the individual-specific components but know that θiss and
θisd, d 6= s, are all identically and independently type-I extreme value distributed with
no correlation between θiss and θ
i
sd, d 6= s, but correlation among the terms θisd, d 6= s.
Allowing for correlation among the individual-specific terms of all potential destination
countries accounts for unobserved individual heterogeneity which captures that migrants
could be a selected group and have correlated utility within destination countries. It
relaxes the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives previously applied in
the migration literature (e.g. Beine et al., 2011; Grogger and Hanson, 2011). In the
language of a nested logit model (McFadden, 1978), all destination countries are assumed
to belong to the same nest.25 Considering the now standard Generalized Extreme Value
generating function (McFadden, 1978), the probability of observing that an individual i
born in country s does not migrate can be written as
ps =
eVss
eVss +
(∑
d 6=s e
Vsd/τ
)τ , (2.5)
25This is a special case of Bertoli and Moraga (2013) that was proposed by Ortega and Peri (2013).
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where 1 − τ captures the correlation among the terms θisd, d 6= s. The probability of
migrating to d 6= s reads as
pd =
eVsd/τ
(∑
d6=s e
Vsd/τ
)τ−1
eVss +
(∑
d6=s e
Vsd/τ
)τ . (2.6)
Thus, the log of the relative probability of staying and migrating is given by
log
(
ps
pd
)
= Vss − Vsd
τ
+ zs, (2.7)
where zs ≡ (1 − τ) log(
∑
d6=s e
Vsd/τ ). Let us approximate ps/pd by the observed number
of stayers in s, ns, relative to the number (flow) of migrants to d 6= s, migsd; that is,
ps/pd ≈ ns/migsd. Taking logs, I obtain
log
(
ps
pd
)
= log(ns)− log(migsd) + sd, d 6= s, (2.8)
where term sd captures the error of approximating probabilities (Ortega and Peri, 2013).
Combining the right-hand sides of (2.7) and (2.8) and adding time index t implies
log(migsdt) =
Vsdt
τ
+ λst + sdt, (2.9)
where λst ≡ log(nst)−Vsst−zst is captured with time-dependent source-country dummies.
Let the observable utility component Vsdt of a migrant moving from s to d in period t addi-
tively depend on bilateral (StD or DtS) trust, the difference in the log of per capita income
across countries, time-invariant differences between s and d, and time-varying character-
istics of the destination country captured by a time-dependent destination-country fixed
effect.26 Indicators of StD trust and DtS trust cannot be simultaneously included in
the estimated equation because they turn out being highly correlated. These theoretical
26Ortega and Peri (2013) do not allow for destination-country fixed effects to vary over time.
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considerations then suggest the following two specifications:
log(migsdt) = α0 + α1trustsdt + α2∆GDPsdt + X
′
sdγ + λdt + λst + sdt, (2.10)
log(migsdt) = β0 + β1trustdst + β2∆GDPsdt + X
′
sdρ+ λdt + λst + esdt, (2.11)
where the dependent variable, denoted by log(migsdt), is the natural logarithm of the
(gross) immigration flows from country-of-origin s to country-of-destination d in period
t, trustsdt and trustdst stand for the StD and DtS trust observed in year t, respectively
and ∆GDPsdt measures the percentage difference in the gross domestic product (GDP)
per capita of the two countries. This variable is used as a proxy for the wage differential
between a country pair suspected to affect international labour migration. X′sd is a vector
of bilateral time-invariant variables, λst and λdt are country-year fixed effects, and sdt
and esdt are mean-zero random variables.
To estimate these specifications, I use data on immigration flows collected by Ortega
and Peri (2011, 2009) for the dependent variable. They merged and harmonised data sets
gathered by Mayda (2010), the United Nations and the OECD (International Migration
Database) to establish an unbalanced panel of annual data on bilateral gross immigration
flows into 30 OECD countries from 1946 to 2008. This unique dataset details the legal
entry of foreign citizens who wish to be residents in an OECD country. Consistency is
ensured by verifying that immigrants are always defined on the same basis across the
database for each destination country.27 The other variables are identical to the ones
used in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. Regarding geographical distance, only the measure provided
by Mayer and Zignago (2011) is employed.
27To complete the dataset, Ortega and Peri (2011, 2009) interpolate observations when the missing
value is situated between two years for which the observations are available and compute the net immi-
gration flows. They correct for the outflow of foreign citizens using the International Migration Database
and the dataset on emigration stocks for the years 1990 and 2000 collected by Docquier, Lowell and Mar-
fouk (2007). However, these net immigration flows are less precise than the gross flows and only have a
limited coverage.
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2.4.2 Results
Panel B of Table 2.1 reports the summary statistics of the sample used to analyse the
relationship between international migration and StD trust, and Panel C those used to
analyse the effect of international migration on DtS trust. The number of observations
varies across panels because of missing data. The analysis again focuses on observations
for European countries in the years for which data on bilateral trust is available.
Basic Estimates
The results of estimating equations (2.10) and (2.11) are shown in Tables 2.6 and 2.7,
respectively. The first three columns present standard OLS estimates. They suggest that
a 1 percent increase in the difference in GDP per capita increases immigration flows on
average by approximately 2 percent. This positive and significant effect is in line with
the notion, typically supported by the data, that international wage differentials affect
migration patterns. Moreover, geographical distance between countries has a significant
and negative effect on the dependent variables, while sharing legal origins has a positive
effect.
The main finding from columns (1)–(3) is the absence of a significant correlation
between bilateral trust and immigration flows. In column (1) of Table 2.6, the coefficient
on StD trust is positive but rather small and not significantly different from zero. In
column (2), an indicator of the existing diaspora in the destination countries is included.
Beine et al. (2011) showed that an increase in the past stock of migrants in a country
increases migration flows, possibly because a larger diaspora reduces the costs and risks
migrants face when moving abroad. Such network effects are captured with a proxy for
the emigration stocks in 1960, as employed in Grossmann and Stadelmann (2013). This
variable ensures a lag of at least 10 years that exists between the proxy and the other
observations included in our regression. It is itself significant and positive, as found in
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Table 2.6: Bilateral migration flows and StD trust
OLS OLS OLS IV-SR IV-S RF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trust (StD) 0.68 0.43 0.23 2.22** 2.40
(0.59) (0.60) (0.65) (0.93) (1.51)
Diff. in GDP p.c. (%) 1.66* 2.07** 1.93** 2.50** 2.55** 2.01**
(0.86) (0.87) (0.84) (0.96) (1.02) (0.84)
Common language -0.24 -0.36 -0.27 -0.41 -0.42 -0.25
(0.34) (0.33) (0.33) (0.28) (0.29) (0.35)
Weighted distance (log) -0.70** -0.57* -0.55* -0.41 -0.41 -0.47
(0.31) (0.30) (0.30) (0.27) (0.29) (0.30)
Common border 0.00 0.26 0.21 0.30 0.30 0.23
(0.34) (0.38) (0.38) (0.30) (0.29) (0.37)
Same legal origin 0.61*** 0.69*** 0.52* 0.54*** 0.56** 0.53**
(0.24) (0.23) (0.27) (0.20) (0.22) (0.26)
Mig. Stock 1960 (log) 0.33* 0.30* 0.24 0.23 0.32*
(0.18) (0.17) (0.15) (0.16) (0.17)
Religious similarity 0.50 -0.08 0.43
(0.46) (0.56) (0.39)
Somatic distance (GSZ) -0.09
(0.07)
Relevance
K-P rk LM statistic 21.61 13.99
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00)
Weak identification
K-P rk Wald statistic 14.41 12.37
Over-identification
Hansen J-statistic 0.02
(p-value) (0.88)
Observations 450 450 450 450 450 450
R-squared 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of migration flows from country s to country d
(Ortega and Peri, 2011, 2009). Trust (StD) measures the average trust that citizens in country s grant
citizens in country d (Eurobarometer surveys). Somatic distance is the measure used by GSZ that sums
the absolute value of the difference in hair colour, height, and cephalic index. All equations include
country-year dummies. The estimated robust standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at
the country pair. Coefficients are statistically different from zero at the ***1%, **5% and *10% level.
Columns (1)–(3) present OLS estimates; columns (4) and (5) present IV estimates with somatic distance
and religious similarity as instruments (IV-SR) and with somatic distance as the only instrument (IV-S),
respectively. RF (column (6)) refers to the reduced-form equation of the dependent variables.
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previous studies. Adding it decreases the coefficient of StD trust, which is still statistically
insignificant. The same pattern is observed when including religious similarity as control
variable in column (3): it halves the coefficient of StD trust and slightly increases its
standard error. The OLS estimates thus suggest that StD trust is not significantly related
to international migration.
Next, again, the IV estimation proposed by GSZ is applied, and a sensitivity analysis
is performed to examine whether the IV results follow a similar pattern in the migration
setting as they did in the trade setting. Using the somatic distance measure as employed
by GSZ and religious similarity as instruments, the coefficient on StD trust strongly in-
creases compared to the OLS estimates and becomes significantly different from zero at
the five percent level (column (4)). The employed instruments pass the Hansen J-test.
The Kleibergen-Paap rk statistics suggest that they are relevant and strong. Neverthe-
less, like for Table 2.3, there are several reasons to regard the results in column (4) with
caution. First, the IV estimate on StD trust is five times larger than the OLS counter-
part. This suggests that an increase in StD trust of one standard deviation increases
gross immigration flows on average by 66 percent, which is a surprisingly large effect in
view of the OLS estimate. Second, there is again plenty of reason to believe that religious
similarity may affect international migration not exclusively through the trust channel
(see also Chapter 4). It rather may shape institutional differences related to international
labour mobility or be affected by migration flows themselves, as these potentially change
the composition of the population in many respects. Finally, the previous section sug-
gests that the coefficient on bilateral trust might not be robust to the use of alternative
measures of somatic distance as instruments.
To address these concerns, an alternative specification that does not exclude the proxy
for religious similarity as an explanatory variable in the migration equation is estimated.
Column (5) reports the results when the sole indicator of somatic distance employed as
instrumental variable for bilateral trust is the one used by GSZ. The IV coefficient on StD
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trust is similar in magnitude to that in column (4), but it loses its significance. Column (6)
shows the results of estimating a reduced-form equation analogously to equation (2.3).
The results suggest that neither somatic distance nor religious similarity are partially
correlated with international migration in the reduced-form. This absence of a correlation
between the instrumental variables and the dependent variable, as well as the insignificant
coefficients found in columns (1)–(3), raise doubts about the hypothesis that StD trust
affects the decision of potential migrants to move abroad.
According to Table 2.7, the relationship between DtS trust and international migration
is similar to the one observed in Table 2.6 between StD trust and international migration.
In columns (1)–(3), the OLS estimates of the coefficient of DtS trust are positive but not
statistically significant. Instrumenting DtS trust with indicators of religious similarity
and somatic distance in column (4) yields significant results, here at the 10 percent level,
that are more than five times larger than their OLS counterparts. They suggest that an
increase of DtS trust of one standard deviation increases immigration flows on average
by 56 percent. However, according to column (5), when including religious similarity at
the second stage rather than using it as an instrument for DtS trust, the coefficient on
DtS trust becomes insignificant. Moreover, also similar to Table 2.6, column (6) in Table
Table 2.7 shows that the correlation between the instruments and international migration
is again insignificant when estimated in the reduced form.
(Lack of) Robustness
In view of these inconclusive results with respect to the relationship between bilateral
trust and international migration, I again exploit the fact that there is a large degree of
freedom in defining the concept of somatic distance and estimate regressions (2.10) and
(2.11) with the same covariates and the same sample again, changing only the somatic
distance indicator used as the instrument. The results of this analysis are reported in
Table 2.8 for the relationship between international migration and StD trust and in Table
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Table 2.7: Bilateral migration flows and DtS trust
OLS OLS OLS IV-SR IV-S RF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trust (DtS) 0.62 0.33 0.22 1.78* 1.53
(0.57) (0.60) (0.62) (0.99) (1.02)
Diff. in GDP p.c. (%) 1.64* 2.05** 1.97** 2.01** 2.05*** 2.10**
(0.84) (0.84) (0.82) (0.78) (0.76) (0.81)
Common language -0.15 -0.30 -0.22 -0.18 -0.19 -0.22
(0.35) (0.34) (0.34) (0.29) (0.29) (0.36)
Weighted distance (log) -0.73** -0.61** -0.58* -0.51* -0.52** -0.50
(0.31) (0.30) (0.29) (0.27) (0.26) (0.31)
Common border -0.04 0.23 0.19 0.15 0.14 0.22
(0.33) (0.39) (0.39) (0.28) (0.29) (0.37)
Same legal origin 0.57** 0.65*** 0.49* 0.51** 0.47** 0.51*
(0.25) (0.23) (0.27) (0.21) (0.22) (0.26)
Mig. Stock 1960 (log) 0.31* 0.28 0.18 0.20 0.30*
(0.17) (0.18) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17)
Religious similarity 0.46 0.25 0.36
(0.39) (0.33) (0.39)
Somatic distance (GSZ) -0.08
(0.06)
Relevance
K-P rk LM statistic 13.93 11.09
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00)
Weak identification
K-P rk Wald statistic 15.05 20.49
Over-identification
Hansen J-statistic 0.60
(p-value) (0.44)
Observations 463 463 463 463 463 463
R-squared 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.90
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the migration flows from country s to country
d (Ortega and Peri, 2009, 2011). Trust (DtS) measures the average trust that citizens in country d
grant citizens in country s (Eurobarometer surveys). Somatic distance is the measure used by GSZ
that sums the absolute value of the differences in hair colour, height and cephalic index. All equations
include country-year dummies. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, which are clustered
at the country pair. Coefficients are statistically different from zero at the ***1%, **5% and *10% level.
Columns (1)–(3) present OLS estimates; columns (4) and (5) present IV estimates with somatic distance
and religious similarity as instruments (IV-SR) and with somatic distance as the only instrument (IV-
S), respectively. RF (column (6)) refers to the reduced-form equation of the dependent variables (see
appendix).
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2.9 for its relationship with DtS trust.
Table 2.8: Migration: Instrumenting StD trust with various measures of somatic distance
Guiso et al. (2008a) Replication Pop. Density
HHC HH HHCS HHS HHC HH HHC HH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: First-stage regression
Dependent variable: source-to-destination trust
Somatic distance -0.04*** -0.06*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.03** -0.06*** -0.04*** -0.06***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Religious similarity 0.21*** 0.18*** 0.21*** 0.18*** 0.21*** 0.16** 0.20*** 0.17**
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Panel B: Reduced-form equation of international migration
Dependent variable: international immigration flows
Somatic distance -0.09 -0.09 0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.08 -0.07
(0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.09)
Religious similarity 0.43 0.41 0.58 0.60 0.58 0.53 0.42 0.44
(0.39) (0.40) (0.43) (0.45) (0.45) (0.46) (0.40) (0.41)
Panel C: Second-stage estimates using somatic distance and religious similarity as instruments
Dependent variable: international immigration flows
StD trust 2.22** 1.84** 0.95 0.83 1.27 1.25 2.00** 1.71*
(0.93) (0.80) (0.83) (0.79) (0.85) (0.81) (0.89) (0.82)
Relevance
K-P rk LM statistic 21.61 25.88 24.39 26.94 21.68 24.99 20.80 24.69
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Weak identification
K-P rk Wald statistic 14.41 16.10 18.64 19.19 12.54 17.59 14.74 17.68
Exogeneity
Hansen J-statistic 0.02 0.07 1.79 2.12 0.90 0.90 0.01 0.17
(p-value) (0.88) (0.80) (0.18) (0.15) (0.34) (0.34) (0.93) (0.68)
Panel D: Second-stage estimates using somatic distance as instrument
Dependent variable: International immigration flows
StD trust 2.40 1.60 -0.33 -0.47 -0.36 0.24 1.89 1.28
(1.51) (1.23) (1.30) (1.23) (1.79) (1.36) (1.50) (1.33)
Relevance
K-P rk LM statistic 13.99 22.52 20.47 23.71 8.23 17.72 17.50 19.50
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Weak identification
K-P rk Wald statistic 12.37 18.11 19.65 23.80 5.54 18.62 12.85 19.30
Observations 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450
Notes. This table presents the coefficients of estimating the first-stage regression (Panel A), the reduced-form equation of
the dependent variable (Panel B), the IV coefficients of estimating equation 2.10 when StD trust is instrumented with both
variables of cultural proximity of country pairs (Panel C) and the IV estimates when instrumenting StD trust only with a
measure of somatic distance (Panel D). In each column, alternative indicators of somatic distance are used as instruments
for bilateral trust. In columns (1) to (4), the employed indicators are the ones made available by GSZ, in columns (5) and
(6) the indicators are elaborated following the instructions given by Guiso et al. (2008a) and in columns (7) and (8) the
measures take the population density into account. The columns are labelled with the letters H, C and S: H stands for
height and hair, C for cephalic inde, and S for skin. The coefficients of the control variables (the same as in Table 2.6) are
not reported. Cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and the coefficients are statistically different from
zero at the ***1%, **5% and *10% level.
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In column (1) of Panels B, C and D of Table 2.8, the most important results of
Panel A in Table 2.6 are restated (columns (6), (4) and (5), respectively). Panel A of
Table 2.8 additionally reports the first-stage coefficients on somatic distance and religious
similarity when StD trust is regressed on all included and excluded exogenous variables.
As in the case where international trade flows are the dependent variable at the second
stage, various measures of somatic distance are equally significant at the first stage, and
the coefficients are similar across the different columns. However, none of these indicators
are correlated with international migration in the reduced-form equation (Panel B).
Panel C shows the second-stage results for the case where the eight measures of somatic
distance are used as instruments jointly with religious similarity. Whereas second-stage
estimates for the coefficients on StD trust are significant in columns (1), (2), (7) and (8),
they are insignificant in the other columns. Given the particularly questionable validity
of religious similarity as instrumental variable for bilateral trust, Panel D reports the
trust coefficients when instrumenting StD trust solely with the measures of somatic dis-
tance (again not excluding religious similarity in the second-stage estimates). Consistent
with the results found in Panel B, none of the estimations yield statistically significant
coefficients, and some even have a negative sign.
Regarding the effect of DtS trust on migration, Table 2.9 provides a sensitivity anal-
ysis of the results presented in Table 2.7. Column (1) of Panels B, C and D of Table 2.9
restate the most important results. According to Panel A of Table 2.9, all indicators of
somatic distance significantly affect DtS trust at the five percent level. However, again,
none of them are correlated with international migration in the reduced-form equation
(Panel B). Panel C reports the IV estimates when using somatic distance and religious
similarity as instruments for DtS trust. Analogously to the results found in Panel C of
Table 2.8, the statistical tests suggest that the instruments are relevant and exogenous.
Moreover, the coefficients on instrumented DtS trust are sometimes significant at the
second stage. However, according to Panel A, as repeatedly mentioned, the indicator of
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religious similarity is not significantly correlated with DtS trust and is thus a potentially
problematic instrument. Panel D of Table 2.9 shows the second-stage estimates when in-
strumenting DtS trust with the various measures of somatic distance as sole instruments.
Consistent with the reduced-form results in Panel B, the coefficients on instrumented DtS
trust are all statistically insignificant and, analogously to Panel D of Table 2.8, sometimes
even negative.
Discussion of Results
Overall, the results in Tables 2.6 to 2.9 suggest that neither StD nor DtS trust play a ro-
bust role in international migration flows. In particular, all measures of somatic distance
are irrelevant in the reduced-form estimates, and the instrumented trust measures are
insignificant if religious similarity is not excluded at the second stage. Thus, analogously
to international trade, there is no convincing evidence that bilateral trust and/or cul-
tural proximity as measured by religious similarity and somatic distance are important
determinants of international migration.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the causal impact of average bilateral trust across countries
on bilateral international trade and migration flows. First, the identification strategy
of GSZ was applied, that is, an indicator of religious similarity and a measure of so-
matic distance between country pairs were used as instrumental variables for bilateral
trust. Next, a sensitivity analysis was added when investigating the determinants of
international trade and, for the first time, the relationship between bilateral trust and
international migration. In contrast to GSZ, the specifications preferred in this chapter
included religious similarity as a covariate in the second stage of the 2SLS procedure and
instrumented bilateral trust only with an indicator of somatic distance. Seven different
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Table 2.9: Migration: Instrumenting DtS trust with various measures of somatic distance
Guiso et al. (2008a) Replication Pop. Density
HHC HH HHCS HHS HHC HH HHC HH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: First-stage regression
Dependent variable: destination-to-source trust
Somatic distance -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.05***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Religious similarity 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Panel B: reduced-form equation of international migration
Dependent variable: international immigration flows
Somatic distance -0.08 -0.08 0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.00 -0.08 -0.06
(0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.08)
Religious similarity 0.36 0.36 0.52 0.55 0.51 0.49 0.35 0.39
(0.39) (0.40) (0.42) (0.44) (0.45) (0.46) (0.39) (0.41)
Panel C: Second-stage estimates using somatic distance and religious similarity as instruments
Dependent variable: international immigration flows
DtS trust 1.78* 1.77* 0.29 0.39 0.77 1.13 1.64* 1.63
(0.99) (1.06) (0.89) (1.02) (0.98) (1.19) (1.00) (1.17)
Relevance
K-P rk LM statistic 13.93 15.21 13.88 14.52 13.15 11.70 15.97 13.97
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Weak identification
K-P rk Wald statistic 15.05 11.37 14.19 10.10 13.23 8.62 14.73 10.10
Exogeneity
Hansen J-statistic 0.60 0.65 2.50 2.48 1.88 1.59 0.74 0.88
(p-value) (0.44) (0.42) (0.11) (0.12) (0.17) (0.21) (0.39) (0.35)
Panel D: Second-stage estimates using somatic distance as instrument
Dependent variable: international immigration flows
DtS trust 1.53 1.39 -0.37 -0.65 -0.29 0.05 1.40 1.06
(1.02) (1.16) (1.03) (1.29) (1.29) (1.52) (1.05) (1.33)
Relevance
K-P rk LM statistic 11.09 13.19 11.82 13.10 7.83 8.44 12.79 10.71
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Weak identification
K-P rk Wald statistic 20.49 17.22 22.35 16.22 14.61 10.73 23.49 14.29
Observations 463 463 463 463 463 463 463 463
Notes. This table presents the coefficients of estimating the first-stage regression (Panel A), the reduced-form equation of
the dependent variable (Panel B), the IV coefficients of estimating equation 2.11 when DtS trust is instrumented with both
variables of cultural proximity of country pairs (Panel C), and the IV estimates when instrumenting DtS trust only with a
measure of somatic distance (Panel D). In each column, an alternative indicator of somatic distance is used as instrument
for bilateral trust. In columns (1) to (4), the indicators employed is the one made available by GSZ, in columns (5) and
(6) the indicators are elaborated following the instructions given by Guiso et al. (2008a) and in columns (7) and (8) the
measures take the population density into account. The columns are labelled with the letters H, C and S: H stands for
height and hair, C for cephalic index and S for skin. The coefficients of the control variables (the same as in Table 2.7)
are not reported. Cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and the coefficients are statistically different
from zero at the ***1%, **5% and *10% level.
indicators of somatic distance (based on different weighting of physical attributes) were
constructed and employed in addition to the one used by GSZ. These alternative somatic
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distance indicators appeared to be all equally valid and strong instruments. Neverthe-
less, in the context of international trade, the estimated coefficient on DtS trust was
only significantly different from zero when it was instrumented with the sole measure
of somatic distance employed by GSZ. In the migration regression, neither coefficients
of StD trust nor DtS trust are ever significant. Moreover, when estimating the reduced
equation—where trade and migration are regressed on the instruments in addition to
the explanatory variables—neither the coefficients on religious similarity nor the ones of
the various somatic distance indicators were statistically different from zero. The only
exception was found in the trade context when the somatic distance indicator by GSZ
was used. In summary, whereas GSZ concluded that their “results suggest that cultural
relationships affect trust and are an important omitted factor in international trade” (p.
1098), the sensitivity analysis performed in this chapter does not provide robust evidence
for the hypotheses that bilateral trust across countries and/or cultural proximity—apart
from language—affect international trade or migration patterns.
Of course, it is possible that the measure of average trust that citizens from one
country place in those from another country, as elicited from the employed Eurobarometer
surveys, is not an appropriate measure of bilateral trust in the context of trade and
migration. I therefore do not go as far as to challenge the view of Arrow (1972, p. 357),
who pointed out that “Virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element
of trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a period of time. It can be plausibly
argued that much of the economic backwardness in the world can be explained by the
lack of mutual confidence.” Moreover, the potential validity problems of the employed
instruments were not fully solved. Future research shall thus attempt to develop and
apply alternative identification strategies to those used by GSZ. A fruitful guidance is
the quasi-experimental approach in Egger and Lassmann (2013), who employ data about
the trade of different language regions in Switzerland with neighbouring countries to deal
better with within-country heterogeneity and to draw more convincing inferences about
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causal effects.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
HHCS HHC HHS HH HHC HH HHC HH
Somatic distance -0.00 -0.03*** -0.00 -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.04*** -0.02*** -0.05***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Common language 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Weighted distance (log) -0.23*** -0.20*** -0.23*** -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.17***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Religious similarity 0.16*** 0.11*** 0.16*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.12*** 0.15*** 0.12***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Same legal origin 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.09***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Common border -0.03 -0.04** -0.02 -0.03 -0.04** -0.03* -0.03* -0.03*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Transportation costs (log) 0.49*** 0.31* 0.51*** 0.37** 0.30 0.32* 0.37** 0.22
(0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Press coverage -0.17 -0.14 -0.19 -0.15 -0.16 -0.19 -0.15 -0.17
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12)
Observations 679 679 679 679 679 679 679 679
R-squared 0.55 0.57 0.55 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.56 0.58
Notes : The estimated standard errors reported in brackets are statistically different from zero at the ***1%,
**5%, and *10% level. 
Table A.2
 Regressing linguistic common roots on bilateral variables, varying the somatic distance indicator
Guiso et al. (2008a) Replication Pop. Density
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HHC HH HHCS HHS HHC HH HHC HH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DtS trust 0.86** 0.71* 0.44 0.28 0.10 0.53 0.54 0.71*
(0.35) (0.36) (0.32) (0.39) (0.39) (0.40) (0.37) (0.39)
Common language 0.25** 0.25** 0.25** 0.25** 0.25** 0.25** 0.25** 0.25**
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Weighted distance (log) -0.94*** -0.96*** -1.00*** -1.02*** -1.05*** -0.99*** -0.98*** -0.96***
(0.24) (0.23) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23)
Common border 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Press coverage -0.48 -0.60 -0.81 -0.94 -1.08 -0.74 -0.73 -0.59
(0.97) (0.95) (0.89) (0.90) (0.88) (0.91) (0.94) (0.95)
Transportation costs (log) 2.45 2.42 2.37 2.34 2.31 2.39 2.39 2.42
(1.57) (1.55) (1.50) (1.49) (1.46) (1.52) (1.50) (1.54)
Same legal origin 0.42*** 0.43*** 0.45*** 0.46*** 0.47*** 0.44*** 0.44*** 0.43***
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
Linguistic common roots -0.13 -0.12 -0.10 -0.08 -0.07 -0.10 -0.10 -0.12
(0.28) (0.28) (0.27) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28)
Relevance
K-P rk  LM Statistic 16.95 23.58 19.89 23.33 18.46 20.40 15.27 20.43
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Weak Identification
K-P rk  Wald Statistic 16.93 21.27 19.95 21.30 13.48 21.58 15.74 20.80
Exogeneity
Hansen J -Stat 0.13 0.02 0.06 0.21 0.58 0.01 0.01 0.02
(p-value) (0.72) (0.90) (0.80) (0.65) (0.45) (0.91) (0.91) (0.90)
Observations 679 679 679 679 679 679 679 679
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
DtS trust 0.96** 0.73 0.38 0.18 -0.14 0.50 0.51 0.74
(0.47) (0.46) (0.45) (0.51) (0.55) (0.52) (0.50) (0.53)
Common language 0.25** 0.25** 0.25** 0.25** 0.25** 0.25** 0.25** 0.25**
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Weighted distance (log) -0.93*** -0.96*** -1.01*** -1.03*** -1.08*** -0.99*** -0.99*** -0.96***
(0.24) (0.23) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.23) (0.24) (0.24)
Common border 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.23** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25***
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Press coverage -0.40 -0.58 -0.86 -1.02 -1.27 -0.76 -0.76 -0.57
(0.92) (0.93) (0.85) (0.89) (0.89) (0.90) (0.91) (0.92)
Transportation costs (log) 2.47 2.43 2.36 2.32 2.26 2.38 2.38 2.43
(1.60) (1.55) (1.49) (1.48) (1.46) (1.51) (1.49) (1.55)
Same legal origin 0.41*** 0.43*** 0.45*** 0.46*** 0.48*** 0.44*** 0.44*** 0.43***
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13)
Linguistic common roots -0.14 -0.12 -0.09 -0.08 -0.05 -0.10 -0.10 -0.12
(0.29) (0.29) (0.28) (0.28) (0.29) (0.29) (0.28) (0.29)
Relevance
K-P rk  LM Statistic 13.97 22.09 16.56 20.81 13.27 18.66 14.32 19.30
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Weak Identification
K-P rk  Wald Statistic 21.35 30.98 25.37 31.70 16.95 31.27 17.11 25.73
Observations 679 679 679 679 679 679 679 679
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table A.3
Dependent variable: aggregated export flows
Panel B: Second-Stage estimates using somatic distance as instrument
Dependent variable: aggregated export flows
Notes . This table presents the IV/LIML coefficients of estimating equation (1) when DtS trust is instrumented with both variables of cultural proximity of country-
pairs (Panel A), and the IV/LIML estimates when instrumenting DtS trust only with a measure of somatic distance (Panel B). In each column, we use an alternative
indicator of somatic distance as instrument for bilateral trust. In columns (1) to (4) we use the indicators made available by Guiso et al. (2008a), in columns (5) and
(6) the indicators elaborated following the instructions given by them, and in columns (7) and (8) the measures that take the population density into account. The
columns are labeled with the letters H , C , and S : H stands for height and hair, C for cephalic index, and S for skin. Cluster-robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses and the coefficients are statistically different from zero at the ***1%, **5%, and *10% level.
 DtS trust and international trade: LIML
Guiso et al. (2008a) Replication Pop. Density
Panel A: Second-stage estimates using somatic distance and religious similarity as instruments
2.5. CONCLUSION 51
HHC HH HHCS HHS HHC HH HHC HH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Somatic distance -0.06*** -0.09*** -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.05*** -0.09*** -0.05*** -0.08***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Religious similarity 0.18*** 0.15** 0.20*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.14** 0.15** 0.15**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Common language 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.13* 0.10* 0.11
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Weighted distance (log) -0.08 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.12 -0.09 -0.06 -0.06
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Common border -0.05 0.00 -0.03 0.03 -0.09 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Press coverage -0.39 -0.30 -0.30 -0.24 -0.49 -0.50 -0.39 -0.29
(0.43) (0.45) (0.42) (0.45) (0.43) (0.46) (0.43) (0.45)
Transportation costs (log) 0.23 -0.05 0.37 0.17 0.40 0.36 -0.00 -0.10
(0.75) (0.76) (0.73) (0.74) (0.72) (0.74) (0.77) (0.77)
Same legal origin 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Linguistic common roots -0.04 -0.26** -0.07 -0.26** -0.10 -0.25** -0.14 -0.30**
(0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Observations 679 679 679 679 679 679 679 679
R-squared 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.81 0.80 0.81
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Somatic distance -0.06* -0.06 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.06
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
Religious similarity 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.09
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14)
Common language 0.30** 0.32** 0.29** 0.28** 0.26** 0.32** 0.30** 0.33**
(0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13)
Weighted distance (log) -0.99*** -0.99*** -1.03*** -1.05*** -1.09*** -1.04*** -1.03*** -0.99***
(0.23) (0.23) (0.24) (0.25) (0.24) (0.23) (0.25) (0.24)
Common border 0.21** 0.25** 0.23** 0.24** 0.24** 0.23** 0.23** 0.25**
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Press coverage -0.80 -0.80 -0.95 -1.03 -1.14 -1.00 -0.95 -0.79
(0.98) (1.01) (0.97) (0.99) (0.95) (0.97) (0.98) (1.01)
Transportation costs (log) 2.49 2.32 2.63 2.60 2.64 2.63 2.45 2.28
(1.66) (1.68) (1.68) (1.72) (1.74) (1.67) (1.81) (1.71)
Same legal origin 0.42*** 0.43*** 0.45*** 0.46*** 0.47*** 0.45*** 0.45*** 0.42***
(0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14)
Linguistic common roots -0.15 -0.30 -0.13 -0.15 -0.08 -0.23 -0.17 -0.33
(0.31) (0.34) (0.31) (0.34) (0.34) (0.36) (0.33) (0.36)
Observations 679 679 679 679 679 679 679 679
R-squared 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes . This table presents the coefficients of estimating the first-stage regression (Panel A), the reduced form equation of the dependent
variable (Panel B), the IV coefficients of estimating equation (1) when DtS trust is instrumented with both variables of cultural proximity of
country-pairs (Panel C), and the IV estimates when instrumenting DtS trust only with a measure of somatic distance (Panel D). In each
column, we use an alternative indicator of somatic distance as instrument for bilateral trust. In columns (1) to (4) we use the indicators
made available by Guiso et al. (2008a), in columns (5) and (6) the indicators elaborated following the instructions given by them, and in
columns (7) and (8) the measures that take the population density into account. The columns are labeled with the letters H , C , and S : H 
stands for height and hair, C for cephalic index, and S for skin. Cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and the
coefficients are statistically different from zero at the ***1%, **5%, and *10% level.
Guiso et al. (2008a) Replication Pop. Density
Table A.4
Trade regression: Instrumenting DtS trust with alternative measures of somatic distance (full results; see Table 3)
Panel A: First-stage regression
Panel B: Reduced form equation of international trade
Dependent variable: Destination-to-Source trust
Dependent variable: aggregated export flows
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HHC HH HHCS HHS HHC HH HHC HH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DtS trust 0.85** 0.69** 0.46 0.35 0.20 0.55 0.55 0.69*
(0.35) (0.34) (0.31) (0.35) (0.36) (0.36) (0.37) (0.36)
Common language 0.25** 0.25** 0.25** 0.25** 0.26** 0.25** 0.25** 0.25**
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Weighted distance (log) -0.94*** -0.96*** -1.00*** -1.02*** -1.03*** -0.98*** -0.98*** -0.96***
(0.24) (0.23) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23)
Common border 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Press coverage -0.34 -0.57 -0.87 -0.99 -1.18 -0.76 -0.76 -0.57
(0.89) (0.92) (0.85) (0.89) (0.87) (0.90) (0.91) (0.92)
Transportation costs (log) 2.48 2.42 2.37 2.37 2.26 2.39 2.37 2.43
(1.57) (1.55) (1.50) (1.49) (1.46) (1.52) (1.49) (1.54)
Same legal origin 0.41*** 0.43*** 0.45*** 0.47*** 0.49*** 0.45*** 0.44*** 0.43***
(0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12)
Linguistic common roots -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.10 -0.13 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11
(0.28) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27)
Relevance
K-P rk  LM Statistic 16.95 23.58 19.89 23.33 18.46 20.40 15.27 20.43
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Weak Identification
K-P rk  Wald Statistic 16.93 21.27 19.95 21.30 13.48 21.58 15.74 20.80
Exogeneity
Hansen J -Stat 0.13 0.02 0.06 0.21 0.58 0.01 0.01 0.02
(p-value) (0.72) (0.90) (0.80) (0.65) (0.45) (0.91) (0.91) (0.90)
Observations 679 679 679 679 679 679 679 679
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
DtS trust 0.96** 0.74 0.39 0.17 -0.17 0.49 0.50 0.75
(0.47) (0.51) (0.44) (0.52) (0.57) (0.59) (0.58) (0.58)
Common language 0.24** 0.25** 0.26** 0.27** 0.28** 0.26** 0.26** 0.25**
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11)
Weighted distance (log) -0.91*** -0.95*** -1.01*** -1.05*** -1.11*** -0.99*** -0.99*** -0.95***
(0.25) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.25)
Common border 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.23** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25***
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Press coverage -0.42 -0.58 -0.83 -0.98 -1.23 -0.76 -0.76 -0.58
(0.93) (0.93) (0.86) (0.90) (0.89) (0.90) (0.91) (0.92)
Transportation costs (log) 2.27 2.35 2.49 2.57* 2.71* 2.45 2.45 2.35
(1.68) (1.63) (1.58) (1.56) (1.61) (1.60) (1.65) (1.65)
Same legal origin 0.42*** 0.43*** 0.45*** 0.46*** 0.48*** 0.44*** 0.44*** 0.43***
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
Linguistic common roots -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.10 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11
(0.28) (0.27) (0.27) (0.28) (0.29) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27)
Religious similarity -0.06 -0.02 0.04 0.08 0.15 0.02 0.02 -0.02
(0.19) (0.19) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20)
Relevance
K-P rk  LM Statistic 14.65 20.97 17.65 19.93 11.88 16.72 14.74 18.43
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Weak Identification
K-P rk  Wald Statistic 22.99 28.22 27.99 30.45 15.20 27.60 16.50 24.89
Observations 679 679 679 679 679 679 679 679
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesYes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent variable: aggregated export flows
Dependent variable: aggregated export flows
Panel D: Second-stage estimates using somatic distance as instrument
Panel C: Second-stage estimates using somatic distance and religious similarity as instruments
Table A.4 continued
Guiso et al. (2008a) Replication Pop. Density
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HHC HH HHCS HHS HHC HH HHC HH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DtS trust -0.05*** -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.05*** -0.08*** -0.04*** -0.06***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Religious similarity 0.15** 0.14** 0.17** 0.17*** 0.15** 0.13* 0.14* 0.14**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Common official language -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.07 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.03
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Common spoken language 0.48*** 0.38*** 0.49*** 0.40*** 0.46*** 0.40*** 0.42*** 0.36**
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Common native language 0.05 0.14 0.00 0.08 -0.02 -0.07 0.10 0.07
(0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.18) (0.19) (0.17) (0.17)
Linguistic proximity (ASPJ) -0.00 -0.04 -0.03 -0.07** -0.03 -0.07* -0.01 -0.05
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Weighted distance (log) -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.09 -0.09 -0.03 -0.04
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Common border -0.08 -0.04 -0.06 -0.01 -0.11* -0.07 -0.07 -0.04
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Press coverage -0.33 -0.44 -0.30 -0.41 -0.47 -0.55 -0.45 -0.43
(0.38) (0.42) (0.37) (0.40) (0.41) (0.44) (0.41) (0.41)
Transportation costs (log) 0.07 -0.31 0.26 -0.06 0.31 0.28 -0.14 -0.25
(0.73) (0.74) (0.71) (0.72) (0.71) (0.72) (0.75) (0.75)
Same legal origin -0.05 -0.09* -0.05 -0.08* -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.08*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Observations 679 679 679 679 679 679 679 679
R-squared 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
DtS trust -0.06* -0.09 -0.03 -0.04 0.01 -0.07 -0.03 -0.08
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05)
Religious similarity 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.14
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14)
Common official language 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.01
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Common spoken language 0.71** 0.59* 0.75** 0.71* 0.79** 0.65* 0.68* 0.54
(0.36) (0.35) (0.36) (0.37) (0.37) (0.35) (0.36) (0.35)
Common native language 0.30 0.40 0.29 0.33 0.35 0.20 0.34 0.31
(0.48) (0.49) (0.48) (0.49) (0.50) (0.48) (0.49) (0.47)
Linguistic proximity (ASPJ) -0.13 -0.17* -0.14 -0.16* -0.11 -0.19* -0.14 -0.19**
(0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
Weighted distance (log) -1.00*** -0.97*** -1.03*** -1.02*** -1.08*** -1.06*** -1.02*** -0.99***
(0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.26) (0.25) (0.28) (0.25)
Common border 0.16 0.21** 0.18* 0.20* 0.19 0.17 0.18* 0.21**
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
Press coverage -1.50 -1.59 -1.62 -1.68 -1.81* -1.73* -1.66 -1.54
(1.01) (0.99) (1.02) (1.02) (1.04) (1.00) (1.01) (1.00)
Transportation costs (log) 2.18 1.72 2.33 2.18 2.28 2.38 2.05 1.72
(1.88) (1.94) (1.88) (1.92) (1.93) (1.85) (2.07) (1.95)
Same legal origin 0.32** 0.27* 0.34*** 0.33** 0.36*** 0.34*** 0.33*** 0.27*
(0.13) (0.14) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.14)
Observations 679 679 679 679 679 679 679 679
R-squared 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Reduced form equation of international trade
Dependent variable: aggregated export flows
Notes . This table presents the coefficients of estimating the first-stage regression (Panel A), the reduced form equation of the dependent
variable (Panel B), the IV coefficients of estimating equation (1) when DtS trust is instrumented with both variables of cultural proximity of
country-pairs (Panel C), and the IV estimates when instrumenting DtS trust only with a measure of somatic distance (Panel D). In each
column, we use an alternative indicator of somatic distance as instrument for bilateral trust. In columns (1) to (4) we use the indicators made
available by Guiso et al. (2008a), in columns (5) and (6) the indicators elaborated following the instructions given by them, and in columns
(7) and (8) the measures that take the population density into account. The columns are labeled with the letters H , C , and S : H stands for
height and hair, C for cephalic index, and S for skin. The indicators measuring linguistic similarity of country-pairs come from Melitz and
Toubal (2014). Cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and the coefficients are statistically different from zero at the
***1%, **5%, and *10% level.
Table A.5
Panel A: First-stage regression
Dependent variable: Destination-to-Source trust
 Trade: controling for linguistic similarity of country-pairs as in Melitz and Toubal (2014)
Guiso et al. (2008a) Replication Pop. Density
54 CHAPTER 2. TRUST, TRADE AND MIGRATION
HHC HH HHCS HHS HHC HH HHC HH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DtS trust 1.02** 1.11** 0.64* 0.65* 0.31 0.93* 0.86* 1.19**
(0.45) (0.47) (0.34) (0.37) (0.44) (0.50) (0.52) (0.51)
Common official language 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11)
Common spoken language 0.22 0.17 0.46 0.45 0.67* 0.28 0.32 0.12
(0.44) (0.45) (0.40) (0.41) (0.40) (0.45) (0.46) (0.47)
Common native language 0.25 0.24 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.24
(0.48) (0.49) (0.45) (0.45) (0.43) (0.48) (0.47) (0.50)
Linguistic proximity (ASPJ) -0.13* -0.13* -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.13 -0.12 -0.13*
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Weighted distance (log) -0.97*** -0.97*** -0.99*** -0.99*** -1.00*** -0.97*** -0.98*** -0.96***
(0.26) (0.26) (0.24) (0.24) (0.23) (0.25) (0.25) (0.27)
Common border 0.24** 0.25** 0.22** 0.22** 0.20** 0.24** 0.23** 0.25**
(0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11)
Press coverage -1.15 -1.08 -1.45 -1.43 -1.69* -1.22 -1.29 -1.01
(1.03) (1.06) (0.97) (0.98) (0.94) (1.04) (0.99) (1.08)
Transportation costs (log) 2.12 2.15 2.01 2.04 1.82 2.09 2.03 2.19
(1.82) (1.85) (1.73) (1.73) (1.65) (1.80) (1.73) (1.87)
Same legal origin 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.39*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.36***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11)
Relevance
K-P rk  LM Statistic 13.23 18.09 15.34 19.76 14.32 15.45 10.54 14.25
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Weak Identification
K-P rk  Wald Statistic 11.88 14.32 15.15 16.52 8.39 13.01 7.86 11.60
Exogeneity
Hansen J -Stat 0.00 0.02 0.17 0.16 0.85 0.00 0.02 0.04
(p-value) (0.97) (0.90) (0.68) (0.69) (0.36) (0.95) (0.88) (0.84)
Observations 679 679 679 679 679 679 679 679
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
DtS trust 1.03* 1.16* 0.51 0.49 -0.25 0.89 0.77 1.32
(0.56) (0.64) (0.46) (0.54) (0.70) (0.79) (0.81) (0.82)
Common official language 0.02 0.02 -0.00 -0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03
(0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11)
Common spoken language 0.22 0.15 0.50 0.51 0.90** 0.30 0.36 0.07
(0.45) (0.48) (0.41) (0.44) (0.45) (0.51) (0.53) (0.54)
Common native language 0.25 0.23 0.29 0.29 0.35 0.26 0.27 0.22
(0.49) (0.50) (0.45) (0.45) (0.43) (0.49) (0.47) (0.52)
Linguistic proximity (ASPJ) -0.13 -0.13* -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13*
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Weighted distance (log) -0.97*** -0.95*** -1.02*** -1.03*** -1.11*** -0.98*** -1.00*** -0.94***
(0.27) (0.28) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.28) (0.28) (0.30)
Common border 0.24** 0.25** 0.21** 0.21** 0.16 0.23** 0.23** 0.26**
(0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
Press coverage -1.15 -1.07 -1.47 -1.48 -1.92** -1.24 -1.31 -0.98
(1.03) (1.07) (0.96) (0.98) (0.95) (1.06) (1.00) (1.11)
Transportation costs (log) 2.10 2.08 2.20 2.21 2.35 2.13 2.15 2.05
(1.92) (1.96) (1.80) (1.79) (1.76) (1.89) (1.90) (2.02)
Same legal origin 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.37***
(0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
Religious similarity -0.01 -0.03 0.07 0.08 0.18 0.01 0.03 -0.05
(0.19) (0.21) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.22) (0.22) (0.24)
Relevance
K-P rk  LM Statistic 11.27 15.96 12.58 15.51 7.78 11.18 8.12 11.22
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Weak Identification
K-P rk  Wald Statistic 17.77 20.45 23.54 25.87 8.63 16.07 8.59 14.20
Observations 679 679 679 679 679 679 679 679
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesYes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: Second-stage estimates using somatic distance and religious similarity as instruments
Dependent variable: aggregated export flows
Panel D: Second-stage estimates using somatic distance as enstrument
Dependent variable: aggregated export flows
Table A.5 continued
Guiso et al. (2008a) Replication Pop. Density
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HHC HH HHCS HHS HHC HH HHC HH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
StD Trust 2.20** 1.83** 0.92 0.56 1.34 1.12 2.00** 1.65*
(0.94) (0.80) (0.87) (0.85) (0.89) (0.84) (0.89) (0.84)
Diff. in GDP p.c. (%) 2.49** 2.40*** 2.19*** 2.10*** 2.28*** 2.23*** 2.44*** 2.36***
(0.97) (0.88) (0.83) (0.78) (0.84) (0.82) (0.91) (0.86)
Common language -0.40 -0.39 -0.37 -0.36 -0.38 -0.38 -0.39 -0.39
(0.29) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28)
Weighted distance (log) -0.42 -0.45* -0.53** -0.56** -0.49* -0.51* -0.44 -0.47*
(0.28) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.28) (0.28) (0.27) (0.27)
Common border 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.28
(0.31) (0.31) (0.32) (0.32) (0.31) (0.32) (0.31) (0.31)
Same legal origin 0.54*** 0.57*** 0.65*** 0.68*** 0.61*** 0.63*** 0.56*** 0.59***
(0.20) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19)
Mig. stock 1960 (log) 0.23 0.25* 0.30** 0.32** 0.28* 0.29** 0.24 0.26*
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15)
Relevance
K-P rk  LM Statistic 21.61 25.88 24.39 26.94 21.68 24.99 20.80 24.69
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Weak Identification
K-P rk  Wald Statistic 14.41 16.10 18.64 19.19 12.54 17.59 14.74 17.68
Exogeneity
Hansen J -Stat 0.02 0.07 1.79 2.12 0.90 0.90 0.01 0.17
(p-value) (0.88) (0.80) (0.18) (0.15) (0.34) (0.34) (0.93) (0.68)
Observations 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
StD Trust 2.40 1.60 -0.33 -0.47 -0.36 0.24 1.89 1.28
(1.51) (1.23) (1.30) (1.23) (1.79) (1.36) (1.50) (1.33)
Diff. in GDP p.c. (%) 2.55** 2.32*** 1.77** 1.73** 1.76** 1.93** 2.40*** 2.23***
(1.02) (0.86) (0.78) (0.74) (0.77) (0.78) (0.89) (0.83)
Common language -0.42 -0.36 -0.23 -0.22 -0.23 -0.27 -0.38 -0.34
(0.29) (0.27) (0.29) (0.29) (0.30) (0.29) (0.29) (0.28)
Weighted distance (log) -0.41 -0.46* -0.59** -0.60** -0.59** -0.55** -0.44* -0.48*
(0.28) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.29) (0.28) (0.27) (0.27)
Common border 0.30 0.26 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.27 0.25
(0.29) (0.30) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.33) (0.29) (0.31)
Same legal origin 0.56** 0.54** 0.51** 0.50** 0.50** 0.52** 0.55** 0.54**
(0.22) (0.22) (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.24) (0.22) (0.23)
Mig. stock 1960 (log) 0.23 0.25 0.33** 0.33** 0.33** 0.30** 0.24 0.27*
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.17) (0.16)
Religious similarity -0.08 0.13 0.65 0.69 0.66 0.50 0.05 0.22
(0.56) (0.51) (0.52) (0.51) (0.67) (0.54) (0.57) (0.54)
Relevance
K-P rk  LM Statistic 13.99 22.52 20.47 23.71 8.23 17.72 17.50 19.50
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Weak Identification
K-P rk  Wald Statistic 12.37 18.11 19.65 23.80 5.54 18.62 12.85 19.30
Observations 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Second-stage estimates using somatic distance as instrument
Dependent variable: international immigration flows
Notes . This table presents the coefficients of estimating the IV/LIML coefficients of estimating equation (3) when StD trust is
instrumented with both variables of cultural proximity of country-pairs (Panel A), and the IV estimates when instrumenting StD trust only
with a measure of somatic distance (Panel B). In each column, we use an alternative indicator of somatic distance as instrument for
bilateral trust. In columns (1) to (4) we use the indicators made available by GSZ, in columns (5) and (6) the indicators elaborated
following the instructions given by Guiso et al. (2008a), and in columns (7) and (8) the measures that take the population density into
account. The columns are labeled with the letters H , C , and S : H stands for height and hair, C for cephalic index, and S for skin. Cluster-
robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and the coefficients are statistically different from zero at the ***1%, **5%, and *10%
level.
Table A.6
Guiso et al. (2008a) Replication Pop. Density
Panel A: Second-stage estimates using somatic distance and religious similarity as instruments
StD trust and international migration: LIML
Dependent variable: international immigration flows
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HHC HH HHCS HHS HHC HH HHC HH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DtS Trust 1.88* 1.78* 0.27 0.09 0.66 0.93 1.76* 1.56
(1.01) (1.08) (0.94) (1.11) (1.06) (1.28) (1.02) (1.20)
Diff. in GDP p.c. (%) 2.10*** 2.10*** 2.05*** 2.04*** 2.06*** 2.07*** 2.10*** 2.09***
(0.79) (0.79) (0.71) (0.70) (0.72) (0.74) (0.78) (0.77)
Common language -0.22 -0.22 -0.30 -0.31 -0.28 -0.26 -0.22 -0.23
(0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30)
Weighted distance (log) -0.51* -0.52* -0.61** -0.62** -0.59** -0.57** -0.52** -0.53**
(0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.28) (0.26) (0.27)
Common border 0.15 0.15 0.23 0.24 0.21 0.19 0.15 0.16
(0.28) (0.29) (0.33) (0.33) (0.31) (0.30) (0.29) (0.29)
Same legal origin 0.54** 0.55*** 0.65*** 0.67*** 0.63*** 0.61*** 0.55*** 0.56***
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.20)
Mig. stock 1960 (log) 0.19 0.20 0.31* 0.33* 0.28* 0.26 0.20 0.21
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16)
Relevance
K-P rk  LM Statistic 13.93 15.21 13.88 14.52 13.15 11.70 15.97 13.97
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Weak Identification
K-P rk  Wald Statistic 15.05 11.37 14.19 10.10 13.23 8.62 14.73 10.10
Exogeneity
Hansen J -Stat 0.60 0.65 2.50 2.48 1.88 1.59 0.74 0.88
(p-value) (0.44) (0.42) (0.11) (0.12) (0.17) (0.21) (0.39) (0.35)
Observations 463 463 463 463 463 463 463 463
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
DtS Trust 1.53 1.39 -0.37 -0.65 -0.29 0.05 1.40 1.06
(1.02) (1.16) (1.03) (1.29) (1.29) (1.52) (1.05) (1.33)
Diff. in GDP p.c. (%) 2.05*** 2.04*** 1.94*** 1.93*** 1.95*** 1.96*** 2.04*** 2.02***
(0.76) (0.75) (0.67) (0.65) (0.66) (0.68) (0.75) (0.73)
Common language -0.19 -0.20 -0.24 -0.25 -0.24 -0.23 -0.20 -0.20
(0.29) (0.29) (0.30) (0.31) (0.30) (0.30) (0.29) (0.29)
Weighted distance (log) -0.52** -0.52** -0.61** -0.62** -0.61** -0.59** -0.52** -0.54**
(0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.26) (0.26)
Common border 0.14 0.14 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.14 0.16
(0.29) (0.29) (0.34) (0.36) (0.34) (0.32) (0.30) (0.30)
Same legal origin 0.47** 0.47** 0.49** 0.50** 0.49** 0.49** 0.47** 0.48**
(0.22) (0.22) (0.24) (0.25) (0.24) (0.23) (0.22) (0.22)
Mig. stock 1960 (log) 0.20 0.20 0.32* 0.34* 0.31* 0.29* 0.20 0.23
(0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17)
Religious similarity 0.25 0.27 0.55 0.59 0.54 0.48 0.27 0.33
(0.33) (0.35) (0.40) (0.44) (0.45) (0.44) (0.33) (0.37)
Relevance
K-P rk  LM Statistic 11.09 13.19 11.82 13.10 7.83 8.44 12.79 10.71
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Weak Identification
K-P rk  Wald Statistic 20.49 17.22 22.35 16.22 14.61 10.73 23.49 14.29
Observations 463 463 463 463 463 463 463 463
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent variable: international immigration flows
Panel B: Second-stage estimates using somatic distance as Instrument
Dependent variable: international immigration flows
Notes . This table presents the coefficients of estimating the IV/LIML coefficients of estimating equation (4) when DtS trust is
instrumented with both variables of cultural proximity of country-pairs (Panel A), and the IV estimates when instrumenting DtS trust
only with a measure of somatic distance (Panel B). In each column, we use an alternative indicator of somatic distance as instrument
for bilateral trust. In columns (1) to (4) we use the indicators made available by Guiso et al. (2008a), in columns (5) and (6) the
indicators elaborated following the instructions given by them, and in columns (7) and (8) the measures that take the population density
into account. The columns are labeled with the letters H , C , and S : H stands for height and hair, C for cephalic index, and S for skin.
Cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and the coefficients are statistically different from zero at the ***1%, **5%,
and *10% level.
Table A.7
DtS trust and international migration: LIML
Guiso et al. (2008a) Replication Pop. Density
Panel A: Second-stage estimates using somatic distance and religious similarity as instruments
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HHC HH HHCS HHS HHC HH HHC HH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Somatic distance -0.04*** -0.06*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.03** -0.06*** -0.04*** -0.06***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Religious similarity 0.21*** 0.18*** 0.21*** 0.18*** 0.21*** 0.16** 0.20*** 0.17**
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Diff. in GDP p.c. (%) -0.22 -0.24* -0.18 -0.20* -0.21* -0.22* -0.24* -0.24**
(0.14) (0.12) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.14) (0.12)
Common language 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.10** 0.13*** 0.09* 0.09*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Weighted distance (log) -0.03 -0.00 0.01 0.03 -0.04 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Common border -0.03 -0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.07 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Same legal origin -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Mig. stock 1960 (log) 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04* 0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450
R-squared 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.89
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Somatic distance -0.09 -0.09 0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.08 -0.07
(0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.09)
Religious similarity 0.43 0.41 0.58 0.60 0.58 0.53 0.42 0.44
(0.39) (0.40) (0.43) (0.45) (0.45) (0.46) (0.40) (0.41)
Diff. in GDP p.c. (%) 2.01** 1.93** 1.83** 1.82** 1.83** 1.88** 1.94** 1.91**
(0.84) (0.84) (0.84) (0.82) (0.80) (0.83) (0.83) (0.84)
Common language -0.25 -0.26 -0.26 -0.26 -0.27 -0.24 -0.21 -0.23
(0.35) (0.35) (0.34) (0.33) (0.35) (0.36) (0.35) (0.35)
Weighted distance (log) -0.47 -0.47 -0.60* -0.62* -0.58* -0.55* -0.46 -0.49
(0.30) (0.31) (0.32) (0.33) (0.31) (0.33) (0.30) (0.32)
Common border 0.23 0.26 0.19 0.17 0.21 0.20 0.23 0.23
(0.37) (0.37) (0.39) (0.40) (0.39) (0.38) (0.36) (0.38)
Same legal origin 0.53** 0.51* 0.51* 0.52* 0.51* 0.51* 0.52** 0.49*
(0.26) (0.26) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.26) (0.26)
Mig. stock 1960 (log) 0.32* 0.31* 0.31* 0.32* 0.31* 0.31* 0.32* 0.31*
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17)
Observations 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450
R-squared 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table A.8
Migration: Instrumenting StD trust with alternative measures of somatic distance (full results; see Table 6)
Guiso et al. (2008a) Replication Pop. Density
Panel A: First-stage regression
Dependent variable: Source-to-Destination trust
Panel B: Reduced form equation of international migration
Dependent variable: international immigration flows
Notes . This table presents the coefficients of estimating the first-stage regression (Panel A), the reduced form equation of the
dependent variable (Panel B), the IV coefficients of estimating equation (3) when StD trust is instrumented with both variables of
cultural proximity of country-pairs (Panel C), and the IV estimates when instrumenting StD trust only with a measure of somatic
distance (Panel D). In each column, we use an alternative indicator of somatic distance as instrument for bilateral trust. In columns (1)
to (4) we use the indicators made available by GSZ, in columns (5) and (6) the indicators elaborated following the instructions given
by Guiso et al. (2008a), and in columns (7) and (8) the measures that take the population density into account. The columns are
labeled with the letters H , C , and S : H  stands for height and hair, C  for cephalic index, and S  for skin. Cluster-robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses and the coefficients are statistically different from zero at the ***1%, **5%, and *10% level.
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HHC HH HHCS HHS HHC HH HHC HH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
StD trust 2.22** 1.84** 0.95 0.83 1.27 1.25 2.00** 1.71*
(0.93) (0.80) (0.83) (0.79) (0.85) (0.81) (0.89) (0.82)
Diff. in GDP p.c. (%) 2.50*** 2.35*** 2.11** 2.01*** 2.05** 2.12*** 2.42*** 2.29***
(0.96) (0.87) (0.83) (0.77) (0.80) (0.81) (0.88) (0.84)
Common language -0.41 -0.37 -0.30 -0.29 -0.31 -0.34 -0.39 -0.36
(0.28) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.28) (0.27)
Weighted distance (log) -0.41 -0.46* -0.57** -0.57** -0.50* -0.51* -0.44* -0.47*
(0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.28) (0.28) (0.27) (0.27)
Common border 0.30 0.26 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.25 0.27 0.25
(0.30) (0.30) (0.32) (0.32) (0.31) (0.32) (0.29) (0.30)
Same legal origin 0.54*** 0.57*** 0.63*** 0.65*** 0.62*** 0.62*** 0.56*** 0.58***
(0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Mig. stock 1960 (log) 0.24 0.24* 0.26* 0.27* 0.25* 0.26* 0.24 0.24*
(0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14)
Relevance
K-P rk  LM Statistic 21.61 25.88 24.39 26.94 21.68 24.99 20.80 24.69
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Weak Identification
K-P rk  Wald Statistic 14.41 16.10 18.64 19.19 12.54 17.59 14.74 17.68
Exogeneity
Hansen J -Stat 0.02 0.07 1.79 2.12 0.90 0.90 0.01 0.17
(p-value) (0.88) (0.80) (0.18) (0.15) (0.34) (0.34) (0.93) (0.68)
Observations 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
StD trust 2.40 1.60 -0.33 -0.47 -0.36 0.24 1.89 1.28
(1.51) (1.23) (1.30) (1.23) (1.79) (1.36) (1.50) (1.33)
Diff. in GDP p.c. (%) 2.55** 2.32*** 1.77** 1.73** 1.76** 1.93** 2.40*** 2.23***
(1.02) (0.86) (0.78) (0.74) (0.77) (0.78) (0.89) (0.83)
Common language -0.42 -0.36 -0.23 -0.22 -0.23 -0.27 -0.38 -0.34
(0.29) (0.27) (0.29) (0.29) (0.30) (0.29) (0.29) (0.28)
Weighted distance (log) -0.41 -0.46* -0.59** -0.60** -0.59** -0.55** -0.44* -0.48*
(0.28) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.29) (0.28) (0.27) (0.27)
Common border 0.30 0.26 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.27 0.25
(0.29) (0.30) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.33) (0.29) (0.31)
Same legal origin 0.56** 0.54** 0.51** 0.50** 0.50** 0.52** 0.55** 0.54**
(0.22) (0.22) (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.24) (0.22) (0.23)
Mig. stock 1960 (log) 0.23 0.25 0.33** 0.33** 0.33** 0.30** 0.24 0.27*
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.17) (0.16)
Religious similarity -0.08 0.13 0.65 0.69 0.66 0.50 0.05 0.22
(0.56) (0.51) (0.52) (0.51) (0.67) (0.54) (0.57) (0.54)
Relevance
K-P rk  LM Statistic 13.99 22.52 20.47 23.71 8.23 17.72 17.50 19.50
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Weak Identification
K-P rk  Wald Statistic 12.37 18.11 19.65 23.80 5.54 18.62 12.85 19.30
Observations 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: Second-stage estimates using somatic distance and religious similarity as instruments
Dependent variable: international immigration flows
Dependent variable: international immigration flows
Guiso et al. (2008a) Replication
Panel D: Second-stage estimates using somatic distance as instrument
Pop. Density
Table A.8 continued
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HHC HH HHCS HHS HHC HH HHC HH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Somatic distance -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.05***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Religious similarity 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Diff. in GDP p.c. (%) 0.03 -0.01 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.01 -0.01
(0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Common language -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.01
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Weighted distance (log) 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Common border 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.09 -0.00 0.03 0.06 0.06
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Same legal origin 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Mig. Stock 1960 (log) 0.07*** 0.06** 0.06** 0.06** 0.06** 0.06** 0.07*** 0.06**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 463 463 463 463 463 463 463 463
R-squared 0.88 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.87
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Somatic distance -0.08 -0.08 0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.00 -0.08 -0.06
(0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.08)
Religious similarity 0.36 0.36 0.52 0.55 0.51 0.49 0.35 0.39
(0.39) (0.40) (0.42) (0.44) (0.45) (0.46) (0.39) (0.41)
Diff. in GDP p.c. (%) 2.10** 2.03** 1.91** 1.90** 1.93** 1.97** 2.05** 2.01**
(0.81) (0.82) (0.82) (0.80) (0.78) (0.80) (0.81) (0.81)
Common language -0.22 -0.23 -0.23 -0.23 -0.24 -0.23 -0.19 -0.21
(0.36) (0.36) (0.34) (0.34) (0.36) (0.37) (0.36) (0.36)
Weighted distance (log) -0.50 -0.50 -0.63* -0.65* -0.60* -0.59* -0.48 -0.53
(0.31) (0.31) (0.32) (0.33) (0.31) (0.33) (0.30) (0.32)
Common border 0.22 0.25 0.18 0.16 0.20 0.19 0.22 0.22
(0.37) (0.37) (0.39) (0.40) (0.39) (0.38) (0.36) (0.38)
Same legal origin 0.51* 0.49* 0.49* 0.50* 0.49* 0.49* 0.50* 0.48*
(0.26) (0.26) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.26) (0.26)
Mig. Stock 1960 (log) 0.30* 0.29* 0.30* 0.30* 0.30* 0.29* 0.30* 0.29*
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17)
Observations 463 463 463 463 463 463 463 463
R-squared 0.89 0.90 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.89
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes . This table presents the coefficients of estimating the first-stage regression (Panel A), the reduced form equation of the
dependent variable (Panel B), the IV coefficients of estimating equation (4) when DtS trust is instrumented with both variables of
cultural proximity of country-pairs (Panel C), and the IV estimates when instrumenting DtS trust only with a measure of somatic
distance (Panel D). In each column, we use an alternative indicator of somatic distance as instrument for bilateral trust. In columns (1)
to (4) we use the indicators made available by Guiso et al. (2008a), in columns (5) and (6) the indicators elaborated following the
instructions given by them, and in columns (7) and (8) the measures that take the population density into account. The columns are
labeled with the letters H , C , and S : H stands for height and hair, C for cephalic index, and S for skin. Cluster-robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses and the coefficients are statistically different from zero at the ***1%, **5%, and *10% level.
Panel A: First-stage regression
Dependent variable: Destination-to-Source trust
Panel B: Reduced form equation of international migration
Dependent variable: international immigration flows
Table A.9
Migration: Instrumenting DtS trust with alternative measures of somatic distance (full results; see Table 7)
Guiso et al. (2008a) Replication Pop. Density
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HHC HH HHCS HHS HHC HH HHC HH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DtS trust 1.78* 1.77* 0.29 0.39 0.77 1.13 1.64* 1.63
(0.99) (1.06) (0.89) (1.02) (0.98) (1.19) (1.00) (1.17)
Diff. in GDP p.c. (%) 2.01** 2.00*** 1.96*** 1.93*** 1.87*** 1.95*** 1.96** 1.97***
(0.78) (0.77) (0.71) (0.70) (0.71) (0.73) (0.77) (0.76)
Common language -0.18 -0.18 -0.24 -0.23 -0.21 -0.21 -0.18 -0.18
(0.29) (0.29) (0.30) (0.30) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29)
Weighted distance (log) -0.51* -0.52* -0.64** -0.63** -0.58** -0.55** -0.53** -0.53*
(0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.26) (0.27)
Common border 0.15 0.15 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.20 0.14 0.16
(0.28) (0.29) (0.32) (0.33) (0.31) (0.30) (0.29) (0.29)
Same legal origin 0.51** 0.52** 0.61*** 0.62*** 0.58*** 0.57*** 0.52** 0.53***
(0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
Mig. Stock 1960 (log) 0.18 0.18 0.28* 0.27* 0.25 0.23 0.19 0.19
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Relevance
K-P rk  LM Statistic 13.93 15.21 13.88 14.52 13.15 11.70 15.97 13.97
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Weak Identification
K-P rk  Wald Statistic 15.05 11.37 14.19 10.10 13.23 8.62 14.73 10.10
Exogeneity
Hansen J -Stat 0.60 0.65 2.50 2.48 1.88 1.59 0.74 0.88
(p-value) (0.44) (0.42) (0.11) (0.12) (0.17) (0.21) (0.39) (0.35)
Observations 463 463 463 463 463 463 463 463
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
DtS trust 1.53 1.39 -0.37 -0.65 -0.29 0.05 1.40 1.06
(1.02) (1.16) (1.03) (1.29) (1.29) (1.52) (1.05) (1.33)
Diff. in GDP p.c. (%) 2.05*** 2.04*** 1.94*** 1.93*** 1.95*** 1.96*** 2.04*** 2.02***
(0.76) (0.75) (0.67) (0.65) (0.66) (0.68) (0.75) (0.73)
Common language -0.19 -0.20 -0.24 -0.25 -0.24 -0.23 -0.20 -0.20
(0.29) (0.29) (0.30) (0.31) (0.30) (0.30) (0.29) (0.29)
Weighted distance (log) -0.52** -0.52** -0.61** -0.62** -0.61** -0.59** -0.52** -0.54**
(0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.26) (0.26)
Common border 0.14 0.14 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.14 0.16
(0.29) (0.29) (0.34) (0.36) (0.34) (0.32) (0.30) (0.30)
Same legal origin 0.47** 0.47** 0.49** 0.50** 0.49** 0.49** 0.47** 0.48**
(0.22) (0.22) (0.24) (0.25) (0.24) (0.23) (0.22) (0.22)
Mig. Stock 1960 (log) 0.20 0.20 0.32* 0.34* 0.31* 0.29* 0.20 0.23
(0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17)
Religious similarity 0.25 0.27 0.55 0.59 0.54 0.48 0.27 0.33
(0.33) (0.35) (0.40) (0.44) (0.45) (0.44) (0.33) (0.37)
Relevance
K-P rk  LM Statistic 11.09 13.19 11.82 13.10 7.83 8.44 12.79 10.71
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Weak Identification
K-P rk  Wald Statistic 20.49 17.22 22.35 16.22 14.61 10.73 23.49 14.29
Observations 463 463 463 463 463 463 463 463
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent variable: international immigration flows
Panel D: Second-stage estimates using somatic distance as instrument
Dependent variable: international immigration flows
Panel C: Second-stage estimates using somatic distance and religious similarity as instruments
Table A.9 continued
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Chapter 3
Is the Role of Trust in International
Migration Gender-Specific?
3.1 Introduction
Female migrants were long believed to be economically unproductive agents whose lo-
cation choices only depend on their husbands’ decisions to move abroad. Because of
this stereotype, women were long neglected in the literature on international migration.
Only since the 1980s did case studies show that women also move for economic reasons
and actively participate in destination countries’ labour markets (United Nations, 1993).
New datasets classifying international migration by gender simultaneously revealed that
the proportion of women in total migrant stock was considerable. In 2013, women were
estimated to represent almost 50 percent of total migrants in the world and to outnumber
men in Europe, Northern America, Oceania, Latin America, and the Caribbean (United
Nations, 2013).
As women were shown to move independently and to significantly participate in the
private and in the economic spheres of host countries, scholars increasingly focused their
research on potential female migrants. They found that determinants of female migration
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may be fundamentally different from the ones influencing men’s location decisions (Grieco
and Boyd, 2003; Pfeiffer et al., 2008). In line with this suggestion, the trust in citizens
of potential destination countries, which is referred to as ”source-to-destination” (StD)
trust, is here suspected to be such a gender-specific determinant. Whereas the previous
chapter focuses on the average effect that StD trust may have on total migration flows,
this chapter attempts to dismantle the potentially heterogeneous effects between female
and male migration flows. Indeed, the insignificant effect of StD trust found in the
previous chapter does not give any indication of the effects between subgroups. For
instance, as women were shown to be more risk-averse than men and to suffer more stress
when moving abroad, StD trust may very well be of particular importance for potential
female migrants while playing a negligible role for male migrants. Such heterogeneous
effects may not be seen when computing average effects by focusing on total migration
flows.
To dismantle these potentially heterogeneous effects, individual location choices are
derived from a random utility maximisation (RUM) model that allows migrants to system-
atically differ from individuals who decide to stay in their home country. The structural
equation is then estimated using various approaches in order to address potential biases
caused by endogeneity, heteroscedasticity or sample selection. International migration
flows are approximated with data provided by the Global Bilateral Migration Database
(GBMD). The indicator of bilateral trust is an indicator provided by the Eurobarometer
surveys that measures the average trust that individuals originating from a given source
country have in citizens of potential destination countries. The sample includes migration
flows that took place within Europe over the years 1970 to 2000.
The estimations do not yield robust evidence in favour of the hypothesis that StD
trust affects the location decisions of potential female migrants differently than those of
potential male migrants. On the contrary, when dismantling the effect, the coefficients
on StD trust are generally insignificant in both settings, suggesting that neither women
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nor men are affected by StD trust when deciding to move abroad.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 briefly describes the
role of women in the literature on international migration. Section 3.3 presents the
theoretical model and section 3.4 presents the data necessary to perform the analysis. The
identification strategies and empirical approaches used to estimate the structural equation
are described in section 3.5. Section 3.6 reports the results of separately regressing total,
female and male migration flows on bilateral trust and other potential determinants of
international migration. The last section concludes.
3.2 Women in International Migration
Women were long ignored in the migration literature because they were considered to
be passive agents who only move abroad for marriage or family reunification (Donato
et al., 2006). This stereotype made it seem unnecessary to find other explanations for
female migration (Kofman, 1999). Early economic models of migration thus exclusively
focused on the experiences of men (Dhar, 2010). However, these gender-insensitive models
were increasingly criticised since Morokvasic (1983, 1984) demonstrated that women also
move for economic reasons and significantly contribute to the host countries’ economic
and social activities. The simultaneous appearance of datasets classifying international
migration by gender further highlighted the scope of female migration. Figure 3.1 shows
the evolution of the proportion of women in total migration stocks. In 1960, women were
estimated to represent 46.8 percent of total migrant stocks, a proportion that increased
over time to reach 49.6 percent in 2006 (United Nations, 2006). In 2013, almost 232 mil-
lion individuals are estimated to live in foreign countries, 120 million men and 111 million
women (United Nations, 2013). These numbers are surprising when considering the large
body of the literature in experimental economics that finds that women are more risk-
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Figure 3.1: Share of women in total migration stocks, 1960–2006
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averse than men.1 Since Halek and Eisenhauer (2001) and Jaeger et al. (2010) show that
risk-averse individuals are less likely to migrate internationally, one could expect women
to represent a lower share of total migration stocks.2 Yet, Pedraza (1991) and Grieco and
Boyd (2003) suggest that women experience migration differently than men and that their
location choices might be affected by factors that do not influence men’s decisions to move
abroad. For instance, in analysing the migration decisions of Mexican men and women,
Kanaiaupuni (2000) finds that migrant networks affect the decisions of both similarly
but that education functions differently for men and women: while educated Mexican
women are more likely to move abroad, educated Mexican men are less likely to do so.3
1Among many others, see Schubert et al. (1999), Eckel and Grossman (2008), Croson and Gneezy
(2009), Borghans et al. (2009) and Booth et al. (2014) for studies that find evidence in favour of a greater
risk aversion in women compared to men.
2Comparing migration within LDCs, Stark and Levhari (1982) find the opposite: more risk averse
individuals are more likely to move from rural to urban environments in order to diversify income and
reduce risk. However, these are two very different settings. As I focus on international migration among
European countries, the findings of Jaeger et al. (2010) are more likely to apply here.
3See United Nations (1993) for further studies on migration in developing countries that are in line
with the statement that migration experiences are different for men and women.
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Similarly, I suspect bilateral trust to be a gender-specific determinant. Focusing on to-
tal migration flows in the previous chapter, no significant relationship between bilateral
trust and migration was found. However, this aggregate effect might result from the fact
that trust affects women’s decisions to move abroad but not men’s decisions. As women
were shown to be more risk averse and to endure more stress then men when moving
abroad (Pedraza, 1991), trust in the citizens of potential destination countries might be
of particular importance for female migrants. Although Eckel and Wilson (2004) and
Houser et al. (2010) find that risk aversion and trust are two different concepts, these
concepts might interact: the likelihood that a risk-averse individual migrates to a foreign
country could increase if trust plays a significant role in the decision-making process and
vice versa.4
Table 3.1: Proportion of women in migration stocks by region, 1990–2013
Region 1990 2000 2010 2013
Europe 51.4 51.8 51.6 51.9
Northern America 51.1 50.5 51.2 51.2
Oceania 49.1 50.0 50.2 50.2
Latin America & the Caribbean 49.8 50.1 51.5 51.6
Africa 46.6 47.2 46.1 45.9
Asia 45.6 45.4 42.0 41.6
Source: United Nations (2013).
The migration data presented in Table 3.1 shows that, since 2000, there are more
immigrant women than men in Europe, Northern America, Oceania, Latin America and
the Caribbean. These large proportions of female migrants are partially explained by
the high labour demand of these countries for traditional female occupations, such as
healthcare workers (particularly nursing), domestic workers, teachers and manufacturing
jobs (Grieco and Boyd, 2003; Pessar, 2005; Mahler and Pessar, 2006; Pfeiffer et al., 2008;
Dhar, 2010; BBC, 2013; Lupieri, 2013). Moreover, women increasingly move to devel-
4Houser et al. (2010) conclude that “trust decisions are not tightly connected to a person’s risk
attitudes”. See also Fehr (2009) who shows that people who trust do not necessarily take risks.
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oped regions in order to escape patriarchal authority and to benefit from more freedom,
rights, and independence. While there is an increasing number of studies analysing the
determinants of female migration (Pedraza, 1991; Grieco and Boyd, 2003), none of them
address the potential role of StD trust in this decision.
3.3 Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework is similar to the one used in Chapter 2 as it is again derived
from a RUM model and allows migrants to systematically differ from individuals who
decide to stay in their home country (Roy, 1951; Sjaastad, 1962; Anderson, 1979; Borjas,
1987, 1989, 1994, 1999). This framework is again employed because of its success in
predicting migration patterns observed in the data.5 For convenience, the derivation is
restated here.
A potential migrant i who can either stay at home (s) or move to destination k is
assumed to face the following location-specific utility functions:
U i =

U iss = Vss + 
i
ss if i is staying in s,
U isk = Vsk + 
i
sk if i is living in k,
where Vss and Vsk are the observable utilities (also called the “representative” utilities)
that result from staying at home or from moving to destination k, respectively, and is
and ik account for the corresponding stochastic individual-specific utilities. Potential
migrants are hence assumed to have identical preferences except for their idiosyncratic
utility i. In order to derive the probability that a would-be migrant chooses location
k among a set of potential locations d ∈ D, McFadden (1976, 1974) assumes that the
random parts of utility are independently and identically distributed with a type I extreme
5See, among others Mayda (2010), Beine et al. (2011), Grogger and Hanson (2011), Ortega and Peri
(2012), and Beine and Parsons (2012)
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value distribution. The choice probability can then be approximated using the following
conditional logit model:
P isk =
eVsk∑
d e
Vsd
, (3.1)
where P isk stands for the probability that individual i originating from country s chooses
location k and
∑
d e
Vsd sums the exponential of the representative utility of all potential
locations d, including the utility derived from staying at home and the utility derived
from moving to country k.
However, the distributional assumption a la McFadden implies the Independence from
Irrelevant Alternative (IIA) property, a property that is rarely satisfied when observing
migration patterns.6 To address this concern, Ortega and Peri (2013) derive the choice
probabilities from a Generalised Extreme Value (GEV) generating function that allows
the random utility components of individuals moving abroad to be correlated.7 Under
this assumption, the probability that individuals originating from s choose destination k
from a set of potential locations d can be written as:
P isk =
eVsk/τ
(∑
d e
Vsd/τ
)τ−1
(
∑
d e
Vsd/τ )
τ ,
where
∑
d e
Vsd/τ again sums the exponential of the representative utility of all locations
d, and τ measures the degree of correlation in the random utility component of migrants.
Ortega and Peri (2013) do not allow iss and 
i
sk to be correlated, which amounts to
treating source countries as singletons. The probability that potential migrants decide to
stay at home is then given by
P iss =
eVss
(
∑
d e
Vsd/τ )
τ .
6For more details, see, among others, Train (2009), Bertoli and Moraga (2013), Ortega and Peri
(2013), and Chapter 4 in this thesis.
7This amounts to grouping all destination countries in one nest. Ortega and Peri (2013) only allow
for spacial correlation. For a GEV generating function that allows spatial and serial correlation in the
unobserved parts of utility, see Bertoli and Moraga (2012, 2013).
70 CHAPTER 3. TRUST, GENDER, AND MIGRATION
The ratio of these two choice probabilities is then
P isk
P iss
=
eVsk/τ
eVss
zs, (3.2)
where zs =
(∑
d e
Vsd/τ
)τ−1
. The choice probabilities P isk and P
i
ss are generally approxi-
mated with the number of people originating from country s who move to destination k
(Msk) and those who stay at home (Mss), respectively. When taking the log and adding
time subscripts, equation (3.2) can be rewritten as
log
(
Mskt
Msst
)
=
Vskt
τ
− Vsst + log zst + skt, (3.3)
where skt captures the error of approximating the choice probabilities with Msdt and
Msst. Including time-varying dummy variables for the source countries, equation (3.3)
simplifies to
logMskt =
Vskt
τ
+ λst + skt, (3.4)
where λst ≡ logMsst − Vsst + log zst.
Let the representative utility component Vskt of migrants originating from s who
choose location k in period t depend on bilateral trust, on differences between the gross
domestic product (GDP) per capita at home and in destination k, on destination country-
specific factors that vary over time and on bilateral migration costs. The latter are ap-
proximated with an indicator measuring the geographic and linguistic distance between
two countries and with binary variables taking the value one whenever two countries share
a border or have the same legal origin. Beine et al. (2011) further find that migration
costs depend on the size of immigrant networks established in the destination country,
and Chapter 4 of this thesis provides evidence that religious similarity might signifi-
cantly affect bilateral migration flows. These theoretical considerations thus suggest the
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following specification:
logMskt = β0 + β2trustskt + β3Nskt + β4∆gdpskt + X
′
skγ + λkt + λst + skt, (3.5)
where trustskt measures the average bilateral trust that citizens originating from s place
in citizens from country k in period t, ∆gdpskt stands for the difference in GDP per
capita between country pairs, Nskt measures the size of immigrant networks established
in location k in period t, X′sk is a vector including the time-invariant determinants of
bilateral migration flows and λkt captures time-varying destination-specific factors that
affect the utility of migrants. To analyse whether bilateral trust is a gender-specific
variable, Mskt will alternatively capture total, female or male migrants from country s
who choose location k in period t.
3.4 Data
The data on international migration used to estimate the relationships of interest comes
from the Global Bilateral Migration Database (GBMD) collected by Ozden, Parson, Schiff
and Walmsley (2011).8 This unique database reports bilateral migration stocks by gender
that are observed between 226 source and destination countries over the years 1960, 1970,
1980, 1990, and 2000. When merging and harmonizing the data from official registers
and census rounds, Ozden et al. (2011) ensure consistency by verifying that migration is
always defined based on the foreign-born concept. With the data made available by the
GBMD, total bilateral migration flows from country s to country k in period t can be
approximated the following way:
Mskt = Sskt+1 − Sskt,
8The GBMD can be downloaded on the following Internet page of The World Bank:
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalogue/global-bilateral-migration-database.
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where Sskt+1 and Sskt stand for the GBMD bilateral migration stocks in years t+ 1 and
t, respectively. Mskt hence captures the total decennial gross migration flows between
two countries. Analogously, female migration flows are computed by subtracting stocks
of female migrants in period t from the corresponding stock in period t + 1, and the
male migration flows are computed by taking the difference in stocks of male migrants.
This approximation results in almost 30 percent negative decennial migration flows and
nearly 60 percent positive flows. Table 3.2 reports the five largest negative and the
five largest positive decennial migration flows included in this analysis. The first row
suggests that between 1990 and 2000 the stock of Portuguese living in France decreased
by approximately 468,000 individuals (220,000 women and 248,000 men). The largest
increase was observed between Poland and France, where the stock of Polish citizens living
in France increased by almost 661,200 individuals from 1990 to 2000. Unfortunately, when
approximating decennial migration flows with differences in stocks, there is no information
about the distribution over time or about the origin of these changes. For instance, it is
impossible to know whether decreases in the stocks of migrants were caused by return
migration, death, and/or migration to a third country. Yet, to the best of my knowledge,
the GBMD is the only dataset that allows one to approximate bilateral migration flows
by gender from 1970 to 1990.9
The decennial migration flows are regressed on an indicator of bilateral trust made
available by the Eurobarometer surveys. The survey question measuring bilateral trust
is the following: “I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in
people from various countries. For each, please tell me whether you have a lot of trust,
some trust, not very much trust, or no trust at all.” It was first asked in the year 1970
in five European countries. From 1970 to 1996, this question was asked 10 times and the
country sample increased each time.10 The measure of StD trust is constructed following
9Ortega and Peri (2009, 2011, 2012) established a dataset providing bilateral migration flows but
these are not classified by gender.
10The data can be downloaded from the ZACAT-GESIS Online Study catalogue,
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Table 3.2: Some decennial international migration flows
Source Destination Year Total Female Male
Largest negative decennial migration flows
Portugal France 1990-2000 -468,323 -219,988 -248,335
Italy France 1990-2000 -283,338 -143,467 -139,870
Spain France 1990-2000 -277,463 -151,277 -126,187
Poland Lithuania 1990-2000 -254,076 -133,345 -120,731
Italy France 1970-1980 -246,554 -111,189 -135,365
Largest positive decennial migration flows
Poland France 1990-2000 661,156 318,058 343,099
Czech Republic France 1990-2000 210,221 105,695 104,528
Poland Germany 1990-2000 209,147 31,846 177,301
Ireland France 1990-2000 176,899 89,052 87,846
Poland United Kingdom 1990-2000 132,474 73,996 58,478
Source: Global Bilateral Migration Database, Ozden et al. (2011).
Guiso et al. (2006), who code the answers to this question the following way: 1 (no trust
at all), 2 (not very much trust), 3 (some trust) and 4 (a lot of trust). To match the data
on international migration, bilateral trust is averaged over the 1970s, the 1980s, and the
1990s.11
The size of immigrant networks established in potential destination countries is ap-
proximated with the GBMD migration stocks. More precisely, diaspora are captured
with the number of migrants born in country s that live in destination k in period t:
Nskt = log(Sskt + 1). Nskt thus stands for the log stock of migrants at the beginning of
the period over which the migration flows are observed. The indicator of geographic dis-
tance between two countries measuring the population-weighted distance is provided by
Mayer and Zignago (2011).12 Data on GDP p.c., the binary variable approximating for
http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/. The bilateral trust question was asked in the Eurobarometer
survey of the years 1970, 1976, 1980, 1983, 1986, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, and 1996; see European
Commission (1970, 1976, 1980, 1983, 1986, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996). In 1996, citizens of 17
European countries were asked to indicate the trust they had in citizens of 25 EU and non-EU countries.
11Decennial migration flows from 1970 to 1980 are regressed on bilateral trust averaged over 1970 and
1976, flows from 1980 to 1990 are regressed on bilateral trust averaged over the years 1980 to 1983, and
finally, flows from 1990 to 2000 are regressed on bilateral trust averaged from 1990 to 1996.
12The population weighted distance calculates the “distances between two countries based on bilateral
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similarities in institutions and the dummy taking the value one whenever two countries
share a border come from the CEPII Gravity Dataset generated by Head et al. (2010)
and Head and Mayer (2013a). Finally, the common language index measuring linguis-
tic similarities between two countries as well as the indicator of religious similarity are
provided by Melitz and Toubal (2014).13
Panel A of Table 3.3 present the summary statistics of the sample including all mi-
gration flows, and Panel B shows the sample that only includes positive flows. Overall,
the sample is composed of 25 European countries and includes observations for the years
1970, 1980, and 1990.14
3.5 Econometric Strategy
Equation (3.5) is first estimated using an ordinary least squares (OLS) approach. How-
ever, estimates resulting from this approach have to be regarded with caution as they
might be biased for three main reasons.
First, OLS estimates on bilateral trust could be biased due to potential endogeneity
caused either by measurement error, omitted variables or reversed causality. As seen in
the previous section, bilateral trust is approximated with a survey based indicator that
might measure trust only imperfectly. Additionally, this measure could be correlated
with omitted cultural and institutional variables that also affect international migration.
To mitigate this mis-specification, a full set of country-year dummies and a vector of
dyadic variables is included in the analysis. Yet, this does not guarantee the complete
distances between the biggest cities of those two countries, those inter-city distances being weighted by
the share of the city in the overall country’s population” (Mayer and Zignago, 2011, p. 11).
13Melitz and Toubal (2014) established a dataset including measures of common official language,
common spoken language, common native language, linguistic similarity and a common language in-
dex that was constructed based on some of these language variables. They can be downloaded from
http://ces.univ-paris1.fr/membre/toubal/papers/Language/lang.html.
14The sample includes migration flows for members of the European Economic Area before 1997 and
for Norway, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania, Slovakia,
Switzerland, and Ukraine.
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Table 3.3: Summary statistics
Mean Median Std. dev. Minimum Maximum N
Panel A: Sample including all international migration flows
Total migration flows 1,938 417 46,020 -468,323 661,156 627
Female migration flows 926 191 22,425 -219,988 318,058 627
Male migration flows 1,012 215 24,229 -248,335 343,099 627
Average StD trust 2.71 2.71 0.35 1.47 3.65 627
Diaspora (log) 7.98 7.98 2.65 0 14.40 627
Common language index 0.32 0.22 0.20 0.04 1.00 627
Diff. in GDP p.c. (log) -0.07 -0.01 1.12 -3.07 3.12 627
Distance (log) 6.96 7.01 0.58 5.08 8.13 627
Common border 0.17 0 0.38 0 1 627
Common legal origin 0.27 0 0.44 0 1 627
Religious similarity 0.28 0.23 0.28 0 0.85 627
Somatic distance 2.19 2 1.17 0 5 627
Panel B: Sample including only positive international migration flows
Total migration flows 10,479 1,096 39,146 1 661,156 443
Female migration flows 5,373 640 19,087 1 318,058 427
Male migration flows 5,333 497 21,105 1 343,099 445
Average StD trust 2.74 2.75 0.35 1.47 3.65 445
Diaspora (log) 7.57 7.68 2.51 0 14.40 445
Common language index 0.27 0.18 0.17 0.03 0.88 445
Diff. in GDP p.c. (log) -0.07 0.00 1.14 -3.07 3.07 445
Distance (log) 6.95 6.99 0.58 5.08 8.13 445
Common border 0.14 0 0.35 0 1 445
Common legal origin 0.22 0 0.42 0 1 445
Religious similarity 0.28 0.23 0.28 0 0.85 445
Somatic distance 2.24 2 1.15 0 5 445
Notes: This table presents the descriptive statistics of the samples used to investigate the
relationship between religious similarity of country pairs and international migration. Panel
A describes the sample including all international migration flows, including the negative
flows. Panel B presents the summary statistics of the sample including only observations that
report positive migration flows.
elimination of biases caused by omitted variables. Finally, bilateral trust might also be
correlated with the error term because of reversed causality, that is, because international
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migration also affects bilateral trust. In the presence of such mis-specifications, causal
relationships can be identified with estimation approaches using instrumental variables
(IV). Guiso et al. (2009) suggest to instrument bilateral trust with an indicator of somatic
distance since DeBruine (2002) showed that physical resemblance enhances trust. This
indicator measures physical dissimilarities between average citizens of two populations.
It is based on differences between three anthropometric traits: hair colour, cephalic index
and hight.15 Information on these traits was published by Biasutti (1959). He classifies
the world into five categories of hair colours: 1 (blond prevails), 2 (mix of blond and
dark), 3 (dark prevails), 4 (sporadic presence of blond) and 5 (exclusively dark). He
further differentiates five categories of average cephalic indexes, going from 71.0 to 86+,
and six categories of height. To construct the measure of somatic distance, the score of 1
is assigned to the category corresponding to the lowest average cephalic index (71.0–74.9),
2 to the second category (75.0–78.9), and so on. The six categories of height defined by
Biasutti (1959) are coded the same way, assigning the lowest score of 1 to the category
”157.9 cm or less” and the highest score of 6 to ”178 cm or more”. GSZ then compute
somatic distance between countries s and d as follows:
SDsd = |Hairs −Haird|+ |Cephalics − Cephalicd|+ |Heights −Heightd|,
that is, SDsd approximates physical dissimilarities by summing the absolute value of the
differences in three anthropometric traits. Additionally, they use a measure of religious
similarity of country pairs as an instrument for bilateral trust. However, as highlighted
by Fehr (2009, p. 259), this instrument might not be valid because “common religion not
only influences trust, but does many other things as well, because it is probably associated
with more frequent interactions between two countries, compared to cases with different
religions”. Chapter 4 even finds that religious similarity between country pairs has a
15The cephalic index measures the shape of a human scull.
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direct effect on migration. Therefore, the measure of religious similarity is included in
the second-stage of the two-stage least-squared (2SLS) approach, and somatic distance is
used as the sole instrument for bilateral trust, exploiting the notion that individuals who
look less alike tend to trust each other less.
Second, OLS estimation might suffer from biases caused by heteroscedasticity in the
data. Indeed, estimating equation (3.5) with OLS only generates consistent estimates if
the conditional variance of zst is independent of the explanatory variables.
16 However,
this condition is not satisfied here since migrants are assumed to be systematically dif-
ferent from stayers. According to Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2013, 2011a,b, 2010, 2008,
2006), this type of mis-specification is best addressed with a Poisson Pseudo Maximum
Likelihood (PPML) estimator. If the data follows a Poisson distribution, the conditional
variance of bilateral migration is proportional to its conditional mean. Therefore, PPML
estimates are consistent even in the presence of heteroscedasticity, as long as the con-
ditional mean is correctly specified (Gourieroux et al., 1984; Santos Silva and Tenreyro,
2010; Wooldridge, 2010). This approach also has the advantage to estimate the relation-
ship of interest in its multiplicative form, therefore including observations that report
zero migration flows and that are omitted in a logarithmic specification.17 However,
this type of selection should be small here as the sample only includes a few zero flow
observations.18
Third, neither OLS nor PPML estimations include observations that report negative
16This follows from Jensen’s inequality, which states that E[log zst] 6= log E[zst]. In other words,
the expected value of log (zst) does not only depend on the mean of zst but also on higher moments of
its distribution. Moreover, if the log-linearisation of the model leads to a non-linear transformation of
the disturbances that is not trivial such that log E[zst|x] = 0 but E[log zst|x] 6= 0, OLS yields biased
estimates. For a formal illustration of how the presence of heteroscedasticity in the conditional variance
of ηskt can also affect the consistency rather than only the efficiency of an estimator, see Santos Silva
and Tenreyro (2006, p. 644) and Felbermayr et al. (2010, p. 45).
17Estimating equation (3.5) using OLS omits zero flow observations as the log of zero is undefined.
18In different settings, this omission can lead to large biases in the estimated parameters, especially
when the zero flow observations report “true” zeros, that is, when migration costs are prohibitively high
such that no migration is observed (Helpman et al., 2008; Anderson and Yotov, 2010). Zero flows can
also be observed because of rounding errors associated with very small migration flows, or they may
replace wrongly coded missing values or errors.
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migration flows. Yet, they represent approximately 30 percent of total observations.
Omitting them is justified when caused by death. Moreover, they are hard to include
when they are caused by migration to a third country. However, if negative migration
flows capture return migration, then they should be included in the analysis. To do this,
migration flows are classified in 10 ordered groups of similar size that regressed in StD
trust in addition to other determinants of international migration. This regression is then
estimated with an ordered logit model.
The results of these different estimation approaches are presented and discussed in
the next section.
3.6 Results
This section briefly revisit the relationship between total migration flows and StD trust
before turning to the gender-specific analysis where female and male migration flows are
alternatively regressed on StD trust in addition to traditional determinants of interna-
tional migration.
3.6.1 Bilateral Trust and Total Migration Flows
As this study builds on the previous chapter but uses different data sources, the results
presented there are briefly reviewed by re-estimating the relationship between StD trust
and total international migration flows. While the data on immigration flows used in
Chapter 2 is provided by Ortega and Peri (2009, 2011), total migration flows are here
approximated by taking the differences in the total GBMD migrant stocks. The indicators
of somatic distance made available by Guiso et al. (2008a) are not employed here as they
are less traceable than the ones constructed in Chapter 2. Moreover, the latter allow the
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inclusion of a larger country sample in the analysis.19 Finally, the language measures
used in Chapter 2 are replaced by the common language index provided by Melitz and
Toubal (2014), who argue that it is preferable to employ this index when the number
of countries included in the analysis is small as the variability in the data might not be
sufficient to identify the coefficients on several measures of linguistic similarities between
country pairs.
The results of estimating equation (3.5) with total migration flows as the dependent
variable are presented in Table 3.4. The OLS coefficient on bilateral trust reported in
column (1) is negative but not significantly different from zero. This is also the case
when bilateral trust is instrumented with different measures of somatic distance. In
column (2), bilateral trust is instrumented by an indicator of somatic distance that sums
the absolute value of the average difference between two populations in terms of hair
colour, height and cephalic index (HHC). In column (3), the somatic distance indicator
ignores the distances in the cephalic index (HH). These two indicators were constructed
following the instructions given by Guiso et al. (2008a) in an attempt to replicate the
measures of somatic distance made available by them. The indicators used to instrument
bilateral trust in columns (4) and (5) are similar to the ones used in columns (2) and (3),
respectively, only that they additionally allow a country to be home to several categories
of traits based on its population density. The magnitude of the IV coefficients on bilateral
trust varies across columns, but the estimates are never statistically significant. These
results are in line with the ones presented in Chapter 2 as they do not provide any
evidence that StD trust affects total bilateral migration flows.
19Guiso et al. (2008a) only provide data on somatic distance for members of the European Economic
Area before 1997 and for Norway. Using data provided in the previous chapter allows me to additionally
include the following countries: Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland,
Romania, Slovakia, Switzerland, and Ukraine.
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Table 3.4: The effect of StD trust on total migration flows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Trust (StD) -0.45 -0.15 -1.71 -1.07 -0.77
(0.34) (2.66) (2.61) (2.75) (3.04)
Diaspora 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.39***
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09)
Common language index 0.76 0.67 1.15 0.95 0.86
(0.63) (1.03) (1.16) (1.03) (1.25)
Distance (log) -0.24 -0.24 -0.22 -0.23 -0.23
(0.29) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26)
Common border -0.11 -0.12 -0.10 -0.10 -0.11
(0.27) (0.24) (0.25) (0.24) (0.24)
Common legal origin 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
(0.26) (0.24) (0.25) (0.24) (0.24)
Diff. in GDP p.c. (log) -2.20** 1.81* 1.34 -0.03 -0.41
(0.94) (1.05) (1.14) (0.79) (1.70)
Religious similarity 0.19 0.14 0.37 0.28 0.23
(0.29) (0.46) (0.42) (0.47) (0.48)
Relevance
K-P rk LM statistic 3.30 3.90 3.51 3.02
(p-value) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08)
Weak identification
K-P rk Wald statistic 3.02 3.64 3.05 2.66
Observations 443 443 443 443 443
Notes: This table reports the results of estimating equation (3.5) with total migration flows as
the dependent variable. All columns include country-year dummies. Column (1) presents OLS
results. Columns (2) and (3) report IV estimates where StD trust is instrumented with the
somatic distance indicators constructed in Chapter 2, following the instructions by Guiso et al.
(2008a). In columns (4) and (5), trust is instrumented with measures of somatic distance that
also take populations densities into account. These columns are labelled with the letters H and
C: H stands for height and hair, and C stands for cephalic index. Estimated standard errors
reported in parentheses are clustered at the country pair. Coefficients are statistically different
from zero at the ***1%, **5% and *10% level.
3.6.2 Bilateral Trust and Female Migration Flows
To analyse whether StD trust is a gender-specific factor, equation (3.5) is next estimated
with female migration flows as the dependent variable. The results of estimating equation
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(3.5) with the different approaches presented earlier are reported in Table 3.5.
OLS and IV estimation using somatic distance as an instrument
The OLS coefficient on bilateral trust is reported in column (1) of Table 3.5. It is negative
and significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level, contradicting the hypothesis
that an increase in bilateral trust fosters female migration flows. However, this signifi-
cance disappears in column (2) where trust is instrumented with the measure of somatic
distance that captures differences in hair colour, height, and cephalic index.20 Yet, the
accuracy of this result strongly relies on the validity, that is, on the relevance, strength,
and exogeneity of the instrument. Its relevance is tested with the Kleibergen-Paap (K-P)
rk LM statistic, which is the efficient first-stage statistic when non-i.i.d. disturbances
are assumed. The statistic reported in column (2) suggests that the model is identified,
that is, that the instrument is correlated with the endogenous variable.21 Indeed, the
first-stage coefficient on somatic distance presented in column (3) is significant. How-
ever, the magnitude of the coefficient is close to zero, the significance only reaches the 10
percent level, and the Kleibergen-Paap (K-P) rk Wald statistic verifying the strength of
the instrument is way below the threshold of 10 recommended in the literature (Staiger
and Stock, 1997; Stock et al., 2002). In other words, the instruments seem to be only
weakly correlated with StD trust, in which case the IV approach applied in column (2)
does not adequately control for potential endogeneity biases.22 Moreover, the exogeneity
of somatic distance cannot be tested as it is the only variable used to instrument bilateral
20Instrumenting StD trust with the alternative indicators of somatic distance provided in Chapter 2
yield the same results. The IV coefficient on StD trust is also insignificant when instrumented with the
measure of genetic distance made available by Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009).
21The null hypothesis is also rejected if I separately instrument StD trust with somatic and genetic
distance (results not reported). Rejection of the null hypothesis thus suggests that the instrumental
variables are relevant. Indeed, they are significantly different from zero in the first-stage regression (not
reported).
22Estimating the regression with CUE yields the same results. The CUE estimator on StD trust
(not reported) is insignificantly different from zero, also suggesting that bilateral trust does not affect
international migration.
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Table 3.5: The effect of StD trust on female migration flows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV 1st stage CUE PPML Logit
Trust (StD) -0.72** -1.11 0.45*** 0.35 0.66
(0.35) (2.81) (0.17) (0.48) (0.31)
Diaspora 0.47*** 0.47*** -0.01 0.37*** 0.39*** 0.77**
(0.09) (0.08) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.09)
Common language index 0.38 0.48 0.18 -0.71*** 1.79*** 1.11
(0.58) (0.90) (0.12) (0.21) (0.67) (0.81)
Distance (log) -0.37 -0.38 -0.01 -0.47*** -0.02 0.32***
(0.29) (0.28) (0.05) (0.11) (0.54) (0.11)
Common border -0.38 -0.39 -0.03 0.08 -0.69* 0.41*
(0.31) (0.29) (0.05) (0.14) (0.40) (0.19)
Common legal origin 0.34 0.35 0.02 0.07 -0.22 1.3
(0.28) (0.25) (0.04) (0.11) (0.47) (0.36)
Diff. in GDP p.c. (log) 0.00 3.59 -0.02 8.79*** -0.88** 0.50**
(0.21) (20.20) (0.04) (2.06) (0.45) (0.17)
Religious similarity 0.24 0.29 0.11** 0.06 0.79 0.97
(0.33) (0.49) (0.05) (0.13) (0.48) (0.41)
Somatic distance -0.03*
(0.01)
Relevance & weak identification
K-P rk LM statistic 3.95 182
(p-value) (0.05) (0.34)
K-P rk Wald statistic 3.63
Exogeneity
Hansen J-statistic 169
(p-value) (0.60)
R-squared 0.78 0.78 0.91
Observations 427 427 427 427 427 627
Notes: This table reports the results of estimating equation (3.5) with international female
migration flows as the dependent variable. All columns include country-year dummies. Column
(1) presents OLS estimates. In columns (2), StD trust is instrumented with the indicator of
somatic distance measuring differences in hair colour, height and cephalic index constructed
following Guiso et al. (2008a). Column (3) reports the results of estimating the corresponding
first-stage equation. In column (4), trust is instrumented with country pair dummies and
estimated with a CUE. PPML and ordered logit estimates are presented in columns (5) and
(6), respectively. Estimated standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the country
pair. Coefficients are statistically different from zero at the ***1%, **5% and *10% level.
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trust. Unfortunately, it is very hard to find additional valid instruments. Even a com-
mon history of war and genetic distance, two alternative instrumental variable candidates
proposed by Guiso et al. (2009), do not pass the statistical tests that verify their valid-
ity. Alternatively, the causal relationship between female migration flows and StD trust
could be isolated by instrumenting trust with a full set of destination-source dummies,
an approach described next.
CUE estimation using bilateral dummies as instruments
Instrumenting bilateral trust with a full set of bilateral dummy variables has the advan-
tage of capturing all observable and unobservable bilateral variables that might affect StD
trust. However, this strategy has the disadvantage of strongly increasing the probability
of weak identification (Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Hausman et al., 2012). To mitigate this
concern, this 2SLS approach is estimated with a continuously updated GMM estimator
(CUE) that should yield consistent estimates in the presence of weak instruments.23 The
CUE coefficient on StD trust reported in column (4) of Table 3.5 is positive and statis-
tically significant at the 1 percent level, simultaneously contradicting the OLS and IV
results presented in columns (1) and (2), respectively. However, the K-P rk LM statistic
suggests that this model is not only weakly identified but that the instruments are irrele-
vant. In this case, not even a CUE estimator is capable of yielding consistent coefficients.
The results presented in equation (4) thus have to be regarded with caution, and further
analysis is necessary.
23Hausman et al. (2011) verify the finite sample properties of the CUE estimator under weak iden-
tification. They claim that the estimator might not have finite moments. Ideally, this relationship of
interest should be estimated with a heteroscedastic robust version of the Fuller (1977) (HFUL) estimator
introduced by Hausman et al. (2012). However, this estimator has not yet been implemented in Stata
and programming it would imply considerable effort. In the meantime, the CUE thus seems to be a
reasonable alternative to the HFUL as it allows for heteroscedasticity and weak instruments.
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PPML estimation: accounting for heteroscedasticity
The contradicting trust estimates in columns (1), (2) and (4) of Table 3.5 could result
from the fact that bilateral trust is in reality exogenous to migration.24 Reversed causality
is very unlikely as trust is measured at the beginning of the period over which migration
flows are observed. Biases caused by omitted variables should be low as the inclusion of
bilateral variables and a full set of time-varying source- and destination-country dummies
controls for many observable and unobservable determinants of international migration.
Finally, Guiso et al. (2009) verify the validity of the trust question asked in the Euro-
barometer survey and provide evidence that it should not suffer from measurement error.
If bilateral trust is in reality exogenous, then the OLS coefficients are less biased than the
IV and CUE estimates. Yet, they might still suffer from biases caused by heteroscadas-
ticity in the data. To address this concern, the model connecting StD trust to female
migration flows is estimated in its multiplicative form using a PPML approach. Following
equation (3.2) presented in the theoretical part of this chapter, the dependent variable is
defined as the total decennial migration flows divided by the total number of stayers.25
The estimation results of regressing this migration share on the explanatory variables
is reported in column (5) of Table 3.5. The coefficient on StD trust is positive but not
statistically significant, again suggesting that it does not affect female migration flows.
However, this approach yields surprising coefficients on the explanatory variables, which
suggest, that distance is insignificant and that a common border has a negative effect on
female migrations flows. Even more surprisingly, the coefficient on the difference between
GDP per capita is negative. These coefficients might suffer from biases caused by the
omission of observations reporting negative migration flows, which represent 30 percent
of the sample. This point is addressed next.
24Statistical tests that verify the exogeneity of an explanatory variable strongly rely on the existence
of valid instruments. If the instruments are not valid, as seems to be the case here, then these tests are
not reliable.
25Stayers are individuals who stay in their country of origin instead of moving abroad. Dividing the
total decennial migration flows by the population of the source country yields the same PPML results.
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Ordered logit estimation: including negative migration flows
To include the negative bilateral migration flows in the analysis, all flows are assigned to
10 ordered groups of similar size. These groups are regressed on StD trust in addition
to the other explanatory variables and the equation is estimated with an ordered logit
approach. The results of this estimation are presented in column (6) of Table 3.5. The
logit coefficient on StD trust is again insignificant, but the coefficients on the explanatory
variables are more plausible than their Poisson counterparts presented in column (5).
They predict that female migration flows increase with the size of immigrant networks
established in destination countries and with differences in GDP per capita. Moreover,
female migration flows seem to be larger between countries sharing a national border.
Surprisingly, the coefficient on distance suggests that migration flows are higher between
countries that are farther apart. As indicated in Table 3.2, this might be the result of
the large flows that took place between countries such as France and Poland or Poland
and Germany. From 1970 to 2000, many workers from less developed European countries
migrated to more developed nations such as Germany, France and Switzerland in search
of work. Furthermore, distances within Europe are short and travel costs relatively low;
therefore, they are no longer major barriers to migration. Finally, although it is controlled
for various bilateral variables as well as for country-year factors affecting migration, it
cannot be discounted that distance captures other effects that are excluded from the
analysis (Head and Mayer, 2013b).26 Also of interest is that the coefficients on common
legal origins and religious similarity are insignificant across all columns (expect in the
first-stage regression). This might be due to the fact that most European countries have
similar formal institutions and the majority of populations adhere to Christian beliefs.
Yet, it is still important to include these variables in the regression because they could
26Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) argue that it is difficult to know what the coefficient on distance really
measures when a full set of time-varying destination- and source-country dummies is included in the
analysis.Yet, as distance is not the main focus of this study, potential biases of its coefficient caused by
endogeneity or other mis-specifications are not addressed here.
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be correlated with StD trust. If this is the case, excluding them would lead to omitted
variable biases.
Further sensitivity analysis
A final concern is that the coefficients on StD trust suffer from biases that are due to multi-
collinearity. These arise when StD trust is highly correlated with the other explanatory
variables included in equation (3.5). For instance, Melitz and Toubal (2014) suggest
that indicators measuring linguistic similarity capture ethnic ties and trust between two
countries. Head and Mayer (2013b) posit that the measures of distance and a common
border proxy for networks that breed familiarity and trust. Finally, as suggested by Guiso
et al. (2009), bilateral trust might also be correlated with the institutional and religious
similarity of country pairs. If StD trust is highly correlated with one or a combination
of these measures, then the inclusion in the specification of both variables might yield
misleading parameter estimates.
To address this concern, the correlation coefficients between StD trust and the dyadic
variables included in the analysis are estimated. As Melitz and Toubal (2014) suggest
that measures of linguistic similarity might capture trust, the different language measures
provided by these authors are included in this analysis. The correlation coefficients are
presented in Table 3.6. They are all well below one, strongly mitigating the concern of
multicollinearity. Only the indicator of common spoken language is moderately correlated
with StD trust. This might reflect the fact that a higher probability of speaking the same
language facilitates communication and decreases the likelihood of misunderstandings
that, in turn, could positively affect bilateral trust. Including this measure of linguistic
similarity when estimating equation (3.5) does not change the coefficient on StD trust.
Neither does the latter change if the language index is replaced by the additional measures
of linguistic similarities provided by Melitz and Toubal (2014) (results not reported).
To further verify that StD trust is not correlated with a combination of dyadic vari-
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Table 3.6: Correlation coefficients between StD trust and time-invariant variables
StD Trust
Diaspora 0.14
Distance -0.26
Common border 0.05
Common legal origin -0.09
Diff. in GDP p.c. 0.21
Religious similarity -0.07
Common language index 0.33
Common official language 0.25
Common spoken language 0.63
Common native language 0.16
Linguistic similarity 0.19
Notes: This table presents the estimated correlation coefficients
between the time-invariant variables included in equation 3.5 as
well as between StD trust and the measures of linguistic proximity
of country pairs provided by Melitz and Toubal (2014).
ables, StD trust is regressed on the time-invariant factors. Estimating this equation using
OLS yields an R-squared of 0.47, which is far below the value of one indicating the pres-
ence of multi-collinearity.
Overall, the results presented in this additional sensitivity analysis confirm the previ-
ous results, that is, that the trust in citizens of a potential host countries does not affect
international female migration flows.
3.6.3 Bilateral Trust and Male Migration Flows
To analyse whether StD trust affects international male migration flows, the dependent
variable in equation (3.5) is now composed of male decennial migration flows. Although
the previous section casts doubt on the validity of the two-stage approaches, they are
still applied here in order to be consistent and to make the results for female and male
migration flows comparable. Therefore, Table 3.7 presents the results of estimating the
relationship between StD trust and male migration flows using OLS, IV, CUE, PPML
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and Logit.
Table 3.7: The effect of StD trust on male migration flows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV 1st stage CUE PPML Logit
Trust (StD) -0.01 -2.24 -0.66*** 0.47 0.56
(0.40) (2.37) (0.16) (0.34) (0.28)
Diaspora 0.35*** 0.33*** -0.01 0.22*** 0.50*** 0.74**
(0.09) (0.09) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.09)
Common language index 0.79 1.54 0.25** 0.71*** 1.71*** 1.99
(0.65) (1.07) (0.11) (0.16) (0.58) (1.46)
Distance (log) -0.25 -0.21 0.04 0.06 -0.19 0.33***
(0.27) (0.26) (0.05) (0.09) (0.47) (0.12)
Common border -0.14 -0.08 0.02 0.59*** -0.40 0.37**
(0.28) (0.27) (0.05) (0.10) (0.29) (0.19)
Common legal origin 0.48** 0.48** 0.01 0.54*** -0.25 1.42
(0.24) (0.23) (0.04) (0.10) (0.46) (0.44)
Diff. in GDP p.c. (log) 0.09 -15.62 0.01 -4.07 -0.45* 0.32***
(0.21) (15.13) (0.04) (5.02) (0.27) (0.11)
Religious similarity 0.08 0.43 0.13** 0.24** 0.43 1.56
(0.32) (0.45) (0.05) (0.10) (0.42) (0.69)
Somatic distance -0.03**
(0.01)
Relevance & weak identification
K-P rk LM statistic 4.64 191
(p-value) (0.03) (0.53)
K-P rk Wald statistic 4.43
Exogeneity
Hansen J-statistic 183
(p-value) (0.38)
R-squared 0.77 0.79 0.24 0.92
Observations 445 445 445 445 445 627
Notes: This table reports the results of estimating equation (3.5) with international male migra-
tion flows as the dependent variable. All columns include country-year dummies. OLS, PPML
and logit estimates are presented in columns (1), (2) and (3), respectively. Estimated standard
errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the country pair. Coefficients are statistically
different from zero at the ***1%, **5% and *10% level.
In column (1) of Table 3.7, equation (3.5) is estimated using OLS. This approach
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yields an insignificant coefficient on StD trust that is very close to zero, suggesting that
trust does not affect male migration flows. This is consistent with the results found in
columns (2), (5) and (6) which show the IV, PPML and Logit estimates, respectively.
Although the magnitude of the trust coefficients varies across these columns, the estimates
remain significantly different from zero. Only the CUE estimate on StD trust reported
in column (4) is significant, suggesting that trust has a negative effect on male migration
flows. However, this approach again seems to be invalid as the country pair dummies
used as instruments neither pass the test that verifies their relevance nor the one that
verifies their exogeneity.
The results presented in Table 3.7 follow a similar pattern to the one observed in
Table 3.5 for female migration flows. It is not surprising that neither of the two-stage
approaches pass the tests that verify their validity here either, but it is interesting to
observe that the CUE estimates are the only highly significant coefficients on trust in
both settings. Moreover, no matter whether focusing on male or female migration flows,
the OLS coefficients take negative values while the PPML and Logit approaches yield
positive—although insignificant—estimates. However, in the context of male migration
flows, neither of the plausible approaches yields a significant coefficient on StD trust.
The results presented here thus do not provide any evidence that StD trust affects male
migration flows taking place within Europe.
3.7 Concluding Remarks
This chapter analysed whether bilateral trust is a gender-sensitive determinant of inter-
national migration. As women are found to be more risk-averse than men and to endure
more stress when moving abroad, trust in the citizens of potential destination countries
might be of particular significance for female migrants while being negligible for men.
The aim of this chapter was thus to disentangle the potentially heterogeneous effects of
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StD trust on female and male migration flows.
To perform this analysis, a structural equation was derived from a RUM model that
allows stayers to be systematically different from migrants, and the dependent variable
was alternately defined as the total, female or male bilateral migration flows. These flows
were regressed on the indicator of StD trust provided by the Eurobarometer surveys and
on other traditional determinants of international migration.
When focusing on total migration flows, the coefficients on StD trust were always
insignificant. Although different datasets and a larger country sample were used here,
these results are similar to the ones found in Chapter 2 and are consistent with its
conclusion that StD trust does not affect average migration, that is, migration flows
aggregated across gender.
The picture is less clear when turning to female migration. Estimating its determi-
nants using OLS, the coefficient on StD trust is significant but negative. This suggests
that increased trust in the citizens of the destination country reduces female migration
flows. Yet, this surprising result is not robust: the significance disappears when applying
an IV approach that instruments StD trust with an indicator of somatic distance, and
the trust coefficient even becomes significantly positive when applying a CUE approach.
Yet, these two-stage estimators do not pass the standard statistical tests that verify the
relevance and exogeneity of the instruments used to capture the exogenous part of trust.
Therefore, the IV and CUE coefficients on StD trust have to be regarded with caution.
The relationship between female migration flows and StD trust is additionally estimated
using a PPML and a Logit approach. These have the advantages of yielding robust
estimates even in the presence of heterosketastic data and of allowing the inclusion of
negative migration flows, respectively. Both approaches yield positive but insignificant
trust coefficients. As the two-step approaches cannot be trusted and the OLS results
are most likely biased because of their inconsistency in the presence of heteroscedasticity
and truncation, the most plausible results are the ones found using the PPML and Logit
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approaches that both yield insignificant coefficients on StD trust. Overall, the results
hence contradict the hypothesis that StD trust might be particularly important for po-
tential female migrants. On the contrary, they even suggest that trust does not affect the
location choices of women.
The results are very similar when focusing on male migration flows. According to
the statistical tests, the two-stage approaches are not valid as their instruments neither
seem to be relevant nor exogenous. The other approaches, that is, the OLS, PPML and
Logit approaches, all yield coefficients on StD trust that are not significantly different
from zero. In other words, they do not provide evidence in favour of the hypothesis that
inter-regional trust matters for international male migration flows.
Overall, the estimations thus do not support the hypothesis that StD trust is a gender-
specific determinant of international migration. However, these results notwithstanding,
one should be very careful when concluding that trust does not matter for international
migration in general. This study focuses on bilateral migration flows within Europe,
where countries share many cultural traits and have similar historical and institutional
backgrounds. Ideally, this analysis should be extended to migration flows taking place
between more diverse countries but, unfortunately, data on bilateral trust necessary for
such an analysis does not yet exist. Therefore, this analysis is left for future research.
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Chapter 4
How does Religious Similarity Affect
International Migration?
4.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates whether religious similarity between two countries affects in-
ternational migration. Religion is a central element in the formation of individual and
social identities, and still shapes cultural traditions today (Kinnvall, 2004; Wellman and
Tokuno, 2004). By affecting the values, morals and behaviour of individuals, it promotes
cultural proximity between country pairs which in turn might increase international mi-
gration by facilitating the integration and assimilation of immigrants in the destination
country. This point is in line with the prediction of the behavioural model developed by
Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2010), according to which the utility of individuals decreases
when they move to countries that proscribe behavioural rules that differ from the ones
they internalised.
Religious similarity between two countries might also affect international migration
by providing newcomers with religious networks that are already well established in the
host country. This can reduce migration costs by supporting immigrants in their search
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for housing and employment or by providing them with places where they can interact
with people who were born or who have already settled in the destination country. Addi-
tionally, religious networks provide newcomers with psychological and spiritual support.
International migration is often described as a destabilising process that causes anxiety
and feelings of intensified insecurity (Hirschman, 2004). In such situations, religious iden-
tification is shown to play a particularly important role in the well-being of immigrants
as it gives them a sense of belonging and improves their self-esteem.1
Some of these practical and spiritual services might also be offered by ethnic-religious
institutions established in the destination country (Levitt, 2003, 2004; Diehl and Koenig,
2013). The extent to which such institutions exist and how much newcomers benefit
from their services depends on the age and the size of immigrant communities. Indeed,
van Tubergen (2013) shows that old and large diaspora often include well-established
ethnic-religious institutions that attract newcomers because they provide services that
are tailored to their specific needs. On the contrary, immigrants coming from new source
countries do not have access to such institutions and are less embedded in ethnic-religious
networks. Therefore, religious similarity between country pairs is suspected to be more
important for the latter as they do not benefit from broad immigrant networks that
could facilitate their moving and integration process. Equivalently, this would mean that
potential destination countries with large diaspora communities are more attractive for
migrants who do not share their majority religion.
This chapter thus examines two questions: Does religious similarity between country
pairs affect international migration? Does the effect of religious similarity depend on the
size of immigrant communities existing in the destination country? The estimation ap-
proach employed to address these questions is derived from a random utility maximisation
(RUM) model. This derivation reveals that the estimation of the specification of interest
1See Smith (1978), Ebaugh and Chafetz (2000), Ebaugh (2003), Kinnvall (2004), Wellman and Tokuno
(2004), Lim and Putnam (2010), Ysseldyk et al. (2010), Olson (2011), and Connor (2012).
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might suffer from engodeneity biases if it is not correctly controlled for multilateral resis-
tance to migration, that is, for the fact that a location choice depends on the migration
frictions between the source country and all potential destination countries (Bertoli and
Moraga, 2013). To address this problem, time-varying country dummies are included in
the specification. Other econometric challenges are the potential heteroscedasticity of
the data and the high frequency of observations reporting zero migration flows. San-
tos Silva and Tenreyro (2006, 2008, 2011a) use Monte Carlo simulations to assess the
validity and performance of alternative empirical methods in the presence of such data.
They provide evidence that the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator
is to be preferred over alternative estimators as it is less subject to biases resulting from
heteroscedasticity and truncation. In light of this evidence, the gravity-type equation
derived in this chapter is estimated using a PPML approach.
To do this, international migration flows are approximated by taking the difference
between migration stocks made available by the Global Bilateral Migration Database
(GBMD). They are regressed on standard explanatory variables of international migra-
tion, such as distance and common language, on an indicator of religious similarity, a
variable capturing the size of diaspora, and on the interaction between these two vari-
ables. Religious similarity between country pairs is approximated using a binary variable
that takes the value one whenever two countries share the majority religion and zero
otherwise. This indicator relies on data provided by the World Religion Database.
The results predict that bilateral migration rates between two countries sharing the
majority religion are on average 136 percent higher than between countries having dif-
ferent religious backgrounds. As expected, this effect decreases with the size of diaspora,
suggesting that religious similarity is particularly important for individuals moving to
countries with small immigrant communities. Moreover, the results reveal that interna-
tional migration increases with the size of diaspora, which is in line with the findings
published by Beine, Docquier and Ozden (2011). According to the Poisson estimates,
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a 1 percent increase in the size of diaspora leads to an increase in bilateral migration
rates of 0.50 percent when countries share the majority religion and to an increase of 0.58
when they have different religious backgrounds. The existence of immigrant networks
in the host country hence seems to be slightly more important for migrants originating
from countries that do not share the destination’s majority religion. Finally, these sig-
nificant results highlight the importance of including religious similarity between country
pairs in specifications analysing migration patterns, especially since the traditional dyadic
variables do not adequately account for cultural factors.
This study is related to several strands of literature. First, it draws on papers in so-
ciology and social psychology that have long recognised the important role that religion
plays for immigrants. Second, the theoretical model is based on the income maximisation
approach originated by Roy (1951)2 and relates to studies in migration literature that
highlight the importance of controlling for multilateral resistance to migration. Third,
the empirical specification is close to the gravity-type frameworks used in recent papers
analysing various determinants of migration.3 Finally, the estimation approach is re-
lated to recent contributions in the econometric literature that verify the consistency
and efficiency of various estimates in the presence of heteroscedasticity in the data and
truncation.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section gives an overview
of the literature. Section 4.3 presents the theoretical framework used to analyse the
relationship between the religious similarity of country pairs and international migration,
from which the econometric specification is derived. The estimation approaches and the
data used to estimate this specification are presented in sections 4.4 and 4.5, respectively.
Section 4.6 reports the main results, and their robustness is verified in section 4.7. The
2See for instance Sjaastad (1962), Anderson (1979), and Borjas (1987, 1989, 1994, 1999).
3Among others, see Clark, Hatton, and Williamson (2007), Pedersen, Pytlikova, and Smith (2008),
Mayda (2010), Beine, Docquier and Ozden (2011), Grogger and Hanson (2011), Ortega and Peri (2012),
and Beine and Parsons (2012).
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last section concludes and proposes future avenues of research.
4.2 Related Literature
Religion has long been ignored by economic scholars as it was viewed to be a purely private
matter that is only likely to reach ignorant, uninformed and irrational individuals (Stark
and Finke, 2000).4 This situation did not change after Max Weber (1904–1921 [2006])
posited that religious factors are main drivers of economic development. He claimed that
the Protestant Reformation favoured the rise of modern capitalism in Western Europe by
breaking with Catholic traditions, particularly with its sacrament of penance. According
to Weber, the Protestant ethic improved personal traits, such as work ethic and disci-
pline, and introduced rationalisation in all areas of life.5 This, in turn, led the Western
economies down the path of modernisation. However, Weber also claimed that religion
is condemned to disappear in response to rationalisation and economic development:
The tension between religion and intellectual knowledge definitely comes to
the force wherever rational empirical knowledge has consistently worked through
to the disenchantment of the world and its transformation into a causal mech-
anism. [...] Every increase of rationalism in empirical science increasingly
pushes religion from the rational into the irrational realm. (Weber, 1946, p.
350–1)
The hypothesis that religion is rooted in irrationality and is doomed to disappear is
known as the secularisation thesis (Wilson, 1966; Berger, 1969). This thesis was largely
supported by sociologists and psychologists until the first half of the 20th century. How-
ever, since then it has been increasingly criticised as being mainly the result of ideological
4See also Stark et al. (1996) for an overview of intellectuals living in the 19th and 20th centuries who
considered religious adherence to be the outcome of an irrational choice.
5The Calvinistic concept of predestination and the quest for salvation encouraged Protestants to
behave rationally in order to experience economic success (Kaufmann, 1997).
98 CHAPTER 4. RELIGIOUS SIMILARITY AND MIGRATION
debates that are not supported by facts.6 Indeed, consistent empirical evidence showing
that religious beliefs decline with modernisation is missing. Religion is rather observed to
be persistent and even to have revived in many countries over the last decades.7 Moreover,
Iannaccone, Finke and Stark (1997) find that countries with similar levels of economic
development can experience different religious trends. For example, while religious beliefs
declined in Sweden to reach low levels of religious mobilisation, religious participation in-
creased in the United States. The authors argue that the secularisation thesis is unable
to predict these different evolutions because it focuses merely on the demand for religion
and fails to consider the empirical evidence that suggests that different religious partic-
ipation rates rather reflect shifts in the supply of religious activities. In order to take
into account both demand-side and supply-side factors, Bainbridge, Finke, Iannaccone
and Stark published various studies in which they develop a theory of religious mar-
kets.8 On the demand side, this theory is in line with the microeconomic models of Azzi
and Ehrenberg (1975) and Ehrenberg (1977), which predict that individuals allocate time
and money to religious and secular activities based on the maximisation of inter-temporal
utility functions.9 On the supply side, religious services are assumed to be produced by
churches and offered on a competitive market. In order to attract adherents, the services
provided by a given church thus have to be of good quality and have to match the de-
6There is a large body of literature rejecting the secularisation thesis. See, among others, Martin
(1965), Shiner (1967), Greeley (1972), Hadden (1987), Warner (1993), Stark et al. (1996), and Iannaccone
(1998). For a good overview, see Stark and Finke (2000).
7For example, a resurgence of religious adherence has been observed in the United States (Finke and
Stark, 1992; Warner, 1993) and in Latin America (Martin, 1990; Stoll, 1990), challenging the secularisa-
tion thesis. As Iannaccone (1998, p. 1466) emphasises, “the resurgence of evangelical Christianity in the
United States, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East, the explosive growth of Protes-
tantism in Latin America, the religious ferment in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the role
of religion in political and ethnic conflicts worldwide - all testify to religion’s pervasive and continuing
importance”.
8To mention only a few studies, see Bainbridge and Stark (1979), Iannaccone (1991), Finke and Stark
(1992), Finke and Iannaccone (1993), Stark and Iannaccone (1994), Stark et al. (1996), and Stark and
Finke (2000). Stark and Finke (2000) give a good overview of the studies developing the theory of
religious markets that were published, among others, by Bainbridge, Iannaccone, Finke and Stark.
9In other words, it predicts that the consumption of religious services depends on the opportunity
costs of time and money. An inter-temporal utility function is a function that takes into account both
lifetime and after-life utility (Azzi and Ehrenberg, 1975).
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mand. Otherwise, individuals consume the goods and services offered by other religious
or secular firms. Moreover, the theory on religious markets suggests that government
intervention can affect participation rates in religious activities by changing the market
conditions. According to Iannaccone et al. (1997), the vibrant church attendance in the
United States finds its origin in the first amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which intro-
duced religious freedom and created a highly competitive religious market characterised
by religious pluralism. The opposite situation is observed in Sweden because public fi-
nancial support of the Lutheran church resulted in a monopolistic religion market, giving
no incentives to the Lutheran state church to provide adequate and efficient services to
its adherents (Stark and Iannaccone, 1994).10
The religion market model introduces a new perspective as it refutes the secularisa-
tion thesis and shows that religious participation is a persistent phenomenon that can
be the outcome of a rational choice. This new perspective gives rise to a growing num-
ber of studies trying to uncover links between religion and economic outcome. Some of
these studies support some aspects of the hypothesis of Max Weber as they suggest that
religion affects economically important behaviour, such as education (Becker and Woess-
mann, 2009; Boppart, Falkinger, Grossmann, Woitek, Wu¨thrich and Gabriela, 2013;
Boppart, Falkinger and Grossmann, 2014) and fertility (Lehrer, 1996), by influencing
personal beliefs and characteristics.11 Others suggest that religion increases economic
activity by providing members of the same congregation with a similar system of val-
ues and moral conduct.12 This similarity might promote cultural proximity and trust
10For a critical discussion of the religious market model, see McCleary (2011b). More precisely, see
Chapters 1, 7, and 13 written by Rachel McCleary, Daniel Olson and Daniel Hungerman, respectively.
11Education and fertility are just two examples of many. It has also been analysed whether religion
affects marriage, divorce, suicide, drug consumption and mental and physical health, to mention only
a few. For a broader overview of empirical studies analysing the link between religion and individual
behaviour, see Iannaccone (1998) and more recently Lehrer (2011) and Ysseldyk et al. (2010).
12According to Ebaugh and Chafetz (2000, p. 21), congregations “indicate, very broadly, groupings
of people who gather together for religious purposes and who create an ongoing structure in which to
worship, share a religious tradition, interact as a group, and attempt to raise their children with specific
religious beliefs, customs, rituals, and values”.
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among individuals, which in turn facilitates cooperation (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Greif,
1993; Putnam, 1993; Greif, 1994, 2006; Fukuyama, 1995; Iannaccone, 1998; Alesina and
La Ferrara, 2002; Tabellini, 2008). Following this reasoning, recent empirical studies
find that religious similarity between two countries increases international trade (Guo,
2004; Helble, 2007) and promotes foreign direct investment (Hergueux, 2012) by reducing
transaction costs. In addition, I posit that religious similarity also affects international
migration by promoting cultural proximity and by offering services that can facilitate
potential migrants’ integration in the host country. To the best of my knowledge, this
relationship has not yet been explicitly analysed in economic studies.
Since the second half of the 20th century, scholars in sociology and social psychology
recognised the importance of religion in the moving and assimilation process. As al-
ready hinted, religion is an important driver for individual and social identity formation
(Kinnvall, 2004; Wellman and Tokuno, 2004). It has shaped cultures and affects daily
interactions still today, even in more secular countries (Kaufmann, 1997). However, each
religion has its doctrine, ideology, and rituals, which prescribe beliefs and behavioural
rules that can be very different from one religion to the next (Iannaccone, 1998). As
most religions claim to possess the universal truth, they often exhibit a certain degree of
intolerance towards people or groups who do not share their ideas (Levitt, 2003). This
can lead to tensions when immigrants carry along religious and cultural traditions that
are not shared by the majority of the population in the host country (Kinnvall, 2004;
Wellman and Tokuno, 2004; Roman and Goschin, 2011). For instance, comparing Mus-
lim Turks and Catholic Poles who migrated to predominantly Catholic Germany, Diehl
and Koenig (2013) show that Turks face more discrimination because, contrary to Poles,
they cannot just become “a little less religious” (p. 13) in order to assimilate. In such
situations, international migration can be a disruptive experience that gives immigrants
a feeling of insecurity and vulnerability. As Hirschman (2004, p. 1210) emphasises:
Immigrants become strangers in a new land with the loss of familiar sounds,
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sights, and smells. The expectations of customary behaviour, hearing one’s
native language, and support from family and friends can no longer be taken
for granted. Even the most routine activities of everyday life - shopping for
food, working, and leisure time pursuits - can be alienating experiences for
many new immigrants who find themselves in strange settings that require
constant mental strain to navigate and to be understood.
Kinnvall (2004) claims that such traumatic events are likely to lead to existential anx-
iety as they challenge the identity and self-esteem of migrants. Giving them a sense of
belonging in a foreign environment, religious identification is suspected to be particu-
larly important for the well-being of immigrants (Smith, 1978; Lim and Putnam, 2010;
Ysseldyk et al., 2010; Connor, 2012; Olson, 2011). Ebaugh and Chafetz (2000, p. 18) em-
phasise that “religion is not only a central element in the maintenance of ethnic identity
among immigrants, but it may well be more important for their identity than was true
in their homelands, where religion is often taken for granted.” The increased importance
of religious identification in times of intensified insecurity is suspected to result from its
monolithic and abstract nature.13 Kinnvall (2004, p. 758) argues that religious identifi-
cation is “the one stable identity that answers to the need for securitized subjectivity.
With its very long history, this monolithic “entity” becomes a stabilizing anchor in an
otherwise chaotic and changing world, linking the past and the present to future actions.”
The religious similarity of country pairs might thus affect international migration by
promoting cultural similarity, thereby decreasing the psychological and emotional chal-
lenge that a resettlement can represent. In economics, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) for-
malise this point by developing a behavioural model where the utility function decreases
due to “losses in identity” (p. 719).14 To capture those losses, a person’s utility depends
13See Smith (1978) for anecdotal evidence that religious identification was salient for the assimilation
of European immigrants moving to America during the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th
century. More recently, see Freeman (2003), who claims that religious, national and ethnic identities are
salient, that is, that they have pre-eminence over other social identities.
14See also Akerlof and Kranton (2010).
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not only on her own behaviour but also on the behaviour of others and the behaviour
that a group or a society prescribes to its members. More precisely, Akerlof and Kranton
suggest that anxiety and losses in utility are the result of a person’s attempt to assimi-
late or integrate in a society that prescribes a different behaviour than the one that was
internalised, and even if “those with non distinguishing physical features may be able to
“pass” as a member of another group [...] others will be constrained by their appearance,
voice, or accent.” (p. 726). The authors further emphasise that “much conflict occurs be-
cause people with different prescriptions or identities come into contact. To avoid conflict
and losses in utility, people may want to match with those who share the same identity or
for whom actions have the same meaning” (p. 731). As religion is an important cultural
component that affects the identity and behaviour of people, the model suggests that
religious similarity between country pairs reduces the probability that an immigrant’s
utility decreases because of losses in identity, which in turn might promote international
migration.
Religious similarity between the home and host countries could also affect interna-
tional migration by providing immigrants with large networks that help them satisfy prac-
tical and economic needs (Cadge and Ecklund, 2007; Aleksynska and Chiswick, 2011).
Newcomers have to find housing, search for employment and deal with bureaucracy in
order to obtain all the immigration-related papers. Some have to improve their language
skills and others need to find a school for their children. Churches, synagogues, temples,
mosques or other sites of religious participation are trustworthy institutions that assist
immigrants in these processes. They also provide places where immigrants can interact
with other members. This can further ease integration in the host country by giving them
access to an even broader social network (Ebaugh and Chafetz, 2000).
Some of these practical and spiritual services might also be offered by immigrant
networks established in the destination country. Beine et al. (2011) find that interna-
tional migration depends on the size of such diaspora. By providing newcomers with
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networks composed of immigrants who are already established in the host country, they
find that the existence of such immigrant communities promotes international migration
by increasing the availability and the quality of information about migration opportu-
nities. Furthermore, Freeman (2003) emphasises that individuals often have difficulties
in separating national and religious identities.15 As these identities generally intertwine,
diaspora often embed ethnic-religious institutions because, once established in the host
country, immigrants practice their own rituals that satisfy their ethnic-specific demand
for religion. As these institutions offer services in the mother tongue and keep familiar
forms of worship, even immigrants sharing the majority religion of the host country might
prefer them over established local congregations (van Tubergen, 2013; Diehl and Koenig,
2013). In this case, diaspora not only alleviate informational frictions as suggested by
Beine et al. (2011), but they also provide immigrants with religious organisations that
can help them through the migration and assimilation processes. Moreover, according
to Levitt (2003, 2004), such ethnic-religious institutions are generally connected to their
communities of origin, representing transnational religious organisations that can further
facilitate international migration. Analysing religious attendance among different im-
migrant groups in the Netherlands, van Tubergen (2013) finds that immigrants coming
from new source countries (Poland and Bulgaria) are less embedded in ethnic-religious
networks than immigrants who belong to larger and more well-established groups (Turks,
Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans). The author concludes (p. 723):
Conditional upon pre-migration religiousness [...] both the well-established
Muslim group from Turkey and Morocco and the well-established, predom-
inantly Christian, groups from Suriname and the Antilles show more reli-
gious continuity in the Netherlands than the recent Muslim immigrants from
Bulgaria and the Christian immigrants from Poland. Thus, rather than pre-
15See also Ebaugh and Chafetz (2000, p. 401) who argue that “ethnicity is frequently determined by
an immigrant’s identification with a particular religious tradition more than by any other factor, such as
language, feelings of nationalism, or belief in a common descent.”
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dominant religious affiliation in the home country, the relevant distinction for
religious continuity is the size and history of the immigrant community in the
Netherlands. The stronger continuation of pre-migration religiosity among
immigrants who belong to the larger and older groups could be the result
of stronger protection to assimilative forces, i.e. the larger ethnic networks
promote the religious monitoring of co-ethnics and protect them against the
more secular Dutch norms and practices. Considering religious practices, an-
other possible explanation is that the religious market is better adapted to the
demands of the immigrants from the older and larger groups, as these groups
have been in Holland for a longer period and are numerically far larger than
the “new” group.
According to van Tubergen, immigrant communities can thus embed protective religious
networks that provide religious services tailored to the specific needs of their members.
However, how well these networks are established and how much immigrants benefit from
their services depends on the age and the size of the immigrant communities. Follow-
ing this reasoning, the migration-promoting effect of religious similarity between country
pairs should be higher for migrants moving to countries with small immigrant networks.
Equivalently, potential destination countries with large diaspora should be more attrac-
tive for migrants who do not share the host countries’ majority religions. In order to
shed some light on this point, this chapter also looks at the interaction between religious
similarity and the size of such diaspora.
To resume, I posit that religious similarity between source and destination countries
increases international migration by promoting cultural proximity between country pairs
and by providing newcomers with economic and social support. I argue that this effect is
especially important for people moving to countries with small immigrant communities,
depending on the size of diaspora established in the destination country. This chapter
hence examines two questions. First, it analyses the relationship between the religious
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similarity of country pairs and international migration, and, second, it verifies whether
and how this relationship depends on the size of the immigrant networks. The theoretical
framework used to perform this analysis is described in the next section.
4.3 Theoretical Considerations
This section first derives the theoretical framework that builds on the models presented
in Chapters 2 and 3. More precisely, it is again based on a random utility maximisation
(RUM) model that assumes that potential migrants only move abroad if the expected mi-
gration benefits exceed the expected migration costs. However, the framework presented
here goes a step further in the generalisation of the distributional assumption. Whereas
the previous models only accounted for heterogeneity within source countries, the model
used in this chapter additionally allows for spatial correlation in the random part of util-
ity. In other words, it does not only assume that migrants are systematically different
from stayers but also allows for destination countries to be viewed as close substitutes by
potential migrants.
After deriving the theoretical model, this section discusses potential determinants of
international migration flows, including the possible role of religious similarity between
country pairs and its interaction with the size of immigrant networks established in des-
tination countries.
4.3.1 A RUM Model allowing for Multilateral Resistance to
Migration
The individual location choice problem faced by potential migrants is derived from a
RUM model where an individual i from country s who can choose her preferred location
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d among a set of n countries D has the following location-specific utility:16
U isd = Vsd + 
i
sd ∀ d, (4.1)
where Vsd represents the deterministic component of the utility obtained by an inhabitant
in s from opting for location d, and isd accounts for the unobserved individual-specific
part of utility that is treated as being random. Among the n possible locations included
in D, individual i is expected to choose the one that yields the highest utility (Roy, 1951).
To illustrate this point, suppose that individual i from country s has two alternatives:
staying at home or moving to country k. In this case, migration is only observed if the
average utility of living abroad is greater than the utility derived from staying at home,
that is, if it holds that U isk > U
i
ss. The probability that an individual chooses to move
from country s to country k 6= s instead of staying at home can then be written as:
P isk = P (U
i
sk > U
i
ss)
= P (Vsk + 
i
sk > Vss + 
i
ss)
= P (iss − isk < Vsk − Vss).
(4.2)
As individual i faces a set of potential locations, this decision problem yields a vector of
choice probabilities Pis = (P
i
s1, . . . , P
i
sn) that depend on the distributional assumptions
about the random component in equation (4.1). Following McFadden (1974, 1976), these
choice probabilities can be described using a conditional logit model if the stochastic term
isd is assumed to be independently and identically distributed with a type I extreme value
distribution.17 In this case, the logistic choice probability that location k is chosen over
16Bilateral migration is observed over time. However, for simplicity, I omit the time subscript here. It
will be included in the end of this sub-section.
17This is because the difference of two extreme value variables follows a logistic distribution. To see
how different distributional assumptions lead to different discrete choice models, see Train (2009) and
Wooldridge (2010, Ch. 16).
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an alternative set of locations is given by:18
P isk =
eVsk∑
d e
Vsd
, (4.3)
where
∑
d e
Vsd sums the deterministic utilities of all potential alternatives d ∈ D, including
the utility derived from staying at home and that derived from moving to destination k.
The individual logit choice probabilities take values between zero and one, and they sum
to one:
∑n
k=1 P
i
sk = 1. This implies that individual i necessarily chooses one location
and that the probability of choosing destination k over location s neither depends on the
existence nor on the characteristics of alternative destinations. Formally, this can be seen
by looking at the ratio of two logit probabilities:
P isk
P iss
=
eVsk/
∑
d e
Vsd
eVss/
∑
d e
Vsd
=
eVsk
eVss
= eVsk−Vss , (4.4)
where the term
∑
d e
Vsd drops, suggesting that the individual choice between locations k
and s is indeed independent of any alternative destination. This property is known as the
independence from irrelevant alternative (IIA) property, which gives rise to proportional
substitution patterns.19 Moreover, the distributional assumption made to derive the
conditional logit model implies that the attractiveness of a potential destination k is
identical for all origin countries and for all individuals within those countries (Bertoli and
Moraga, 2013). The model thus does not allow for any type of unobserved heterogeneity.
Therefore, the IIA axiom is only satisfied when the model is specified correctly, that is,
when the deterministic part of utility includes all determinants capturing correlations
18For derivation, see Appendix 1.
19Suppose there are three countries labelled A, B and C. Country A and B are close substitutes. If
the attractiveness of country A declines, then the IIA assumption implies that migrants who previously
moved to country A are allocated to the two remaining countries such that the relative choice probabilities
remain unchanged (Falaris, 1987; Train, 2009). However, if A and B are close substitutes, I would expect
most of these migrants to move to country B. To take this possibility into account, countries will be
grouped in nests (see hereafter). The conditional logit model was used, among others, to analyse how
bilateral migration is affected by changes in immigration policies (Clark et al., 2007; Mayda, 2010),
networks (Pedersen et al., 2008), and skill-related differences in earnings (Grogger and Hanson, 2011).
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between alternative locations such that the stochastic term of utility only captures white
noise (Train, 2009, p. 39).
Such restrictive properties are not plausible when analysing international migration
patterns, as limited data availability often impedes the inclusion in the model of all rel-
evant determinants of location-specific utility. This is problematic, first because it is
unlikely that potential migrants of the same origin all have identical preferences. Take
Switzerland, which has four official languages (French, German, Italian and Romansh) as
an example. A Swiss-German might have higher utility from moving to Germany than
a Swiss-French or a Swiss-Italian. Second, the relative probability of choosing location k
over location s generally depends on the attractiveness of alternative destinations, which
also violates the IIA property. This should be especially true when two alternative lo-
cations are perceived as close substitutes by potential migrants.20 Suppose individual
i originating from s is indifferent between moving to Germany or Switzerland. In this
case, already a small change in the attractiveness of Germany—induced, for example,
by an increase in wages or a change in immigration policies—might redirect flows from
Switzerland to Germany. The fact that the decision to move from a country s to a
location k depends on the migration frictions between them relative to the average im-
pediments these two countries have with all alternative destination countries is known as
“multilateral resistance to migration” (Bertoli and Moraga, 2013).21
To address these concerns, Ortega and Peri (2012, p. 8) allow for unobserved individ-
ual heterogeneity within source countries: “Our migration model extends Grogger and
20As mentioned by McFadden (1974, p. 113), “The primary limitation of the model is that the indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternative axiom is implausible for alternative sets containing choices that are close
substitutes.” See also McFadden (1976, p. 369): “The multinomial logit model combined with the results
relating to the random utility model is particularly appealing in applications because of computational
advantages and consistency with a theory of sampling from a population of classical utility-maximising
consumers. The primary drawback of this formulation is that it ignores some of the structural aspects of
choice which makes the independence from irrelevant alternatives property inappropriate in some appli-
cations. As pointed out by Debreu (1960), the strict utility model predicts too high a joint probability
of selection for two alternatives which are in fact perceived as “similar” rather than “independent” by
the subject.”
21For an analogue in the trade setting, see Anderson and van Wincoop (2003, p. 176).
4.3. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 109
Hanson (2011) by allowing for unobserved individual heterogeneity between migrants and
non-migrants. It is plausible that migrants systematically differ from non-migrants along
important dimensions that are hard to measure, such as ability, risk aversion and the
psychological costs of living far from home.” They account for this type of unobserved
heterogeneity by including time-varying origin-country dummies in their specification.
According to Bertoli and Moraga (2013), this is only sufficient to restore the IIA property
and to make the specification of Ortega and Peri (2012) consistent with the underlying
RUM model if the unobserved individual heterogeneity affects all destination countries
identically. As this is unlikely to be true, Bertoli and Moraga (2012) further relax the
distributional assumption by grouping destination countries into “nests”. Potential mi-
grants perceive any two alternative destination countries belonging to the same nest as
close substitutes (McFadden, 1984; Train, 2009). If a nest is composed of only one coun-
try, then this nest, respectively the country belonging to the nest, is called a singleton. In
their empirical example analysing how immigration policies and networks affect bilateral
migration flows, Bertoli and Moraga (2012) assume that the source countries are sin-
gletons in order to account for heterogeneity within these countries, and they partition
the destination countries into six subsets (six nests) in order to reduce cross-sectional
dependence.
In a recent publication, Bertoli and Moraga (2013) go a step further in their attempt
to generalise the distributional assumption of the stochastic component of utility. They
use a Generalised Extreme Value generating function that allows destination countries to
be allocated not only to one but simultaneously to J different nests {b1, ..., bJ}, indexed
by j = 1, ..., J . They derive the following individual choice probabilities:
P isk =
J∑
j=1
P isk|bjP
i
sbj
=
∑
j(αskje
Vsk)1/τ
(∑
d∈bj(αsdje
Vsd)1/τ
)τ−1
∑
j
(∑
d∈bj(αsdje
Vsd)1/τ
)τ ,
where P isk|bj is the probability that individual i originating from country s chooses location
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k conditional on opting for a location belonging to nest bj and P
i
sbj
is the probability that
the same individual chooses a location that is in nest bj. αskj ∈ [0, 1] is known as the
“allocation parameter” that allocates the location k to the J different nests and τ ∈ [0, 1]
as the “dissimilarity parameter” that measures the degree of correlation in unobserved
utility among the locations within the subgroups (Bertoli and Moraga, 2013; Wen and
Koppelman, 2001; McFadden, 1981, 1978).22 If τ = 1, then there is no correlation and
the model simplifies to the conditional logit model seen previously. As τ approaches zero,
the within-nest (spatial) correlation in the random part of utility increases. Taking the
ratio of two choice probabilities yields:
P isk
P iss
=
∑
j(αskje
Vsk)1/τ
(∑
d∈bj(αsdje
Vsd)1/τ
)τ−1
∑
j(αssje
Vss)1/τ
(∑
d∈bj(αsdje
Vsd)1/τ
)τ−1 , (4.5)
where
(∑
d∈bj(αsdje
Vsd)1/τ
)τ−1
allows location decisions between two countries to depend
on the characteristics and existence of alternative destinations d belonging to the same
nest bj while the stochastic part of the utility of two alternatives belonging to different
nests are assumed to be independent. Bertoli and Moraga (2013) further make the as-
sumption that the source country s is a singleton. Adding time subscripts, equation (4.5)
can then be re-written as:23
P iskt
P isst
=
∑
j(αskje
Vskt)1/τ
(∑
d∈bj(αsdje
Vsdt)1/τ
)τ−1
eVsst
=
(eVskt)1/τ
eVsst
ηskt, (4.6)
where
22See Train (2009) for a simple explanation of nested logit models.
23As explained by Bertoli and Moraga (2013, p. 82), if s is a singleton then “there is a nest bj such
that αssj = 1 and αsdj = 0 for all d ∈ D”. Note that indexes in the citation have been changed to match
the notation in this chapter.
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ηsk =
∑
j
(αskj)
1/τ
∑
d∈bj
(αsdje
Vsdt)1/τ
τ−1 ,
captures multilateral resistance to trade as it “captures the influence exerted by the
opportunities (and barriers) to migrate to other destinations upon migration from country
s to country k at time t” (Bertoli and Moraga, 2013, p. 82).24 As individual choice
probabilities can be aggregated and approximated with frequencies (Train, 2009), the
average probability that potential migrants originating from s choose destination k over
destination s in period t can then be re-written as:
Mskt
Msst
=
(eVskt)1/τ
eVsst
µskt, (4.7)
where µskt = ηsktzskt and zskt captures the error of approximating probabilities, Mskt
counts the number of individuals born in country s who choose location k in period t and
Msst represents those who choose to stay at home in the same period.
4.3.2 The Determinants of International Migration Flows
The representative utility is generally assumed to take a linear function of its determi-
nants. The utility of individuals staying at home (Vss) is typically assumed to depend on
the characteristics of the home country, such as prevailing wages, climate and existing
welfare systems:
Vsst = λst, (4.8)
where λst captures these source-country specific characteristics that can vary over time.
Similarly, the representative utility of living abroad depends on the characteristics of the
host country k and on the moving, assimilation and integration costs that individuals
24The indexes in the citation have been changed to match the notation used in this chapter.
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face when migrating to a foreign country k 6= s:
Vskt = λkt − g(Xsk, Rskt, Nskt), (4.9)
where λkt stands for the time-varying country-specific characteristics of destination k and
g(Xsk, Rskt, Nskt) captures the bilateral migration costs. While λkt affects all immigrants
similarly, independently of their origin, migration costs are specific to a given country
pair. Indeed, bilateral migration frictions, such as the magnitude of physical moving
costs and policy-based migration barriers, vary from one destination to another, leading
to different bilateral costs. These costs are generally approximated with bilateral time-
invariant control variables, such as a measure of geographical distance and dummies that
take the value one whenever two countries share a border, when they have the same
official language, the same legal origins or a common colonial history. These traditional
dyadic variables are included in vector Xsk. Furthermore, these migration costs are
allowed to depend on religious similarity between country pairs (Rskt), the size of diaspora
established in a destination country (Nskt) and the interaction of these two variables
(Rskt ∗ Nskt). If, as suspected, religious similarity lowers migration costs by promoting
cultural proximity between country pairs and by providing newcomers with networks,
there should be evidence in favour of gR < 0.
25 Similarly, if the size of a diaspora
lowers migration costs by improving the information flows between the source and the
destination countries, then there should be evidence in favour of gN < 0. Finally, if the
cost-reducing effect of religious similarity decreases with the size of immigrant networks,
or vice versa, then there should be evidence in favour of the hypothesis that the effect of
religious similarity on the utility of migrating to another country decreases based on the
size of the diaspora, that is, gRN > 0. Bilateral migration frictions are thus specified to
25gR denotes the partial derivative of g with respect to R and gN with respect to N ; gRN is the cross
derivative.
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take the following functional form:
g(Xsk, Rskt, Nskt) = X
′
skγ + β1Rskt + β2Nskt + β3Rskt ∗Nskt. (4.10)
Substituting equations (4.8) to (4.10) into equation (4.7) and rearranging terms yields
the following constant-elasticity model:
Mskt
Msst
= exp (β1Rskt + β2Nskt + β3Rskt ∗Nskt + X′skγ + λkt/τ + λst)µskt, (4.11)
which is estimated using the empirical approaches described in the next section. Accord-
ing to the previous discussion, we expect the following signs of the estimated coefficients:
β1 > 0, β2 > 2 and β3 < 0.
4.4 Empirical Strategy
A conventional estimation procedure involves taking the logarithm of equation (4.11) to
obtain:
log (Mskt/Msst) = β1Rskt + β2Nskt + β3Rskt ∗Nskt + X′skγ + λkt/τ + λst + µskt. (4.12)
However, this estimation approach suffers from two main limitations. First, estimating
equation (4.12) using OLS only generates consistent estimates if the conditional variance
of µskt is independent of the explanatory variables.
26 As discussed in the previous section,
this condition is not satisfied when analysing international migration patterns because
26This follows from Jensen’s inequality, which states that E[log ηskt] 6= log E[ηskt]. In other words,
the expected value of log (ηskt) not only depends on the mean of ηskt but also on higher moments
of its distribution. If the log-linearisation of the model leads to a non-linear transformation of the
disturbances that is not trivial, such that log E[ηskt|x] = 0 but E[log ηskt|x] 6= 0, OLS cannot be used
as it would yield biased estimates. For a formal illustration of how the presence of heteroscedasticity
in the conditional variance of ηskt can also affect the consistency rather than only the efficiency of an
estimator, see Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006, p. 644) and Felbermayr et al. (2010, p. 45).
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multilateral resistance to migration leads to serially and spatially correlated error terms.
Mayda (2010) addresses this problem by constructing an explanatory variable that mea-
sures the weighted average GDP per capita of all the alternative destinations included in
her sample. Bertoli and Moraga (2012) address it by including origin-year dummies in
their specification that interact with nest dummies. Bertoli and Moraga (2013) go a step
further by estimating their model using the Common Correlated Effects (CCE) estimator
proposed by Pesaran (2006) and Pesaran and Tosetti (2011).27 This estimator allows ac-
counting for unobserved heterogeneity at all levels because it can control for spatial and
serial correlation in the error terms and permits a broad and flexible structure of nests.
However, the CCE approach cannot be applied here because it requires a dataset with
a large time dimension. Moreover, Bertoli and Moraga (2013) take the log of bilateral
migration rates, which leads to the exclusion of all zero observations. This is also the sec-
ond main limitation of the approach that estimates equation (4.12) using OLS, as it leads
to a highly selective omission of observations and to potentially severe biases, especially
when the omitted observations provide valuable information about why zero migration
is observed (Anderson and Yotov, 2010; Helpman et al., 2008).28 A common response
to this problem is to add one to the dependent variable and regress log (y + 1) on the
covariates of y.29 However, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) provide evidence that the
results obtained using this estimation approach are also misleading. Using Monte Carlo
27As Bertoli and Moraga (2013, p. 80) explain, “Pesaran (2006) proposed an estimator, the Common
Correlated Effects (CCE) estimator, which allows to derive consistent estimates from panel data when the
error follows this structure, i.e. it is serially and spatially correlated, and the regressors are endogenous.
The CCE estimator requires to estimate a regression where the cross-sectional averages of the dependent
and of all the independent variables are included as auxiliary regressors: consistency of the estimates
follows from the fact that the multilateral resistance to migration term can be approximated by a dyad-
specific linear combination of the cross-sectional averages.”
28Zero observations can result from rounding errors associated with very small migration flows, or they
may reflect wrongly coded missing values or errors. However, they can also represent the “true” absence
of migration due to the fact that migration costs are too high. Omitting these true zeros leads to the
loss of valuable information and, thereby, to potentially large biases in parameter estimates. See, for
example, Head et al. (2010), who verify the robustness of their OLS estimates with a PPML approach.
29See, for example, Eichengreen and Irwin (1995, 1998) and more recently, Felbermayr and Kohler
(2006).
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simulations, they assess the validity and performance of alternative empirical methods
that truncate or perform a non-linear transformation of the dependent variable.30 They
find that the PPML estimator is generally less subject to bias resulting from heteroscedas-
ticity and rounding errors than the other estimators under analysis. Another advantage
that follows from modelling the error terms as generated from a Poisson distribution is
that the conditional variance of the dependent variable is proportional to its conditional
mean. In other words, the data does not have to follow a Poisson distribution nor does
the dependent variable have to be an integer. The only condition required for the PPML
estimator to be consistent is that the conditional mean is correctly specified (Gourieroux
et al., 1984; Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2010; Wooldridge, 2010).
Martinez-Zarzoso, Nowak-Lehmann and Vollmer (2007) and Martin and Pham (2008)
challenge the results published by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006). They criticise the
idea that the data-generating process used by the latter only generates zero observations
that result from rounding errors associated with very small trade flows. But in practice,
zero observations in data on international trade and migration may also reflect wrongly
coded missing values or errors and, more importantly, they can reflect the true absence of
international trade or migration between country pairs due to the fact that transaction
costs are too high. As mentioned earlier, omitting these “true” zeros leads to the loss of
valuable information and thereby to potentially large biases in parameter estimates. To
verify whether the PPML estimator also behaves well when the zero observations have
alternative origins, Martinez-Zarzoso et al. (2007) and Martin and Pham (2008) perform
Monte Carlo simulations using mechanisms to generate zeros that are different from the
ones used by Santos Silva and Tenreyro. Martin and Pham (2008) generate a latent
30Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) use Monte Carlo simulations to verify the validity of the following
estimation approaches: Non-Linear Least-Squares, Gamma Pseudo Maximum Likelihood, OLS of the
log linear model, OLS when the depend variable is yi + 1, PPML, the threshold Tobit of Eaton and
Tamura (1994), and a truncated OLS. Moreover, they define four different forms of heteroscedasticity in
order to test how robust these estimation approaches are. They also verify how the performance of the
estimators change in the presence of rounding errors. Follow-up papers that further analyse the validity
of PPML estimation are Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2010, 2011a).
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variable taking the form y∗ = y − k, which is set to zero if its value is negative. Using
this censored regression, they find that the standard threshold-Tobit estimator performs
better then the PPML estimator, as long as it is correctly controlled for heteroscedasticity.
When randomly generating zero observations, Martinez-Zarzoso et al. (2007) find that
the PPML estimator still performs well in the presence of a high frequency of zeros, as
long as the sample size is large. Otherwise, they recommend using a feasible generalised
least squares estimator, which seems to outperform PPML when the sample is small.
Santos Silva and Tenreyro study these concerns and provide further simulation ev-
idence that PPML estimators are suited to estimate constant-elasticity models as long
as the user verifies that the maximum likelihood exists for the parameters of interest
(Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2008, 2010, 2011a,b). Indeed, the PPML estimator can have
difficulties converging in some situations, namely when the dataset has a high frequency
of zero observations, when the model contains many fixed effects, when the values of the
dependent variables are large and when the covariates are highly correlated or have differ-
ent scales.31 However, Santos Silva and Tenreyro propose simple solutions that solve these
problematic situations, such that the PPML procedure still converges and consistently
estimates the parameters of a constant-elasticity model in a variety of circumstances.
In light of the evidence provided by Santos Silva and Tenreyro, it has become common
in recent empirical literature to estimate gravity-type equations first in their logarithmic
form and to compare resulting OLS coefficients to their PPML counterparts that are more
consistent in the presence of heteroscedasticity and zero outcome observations. This is
also the approach adopted here, as Guimaraes et al. (2003, 2004) and Schmidheiny and
Brulhart (2011) verified that Poisson estimation complies with choice models derived
from individual utility maximisation. In order to address the potential violations of the
IIA assumptions discussed earlier, two versions of the location-choice model introduced
in section 4.3 are estimated. First, a full set of origin-year and destination-year dum-
31See also the “The log of gravity” page at http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/∼jmcss/LGW.html.
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mies is included in the estimated specification. The former capture all observable and
unobservable time-varying origin-specific characteristics that might promote or hinder
migration flows, and they also control for heterogeneity in individual propensities to mi-
grate (Bertoli and Moraga, 2012, 2013). Destination-year dummies restore spatial (cross-
sectional) independence in the residuals and account for the time-varying characteristics
of host countries that might affect international migration.32 However, by including a
full set of destination-year dummies, the variability in the data used for identification is
strongly reduced.33 To address this point, the set of potential host countries is partitioned
into different nests based on geographical and economic (GDP per capita) proximity and
the regression is re-run, replacing destination-year dummies with nest fixed effects.34 The
data used to perform this analysis is described next.
4.5 Data
The data on international migration comes from the Global Bilateral Migration Database
(GBMD) collected by Ozden, Parson, Schiff, and Walmsley (2011).35 This unique database
includes data on bilateral migration stocks between approximately 230 source and des-
tination countries for the years 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000. The GBMD is the
migration database with the largest coverage and it is, so far, the only one to include
a complete set of information on South-South migration. It thus allows one to proxy
32This approach is close to the one applied in the trade literature where researchers have to control
for multilateral resistance to trade in order to have an unbiased estimation of parameters.
33As highlighted by Bertoli and Moraga (2012, p. 26), there is a clear trade-off between identification
power and correct specification: “Finer nests [...] run the risk of saturating the model and losing much
of the identification power in the data. In the limit, the finest partition, which is represented by single-
destination nests, ensures cross-sectional independence but delivers no identification in the cross section
as they would be equivalent to origin-destination fixed effects.”
34Destination countries are assigned to different nests based on the country classification of the United
Nations Statistics Division (2013). More precisely, they are classified based on their geographic location,
their economic situation (developed, transition, developing, least developed), whether they export fuel
and whether they are small island developing states.
35The GBMD can be downloaded from the following Internet page of The World Bank:
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/global-bilateral-migration-database.
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bilateral migration flows for a large country sample. These proxies are obtained from
computing Mskt = Sskt+1 − Sskt, where Sskt+1 and Sskt stand for the bilateral migration
stocks in years t + 1 and t, respectively, made available by the GBMD. Mskt hence cap-
tures the decennial gross migration flows between two countries.36 Almost 60 percent of
the observations report zero migration flows, 90 percent have migration flows below 160
and only 1.5 percent report flows above 10,000. Only the six observations reported in
Table 4.1 have decennial migration flows larger than one million.
Table 4.1: Decennial migration flows larger than one million
Origin Destination Year Decennial Migration flows Mskt/Msst
Mexico USA 1970–1980 1,472,078 0.03
Mexico USA 1980–1990 2,253,731 0.03
Mexico USA 1990–2000 4,705,677 0.06
Turkey Germany 1970–1980 1,211576 0.04
Romania Germany 1980–1990 1,070,597 0.05
Bangladesh India 1970–1980 4,577,227 0.07
Source: Global Bilateral Migration Database.
The bilateral migration stocks provided by the GBMD are also used to approximate
diaspora and the native population. Diaspora are approximated by the number of mi-
grants born in country s that live in destination k in year t: Nskt = log(Sskt + 1). Nskt
hence stands for the log stock of migrants at the beginning of the period over which I
compute the migration flows. The proportion of the native population that stays at home
is approximated following Beine and Parsons (2012), that is, by computing:
Msst = Popst −
D∑
k=1
Skst,
where Popst is the total population of country s in year t (natives and foreigners) made
36Note that this proxy only observes the changes in migration stocks. It does not give any information
about the distribution over time or about the origin of these changes. For example, it gives no indication
of whether negative bilateral migration flows are caused by return migration, death, and/or migration
to a third country.
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available in the Penn World Tables (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2012).
∑D
d=1 Skst cap-
tures the foreigners living in country s, independently of their origin k. The population
born in country s that stays at home (Msst) is thus approximated by subtracting the
stock of foreigners in s from its total population.
Religious similarity between two countries is captured with a dummy variable that
takes the value one whenever two countries have the same majority religion, and zero
otherwise. The “majority religion” is the religion that unites the largest part of the pop-
ulation in a country for a given year. The data used to construct this binary variable
comes from the World Religion Database (WRD). It is edited by Johnson and Grim
(2008), provides data for the years 1900, 1950, 1970 and 2000 and reports the national
distribution of population for every country in the world according to the following re-
ligious affiliations: Muslim, Christians, Baha’is, Hindus, Agnostics, Buddhists, Zoroas-
trians, Ethno-religionists, Sikhs, Atheists, Jews, Shintoists, Confucianists, Chinese Folk-
religionists, New Religionists, Spiritists, Jains and Daoists. If the majority religion for
a given country is the same in 1950, 1970 and 2000, it is assumed that this was also
the prevailing religion in 1960, 1980 and 1990. Note that this proxy captures the reli-
gious similarity between two countries at the beginning of the period over which bilateral
migration flows are observed.37
The remaining variables included in Xsk—the variable measuring the weighted dis-
tance between two countries and the dummy variables taking the value one whenever two
countries share a border, have a common colonial history, share the official language and
have the same legal origin—come from the CEPII Gravity Dataset generated by Head,
Mayer and Ries (2010) and Head and Mayer (2013a).
The descriptive statistics of the samples used to analyse the relationship between
37This dummy variable is chosen to proxy the religious similarity of country pairs because it should
not suffer from endogeneity bias caused by reversed causality. This is not necessarily the case when
religious similarity is approximated with a Herfindahl index measuring the probability that a randomly
chosen individual from country s has the same religion as a randomly chosen individual from country k.
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max N
Panel A: Non-negative bilateral migration flows
(with zero observations, estimation with PPML)
Migration flows 980 24,457 0 4,705,677 115,683
Native population (ths) 19,300 78,800 9 1,150,000 115,683
Migration rate 0.0002 0.0041 0 0.5295 115,683
Diaspora 1.20 2.29 0 15.38 115,683
Religious similarity (RS) 0.46 0.50 0 1 115,683
RS*Diaspora 0.70 1.92 0 15.38 115,683
Distance (log) 8.85 0.74 4.15 9.89 115,683
Common language 0.16 0.37 0 1 115,683
Colony 0.01 0.10 0 1 115,683
Common legal origin 0.29 0.46 0 1 115,683
Common border 0.01 0.10 0 1 115,683
Panel B: Positive bilateral migration flows
(without zero observations, estimation with OLS)
Migration flows 2,688 40,444 1 4,705,677 42,184
Native population (ths) 35,200 116,000 9 1,150,000 42,184
Migration rate 0.0006 0.0068 0 0.5295 42’184
Diaspora 3.13 2.87 0 15.38 42,184
Religious similarity (RS) 0.53 0.50 0 1 42,184
RS*Diaspora 1.84 2.81 0 15.38 42,184
Distance (log) 8.55 0.88 4.15 9.89 42,184
Common language 0.20 0.40 0 1 42,184
Colony 0.02 0.15 0 1 42,184
Common legal origin 0.34 0.47 0 1 42,184
Common border 0.03 0.16 0 1 42,184
Notes: This table presents the descriptive statistics of the samples used to estimate the rela-
tionship between the religious similarity of country pairs and bilateral migration rates, and to
analyse whether this effect depends on the size of immigrant networks established in the desti-
nation country. Panel A includes all observations reporting non-negative migration flows. It is
the sample used to estimate the relationship of interest in its multiplicative form with PPML.
Panel B drops all zero migration flow observations and presents the sample used to estimate
equation (4.12) with OLS. The data and its sources are described in section 4.5.
bilateral migration rates and the religious proximity of country pairs are presented in
Table 4.2. The sample includes observations for approximately 230 countries for the years
1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990. Panel A of Table 4.2 presents the summary statistics of the
sample, including all observations reporting non-negative migration flows. This sample
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is used when applying the PPML approach. As almost 60 percent of these observations
report zero migration flows, the sample strongly decreases when estimating equation
(4.12) using OLS. The sample including only positive migration flows is described in
Panel B of Table 4.2.
4.6 Results
The results of estimating the relationship between the religious similarity of country pairs
and bilateral migration rates using OLS and PPML are presented in Table 4.3. Both
approaches find that migration costs captured with the distance between two countries
or with proxies for linguistic and legal similarity have significant effects on migration
flows that go in directions typically observed in the data. The coefficients on religious
similarity, on diaspora in the destination country and on the interaction of these two
variables are also significant but their magnitude varies across columns.
Column (1) of Table 4.3 presents the results of estimating equation (4.12) using OLS.
The positive and highly significant coefficient on religious similarity predicts that migra-
tion rates between two countries sharing the majority religion are on average 40 percent
higher than between countries having different religious backgrounds.38 The results also
predict that bilateral migration flows increase with the size of diaspora established in the
destinations. More precisely, they suggest that a 1 percent increase in the size of immi-
grant networks increases migration rates on average by 0.76 percent. This effect is similar
to the ones published by Beine et al. (2011), who find OLS coefficients on diaspora that
lie between 0.62 and 0.83. As expected, regressing the logarithm of bilateral migration
38For a correct interpretation of the coefficients of dummy variables in a semilogarithmic regres-
sion model see Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980), Kennedy (1981), and Giles (1982), or more recently
Van Garderen and Shah (2002) and Giles (2011). These studies conclude that the estimator by Kennedy
has computational advantages and that it is very close to the unbiased estimator as long as the sam-
ple size is reasonably large. I therefore adopt this estimator. Given a coefficient of 0.34 and a stan-
dard error of 0.03, this yields a difference in predicted bilateral migration flows of approximately
βˆ1 = 100 ∗ [exp(0.34− (0.03)2/2)− 1] = 40.4 percent.
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Table 4.3: The effect of religious similarity on international migration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS PPML PPML PPML PPML
Religious similarity (RS) 0.34*** 0.53*** 0.87*** 0.74***
(0.03) (0.19) (0.16) (0.19)
RS*Diaspora -0.07*** -0.04* -0.08*** -0.08
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Diaspora 0.76*** 0.54*** 0.58*** 0.59*** 0.53***
(0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Distance (log) -0.34*** -0.46*** -0.67*** -0.55*** -0.69***
(0.01) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09)
Common language 0.26*** 0.32*** 0.44*** 0.39*** 0.48***
(0.03) (0.08) (0.09) (0.13) (0.09)
Colony 0.01 0.34** 0.60*** 0.52*** 0.57***
(0.06) (0.15) (0.16) (0.20) (0.17)
Common legal origin 0.07*** -0.00 0.26*** 0.23** 0.23***
(0.02) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.08)
Contiguity 0.15** 0.10 0.10 -0.05 0.12
(0.06) (0.11) (0.13) (0.19) (0.14)
Observations 42,184 42,184 104,676 115,683 104,676
R-squared 0.86 0.86 0.84 0.57 0.83
Source-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Destination-nest fixed effects No No No Yes No
Notes: Column (1) reports the results of estimating equation (4.12) using OLS. The depen-
dent variable is the natural logarithm of bilateral migration rates (Global Bilateral Migration
Database) for the years 1960, 1970, 1980 and 1990. Columns (2) and (3) report PPML coef-
ficients that result from estimating the relationship of interest in its multiplicative form. In
these columns, the dependent variables are the bilateral migration rates. Column (2) only uses
the sub-sample of positive migration flows, and column (3) also includes zero migration flow
observations. Religious similarity (World Religion Database) is a dummy variable that takes
the value one when two countries have the same majority religion. Estimated robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses, which are clustered at source-nest pairs. Coefficients are
statistically different from zero at the ***1%, **5% and *10% level.
rates on the interaction between religious similarity and the size of diaspora yields a neg-
ative coefficient that is significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. This might
reflect the fact that larger immigrant networks embed ethnic-religious institutions that
offer services tailored to a given immigrant group, thereby decreasing the cost-reducing
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effect that religious similarity has on international migration. Alternatively, this negative
coefficient on the interaction term might reflect that the size of diaspora has a greater
effect on immigration flows that take place between two countries with different religious
backgrounds. This is in line with Diehl and Koenig (2013), who show that Muslim Turks
moving to predominantly Catholic Germany are more integrated in immigrant networks
than Catholic Poles. As Muslim Turks are less familiar with the cultural and religious
background of the host country, the authors suspect that they also face more discrimina-
tion, in which case immigrant networks take the role of a refuge where newcomers with
different religious traditions are protected from assimilation pressures coming from the
mainstream culture.39
As mentioned earlier, the estimates reported in column (1) have to be regarded with
caution, as estimating equation (4.12) using OLS omits all observations that report zero
migration flows. This strongly decreases the number of observations included in the anal-
ysis because only 40 percent of the sample exhibits positive migration flows. Thus, the
OLS approach might not only yield biased coefficients because of potential heteroskedas-
tictiy in the data but also because of this truncation. In order to separately examine
these sources of mis-specification, column (2) reports the PPML estimates using only
the sub-sample of positive migration flows and column (3) shows the Poisson coefficients
for the sample including zero-flow observations. Compared to the OLS estimates, the
Poisson coefficients on religious similarity are about 1.6 and 2.6 times larger in columns
(2) and (3), respectively, suggesting that heteroscedasticity as well as truncation cause
OLS estimates to be biased. In column (2), the PPML approach predicts that bilateral
migration rates between countries sharing the majority religion are on average 67 percent
higher than between countries with different majority religions. Including observations
reporting zero migration flow in column (3) even yields Poisson estimates on religious
39A more precise interpretation of the interaction term and its implication for the effect of religious
similarity and diaspora is made later in this chapter, when the model is estimated with PPML.
124 CHAPTER 4. RELIGIOUS SIMILARITY AND MIGRATION
similarity, which suggests that this effect increases to 136 percent. As for the coefficients
on the size of diaspora, they are still highly significant in columns (2) and (3) but de-
crease by almost 24 percent when estimated using PPML. The results suggest that the
diaspora coefficients mainly suffer from biases due to heteroscedasticity. They predict
that a 1 percent increase in the size of diaspora leads to an increase in bilateral migration
rates between 0.54 and 0.57 percent. Finally, the coefficient on the interaction between
religious similarity and diaspora decreases and is only significant at the 10 percent level in
column (2). However, when including zero migration flows in the analysis, the magnitude
of the coefficient on the interaction term becomes significant at the 1 percent level and
increases to a slightly higher level than in column (1).
The coefficient on the interaction term can be interpreted in two different ways. First,
it might suggest that diaspora has a larger effect on migration flows taking place between
countries with different religious backgrounds: column (3) of Table 4.3 predicts that a
1 percent increase in the size of diaspora leads to an increase in migration rates of 0.50
percent when countries share the majority religion and of 0.58 percent when they have
different religious backgrounds. Second, the coefficient on the interaction term suggests
that the effect of religious similarity depends on the size of immigrant networks. For
instance, the results presented in column (3) predict that the coefficient on religious
similarity is equal to 0.87 in the absence of diaspora, is equal to 0.77 when the size of
diaspora is at its mean and is equal to -0.36 when diaspora takes the maximum value.40
The last coefficient is surprising because it not only suggests that religious similarity
between two countries becomes less important as the size of diaspora increases but that
40As the size of diaspora is a continuous variable, there is also a continuous number of coefficients on
religious similarity that can be computed the following way:
∂
(
Mskt
Msst
)
∂Rskt
= β1 + β3 ∗Nskt.
Recall that Nskt measures the log of bilateral migration stocks. It has a sample mean of 1.2 and takes
values between 0 and 15.38.
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religious similarity even has a negative effect on bilateral migration rates when immigrant
networks are large. However, the results presented in column (3) do not say anything
about the significance of the different coefficients on religious similarity. In order to make
a statement about their significance, the model needs to be re-parametrised (Wooldridge,
2010, p. 197). More precisely, the variable capturing the size of diaspora (Nskt) in equation
(4.11) has to be replaced by Nskt − µN in the interaction term to obtain:
Mskt
Msst
= exp (β1Rskt + β2Nskt + δ1Rskt ∗ (Nskt − µN) + X′skγ + λkt + λst)ηskt, (4.13)
where δ1 = β1+β3µN and µN can take any value of Nskt. Estimating this equation directly
yields coefficients capturing the effect that religious similarity has on bilateral migration
rates when the size of diaspora is equal to µN and, more importantly, it reports useful
standard errors that indicate whether the estimated effect is significantly different from
zero or not.41 The Poisson coefficients on religious similarity that result from estimat-
ing equation (4.13) at different sizes of diaspora are displayed in Figure 4.1. Consistent
with previous results, they suggest that bilateral migration rates are significantly higher
between countries sharing the majority religion than between countries having different
religious backgrounds. They also confirm that this effect decreases with the size of dias-
pora. Additionally, the results presented in Figure 4.1 suggest that religious similarity
becomes insignificant as soon as the stocks of immigrants reach approximately 6,000 in-
dividuals. However, more than 98 percent of observations report migration stocks below
this threshold. Religious similarity hence seems to significantly affect migration flows of
almost all observations included in the sample.
Comparing the PPML coefficients presented in Table 4.3 to estimates reported in
column (1), the results further suggest that the coefficients on the traditional dyadic
41Additionally, estimating equation (4.13) has the advantage of yielding standard errors that can be
used to compute the partial effect that religious similarity has on the dependent variable using the
estimator by Kennedy (1981).
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Figure 4.1: Coefficients on religious similarity depending on the size of diaspora
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variables also suffer from biases due to heteroscedasticity and selection when estimated
using OLS. The Poisson coefficient on the (log) distance between two countries is almost
twice as large as the corresponding OLS estimate. It suggests that a 1 percent increase
in the distance reduces bilateral migration rates by 0.67 percent. The same is observed
for the binary variable taking the value one when two countries share the same official
language: its coefficient almost doubles when increasing the sample and estimating the
specification of interest with PPML. Even more striking are the differences between the
OLS and PPML coefficients on colony, a binary variable proposed in the Gravity dataset
that takes the value one if a country pair has been in a colonial relationship. OLS
estimation reports an insignificant coefficient that is very close to zero while columns (2)
and (3) report significant PPML estimates of 0.34 and 0.60, respectively. More precisely,
column (3) suggests that the predicted migration rates between two countries having a
common colonial history is on average 80 percent higher than between countries that
were never in a colonial relationship. Similarly, OLS estimation predicts migration rates
4.6. RESULTS 127
between countries sharing a legal system to be only slightly larger then between countries
with different legal origins, while PPML coefficients predict migration rates to be 29
percent higher between the former. The opposite is observed for the common border
coefficient. This dummy variable taking the value one when two countries share a border
is estimated to have a positive effect on bilateral migration only when applying the OLS
approach. Overall, the fact that the coefficients on distance, common language, colony,
and legal origin increase while the coefficient on common border becomes insignificant in
column (3) suggests that the observations dropped with the OLS approach are not only
reporting rounding or measurement errors. Much more, this suggests that they represent
true zeros, that is, that these observations report zero migration flows because migration
costs exceed migration benefits.
Column (4) of Table 4.3 reports the results of estimating equation (4.11) with nest
dummies instead of destination-year fixed effects. Recall that potential host countries are
grouped in nests based on geographic and economic proximity, and that countries in the
same nest are close substitutes for potential migrants. The results are very similar to the
ones reported in column (3). The Poisson estimate in column (4) suggests that migration
flows between countries sharing the majority religion are on average 101 percent higher
than between countries having different religious backgrounds. This effect decreases with
the size of diaspora as the coefficient on the interaction term is negative and highly sig-
nificant. Moreover, column (4) reports that a 1 percent increase in the size of diaspora
increases migration flows by 0.59 percent between countries with different religious back-
grounds and by 0.51 between countries sharing the majority religion. The magnitude
of the coefficients on distance, common language, colony, contiguity and common legal
system are very similar to the ones reported in column (3).
Finally, column (5) of Table 4.3 presents the Poisson coefficients on the dyadic vari-
ables when the religious similarity of country pairs and its interaction with diaspora
are dropped from the specification. These dyadic variables are traditionally included in
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regressions used to analyse migration patterns in order to control for geographic and
cultural distances between country pairs. However, even if these variables were shown
to account for many types of migration costs, they might not adequately approximate
cultural proximity. Sharing a common official language decreases migration costs by fa-
cilitating communication and increasing the probability of employment, but this does
not necessarily imply cultural proximity between the source and host countries. Similar
reasoning can be applied to the other dyadic variables. If they really capture cultural
proximity, then their coefficients should decrease when including religious similarity in
the specification. However, the coefficients on the dyadic variables reported in column (5)
are not significantly different to the ones reported in column (3). This suggests that they
do not adequately control for cultural factors that affect international migration flows.
To resume, the results presented in Table 4.3 predict that the religious similarity of
country pairs has a positive effect on bilateral migration rates by promoting cultural prox-
imity, providing newcomers with economic and social services, and providing immigrants
with places where they can benefit from emotional and psychological support. Religious
similarity seems to be especially important for immigrants moving to countries with small
diaspora. Similarly, the positive effect of immigrant networks seems to be larger when
migration takes place between countries with different religious backgrounds. These sig-
nificant results suggest that religious similarity between country pairs should be included
in specifications analysing migration patterns, especially because the traditional dyadic
variables do not seem to adequately account for cultural factors.
Nonetheless, further analysis has to be performed before reaching general conclusions.
Even if estimating the relationship of interest with PPML captures mis-specifications due
to the high frequency of zero observations and to heteroscedasticity, there are still other
challenges that need to be addressed before concluding that religious similarity has a
causal effect on bilateral migration. This sensitivity analysis is performed in the next
section.
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4.7 Sensitivity Analysis
This section verifies the robustness of the main results by including negative migration
flows in the analysis, accounting for endogeneity biases and verifying the efficiency of the
PPML approach.
4.7.1 Negative Bilateral Migration Flows
International migration flows can take positive and negative values. Indeed, when approx-
imating international migration flows with differences in migration stocks made available
by the GBMD, 15 percent of observations report negative migration flows, 54 percent re-
port zero flows and 31 percent report positive flows.42 Almost 50 percent of the negative
migration flows are greater than -10, but there are also large flows, some of which are
reported in Panel A of Table 4.4. They are mainly observed between big countries, such
as India and Pakistan. Scaling the flows with the native population of the source country
yields low migration rates. The opposite is observed in Panel B of Table 4.4, where it
can be seen that the observations reporting high negative migration rates are associated
with small island states, such as Palau, Brunei and Comoros.
Typically, observations reporting negative migration flows are excluded first because
empirical approaches used in the migration setting, such as PPML, only allow non-
negative dependent variables and second because there is only limited information about
the source of these negative migration flows. They might represent return migration, but
they can also be caused by measurement error, by migration to a third country or by
death, which can all reduce the stock of immigrants but need to be treated differently
when included in an analysis. If the stock of immigrants decreases because of measure-
ment errors, migration to a third country or death, negative flows can be set to zero as
they do not represent migration flows taking place between the source and destination
42The GBMD migration stocks allow me to compute the flows for 136,107 observations.
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Table 4.4: Negative Bilateral Migration Flows
Destination Source Year Flows Rate
Panel A: Largest Negative Migration Flows
Pakistan India 1960 -521,231 -0.01
Pakistan India 1970 -5,077,778 -0.08
Pakistan India 1990 -534,786 0.00
India Pakistan 1960 -1,435,893 0.00
India Pakistan 1970 -958,317 0.00
India Pakistan 1980 -769,275 0.00
India Pakistan 1990 -617,525 0.00
Pakistan India 1980 -1,197,084 -0.01
Russia Ukraine 1990 -1,598,682 -0.01
Ukraine Russia 1990 -1,035,836 -0.02
Romania Germany 1990 -820,763 -0.04
Poland Germany 1980 -547,641 -0.02
Panel B: Largest Negative Migration Rates
Palau United States 1960 -2,886 -0.31
Brunei India 1990 -40,813 -0.23
Macedonia Austria 1980 -302,648 -0.17
Belize United Kingdom 1970 -14,489 -0.13
Comoros Madagascar 1970 -25,740 -0.11
Lesotho South Africa 1990 -172,561 -0.10
Bermuda United States 1960 -3,610 -0.10
Micronesia Switzerland 1980 -7,161 -0.10
Turkmenistan Russia 1960 -132,823 -0.10
Malta United Kingdom 1990 -30,971 -0.09
Pakistan India 1970 -5,077,778 -0.08
Sao Tome & P. Angola 1970 -5,162 -0.08
Notes: Bilateral migration flows are computed by taking the difference be-
tween the GBMD migration stocks, that is, Mskt = Sskt+1 − Sskt. Migra-
tion rates are computed by dividing the flows by the native population,
Mskt/Msst.
countries. However, they should be included in the analysis if they represent return mi-
gration. To do this, migration flows are first set to zero. Second, a proxy of international
migration is constructed following Beine and Parsons (2012), where negative flows from
country s to country k in period t are added to the inverse flows, that is, to the flows from
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country k to country s in the same period.43 Third, the rates of migration (Mskt/Msst) are
partitioned into ordered groups and the relationship of interest is estimated using an or-
dered logit approach. Besides allowing the inclusion of negative flows, this approach also
has the advantage of controlling for potential biases due to outliers. Finally, if religious
similarity between country pairs fosters positive migration flows by reducing assimilation
and integration costs, then it should also decrease the likelihood that immigrants sharing
the majority religion leave the host country. To support this assumption, negative flows
are multiplied by -1 and regressed on the explanatory variables presented in equation
(4.11). This regression is then estimated using a PPML approach.
Column (1) of Table 4.5 presents the results of setting the negative flows to zero. The
Poisson coefficients are very similar to the ones observed in Table 4.3. They suggest that
migration flows are 117 percent higher between countries sharing the majority religion
and that this effect decreases with the size of diaspora. Column (2) presents the results
of regressing the measure of bilateral migration suggested by Beine and Parsons (2012)
on the explanatory variables. Religious similarity still has a significant and positive
effect, but the magnitude of the Poisson estimate decreases. Moreover, the coefficient
on the interaction term is not significantly different from zero anymore. However, the
results presented in column (2) should be regarded with caution as the definition of this
alternative response variable relies on the strong assumption that all negative flows can
be added to the inverse positive flows without introducing any biases.
The results of estimating the relationship of interest with an ordered logit approach
are presented in column (3). To do this, migration rates were partitioned into 12 groups
of similar size, except for the largest group including all zero flow observations. Logit
43The proxy of international migration flows proposed by Beine and Parsons (2012) takes the following
form:
m
′
kst =
{
mkst if mskt > 0,
mkst +mskt if mskt < 0.
mskt is set to zero if it is negative, and is unchanged if it is greater or equal to zero.
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Table 4.5: Including negative bilateral migration flows
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PPML PPML Logit PPML
Religious similarity (RS) 0.79*** 0.42** 0.19*** -0.22*
(0.17) (0.21) (0.02) (0.13)
RS*Diaspora -6.00** -0.48 -0.06*** 1.56
(2.34) (3.04) (0.01) (1.57)
Diaspora 45.12*** 48.74*** 0.04*** 97.16***
(3.20) (3.08) (0.01) (1.45)
Distance (log) -0.85*** -0.78*** -0.47*** 0.06**
(0.09) (0.08) (0.02) (0.03)
Common language 0.47*** 0.51*** 0.33*** -0.10*
(0.11) (0.10) (0.03) (0.06)
Colony 0.89*** 0.58*** 0.82*** -0.05
(0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.08)
Common legal origin 0.32*** 0.24*** -0.02 -0.04
(0.08) (0.09) (0.02) (0.05)
Common border 0.14 -0.24* 0.46*** -0.27***
(0.15) (0.13) (0.17) (0.06)
Dependent variable
Positive migration flows Yes Yes Yes No
Zero migration flows Yes Yes Yes No
Negative migration flows Zero Added to Yes Yes
Observations 119,387 115,564 136,107 20,424
R-squared 0.80 0.79 0.99
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating the relationship between the
religious similarity of country pairs and international migration flows using PPML
and Logit. In each column, the observations reporting negative migration flows are
included in the sample with different approaches. In column (1), they are set to zero.
In column (2), they are added to the inverse positive flows. Column (3) reports the
results of partitioning all observations in ordered groups and estimated the model
using an ordered logit. Finally, column (4) multiplies the negative migration flow by
−1 and regresses them on the explanatory variables. All columns include country-
year dummies. The estimated robust standard errors reported in parentheses are
clustered at source-nest pairs. Coefficients are statistically different from zero at the
***1%, **5% and *10% level.
estimates cannot be directly compared to PPML coefficients as they have a different
interpretation. The logit coefficient on religious similarity suggests that the probability
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of observing high migration flows between two countries sharing the majority religion is
1.2 times greater than between countries with different religious backgrounds, holding all
other variables constant.44 Again, the coefficient on the interaction term suggests that
this difference decreases with the size of diaspora in the host country. This is consistent
with the main results reported in section 4.6. However, in column (3), the coefficient
on the dummy variable measuring common legal origin loses its significance while the
estimate on contiguity is highly significant. This contradicts the results presented in
Table 4.3, where I observe the opposite. There, the variable of common legal origin
has a significant effect while sharing a common border does not seem to affect bilateral
migration.
To shed some light on these contradicting results, negative bilateral migration flows
are multiplied by -1 and the coefficients of interest are estimated using a PPML approach
(column (4)). As expected, this estimation yields a negative coefficient on religious sim-
ilarity, which suggests that negative migration flows are on average 24 percent lower
between countries sharing the majority religion. In other words, immigrants are less
likely to leave a country that shares the majority religion of their home country. Sim-
ilarly, common language also seems to reduce outflows of immigrants as it facilitates
assimilation and integration in the host country. Surprisingly, the results reported in
column (4) predict that a 1 percent increase in the size of diaspora increases negative
migration flows by 0.97 percent. A possible explanation is that a large diaspora attracts
migrants who have strong relationships with their home country and only migrate be-
cause they find a familiar environment in the host country. This strong link with the
country of origin might also increase the probability of return migration. Alternatively, as
suggested by Beine et al. (2011), a larger diaspora might attract less qualified immigrants
in particular. Such immigrants are more exposed to varying economic conditions, which
44For an interpretation of the coefficients estimated using an ordered logit approach, see Long and
Freese (2006) and Wooldridge (2010).
134 CHAPTER 4. RELIGIOUS SIMILARITY AND MIGRATION
can lead to more fluctuation in the stock of immigrants. Finally, I observe in column
(4) that negative flows increase with distance but decrease between two countries sharing
a common national border. This contradicts the previous results and suggests that the
theoretical model derived here to predict positive migration flows might not be adapted
to predict negative migration flows. Further analysis is necessary to determine which
factors affect negative migration flows. However, as this is not the main focus of this
chapter and as precise data on return migration is not available, these questions are left
for future research.
Overall, the results presented in Table 4.5 confirm the results found in section 4.6 as
they also suggest that the religious similarity of country pairs increases bilateral migration
flows and that this effect is especially important for migrants moving to countries with
a small diaspora. Equivalently, they support the assumption that immigrant networks
have a positive effect on international migration flows, which is especially important for
flows taking place between countries with different religious backgrounds.
4.7.2 Endogeneity Bias
The results presented in Table 4.3 also have to be regarded with caution because religious
similarity between country pairs might be correlated with the error term, which would
lead to biased estimation.45 It is unlikely that this bias is caused by simultaneous causal-
ity as religious similarity is approximated with a binary variable that is equal to one if
two countries share the majority religion at the beginning of the period over which bi-
lateral migration flows are observed. Moreover, even if international migration can affect
the religious composition of a country, it is unlikely to change the majority religion.46
45The exogeneity of religious similarity is verified using a control function approach (see Wooldridge,
2010, p. 127) and an endogeneity test suggested by Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2007) and imple-
mented in Stata that is robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity. Both tests rejects the null hypothesis at
conventional levels, which means that religious similarity is exogenous.
46Of the 232 countries included in the WRD, only 39 changed their majority religion between 1970
and 2000 (Johnson and Grim, 2008). Among them, the majority religion of 36 countries changed from
an “ethnic religion” to a Christian religion. It is very unlikely that the origin of this change lies in past
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Alternatively, the endogeneity bias might be caused by unobserved omitted variables that
simultaneously affect religious similarity and bilateral migration flows. Yet, the inclusion
of pair-specific variables and of a full set of time-varying country dummies should address
this type of mis-specification. Finally, endogeneity could be caused by measurement error
as a dummy variable taking the value one when two countries share the majority religion
might only imperfectly approximate religious similarity between country pairs.
To address this concern, the relationship of interest is estimated using two different
instrumental variables (IV) approaches where religious similarity between country s and
country k in year t (Rskt) is instrumented with an indicator of religious adherence in
1900. This indicator is an index that measures the probability that a randomly chosen
individual in country k has the same religion as a randomly chosen individual in country
s in 1900. It is obtained based on data from the WRD and is computed as follows:
Ask1900 =
∑
r
ars1900 ∗ ark1900, (4.14)
where Ask1900 is a Herfindahl index approximating religious similarity between countries s
and k in 1900; r stands for the different religious denominations defined in the WRD and
ars1900 and a
r
k1900 are the fractions of individuals living in countries s and k, respectively,
that adhere to religion r in 1900. Due to the strong persistence of religion over time, this
instrument is correlated with religious similarity. However, it is very unlikely that religious
adherences in 1900 affect flows of bilateral migration taking place between 1960 and
2000 other than through religious similarity today. If religious similarity is endogenous,
then its interaction with the size of diaspora in the destination country also has to be
instrumented. To do this, the index for religious adherence in 1900 is interacted with
the proxy measuring the size of diaspora, and this term is employed as an instrument for
Rskt ∗Nskt (Wooldridge, 2010).47
bilateral migration flows.
47Note that according to Beine et al. (2011), the proxy measuring the size of diaspora is also correlated
136 CHAPTER 4. RELIGIOUS SIMILARITY AND MIGRATION
Table 4.6: Estimating the migration equation with an IV approach
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Method IV OLS OLS OLS
Stage 2nd 1st 1st Reduced
Dependent variable Mig. RS RS*Dia Mig.
Religious similarity (RS) 0.55***
(0.03)
RS*Diaspora -0.11***
(0.01)
Religious adherence (RA) 1900 0.87*** -0.17*** 0.50***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
RA 1900*Diaspora 0.00 0.97*** -0.11***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Diaspora 0.78*** 0.01*** 0.10*** 0.76***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Distance (log) -0.35*** 0.05*** 0.16*** -0.34***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01)
Common language 0.25*** 0.09*** 0.40*** 0.25***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02)
Colony 0.02 -0.01 0.22** 0.01
(0.06) (0.01) (0.11) (0.06)
Same legal origin 0.08*** -0.03*** -0.02 0.06***
(0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02)
Common border 0.18*** 0.06*** 0.20* 0.19***
(0.06) (0.02) -0.12 (0.06)
Observations 42,184 42,184 42,184 42,184
R-squared 0.55 0.80 0.71
Notes: This table reports the results of estimating the determinants of (log) bilateral migration
rates with an IV approach. Religious similarity is a dummy variable taking the value one when
the source and destination countries share the majority religion. It is instrumented with a
measure of religious adherence in 1900. Column (1) reports the second-stage results. Columns
(2) and (3) report the first-stage estimates for religious similarity and its interaction with the
size of diaspora, respectively. Column (4) presents the results of estimating the reduced-
form equation of the dependent variable. All equations include country-year dummies. The
estimated robust standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the country-nest
pair. Coefficients are statistically different from zero at the ***1%, **5% and *10% level.
with the error term. In this case, the corresponding coefficients suffer from endogeneity bias and have
to be interpreted with caution. I could follow Beine et al. (2011) and instrument the size of diaspora in
order to address this problem. However, it is very difficult to identify models with multiple endogenous
variables and their estimation might lead to results that are very difficult to interpret (Angrist and
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In order to test the validity of the instruments, equation (4.12) is first estimated using
a standard IV approach. The results of this estimation are reported in Table 4.6. Column
(1) predicts that migration flows between two countries sharing the majority religion are
about 73 percent higher than between countries having different majority religions, an
effect that is 62 percent higher than the one predicted by the OLS estimates reported
in Table 4.3. The negative coefficient on the interaction between religious similarity and
the size of diaspora is only slightly higher than its OLS counterpart. It again suggests
that religious similarity is especially important for potential migrants when the diaspora
established in the host countries are small.
Table 4.7: Statistical validity of the instruments
(1) (2) (3)
Method IV OLS OLS
Stage 2nd 1st 1st
Dependent variable Mig. RS RS*Dia
Testing strength of identification
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald statistic 5,684
(p-value) (0.00)
Angrist-Pischke multivariate F-test of excluded instruments
Statistic 9,715 7,870
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00)
Testing under-identification
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 3,868
(p-value) (0.00)
Angrist-Pischke first-stage chi-squared 10,046 8,138
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00)
Notes: See notes in Table 4.6 and the description of the tests in the text.
To verify the validity of the IV approach, the Kleibergen-Paap (KP) statistics are
Pischke, 2009). Therefore, and as the focus of this chapter is on religious similarity, I for now abstain
from simultaneously instrumenting the proxy for religious similarity and the one measuring the size of
diaspora. Ways of coping with this problem should be addressed in future work.
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computed and presented in column (1) of Table 4.7. The KP rk LM statistic48 suggests
that both instruments are relevant and provide enough information in order to identify
the model, and the KP rk Wald statistic49 suggests that the correlation between the
instruments and the endogenous regressors is sufficiently strong in order to avoid problems
due to weak identification. These results are consistent with the first-stage estimates for
religious similarity and for its interaction with diaspora which are reported in columns
(2) and (3) of Table 4.6, respectively. The coefficients on the instruments are highly
significant, and the Angrist-Pischke first-stage statistics presented in columns (2) and
(3) of Table 4.7 also indicate that the individual endogenous regressors are identified
and are sufficiently correlated with their instrument in order to avoid weak identification
problems (Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Baum et al., 2007, 2002).50
Finally, column (4) of Table 4.6 reports the results of estimating the reduced-form
equation of the dependent variable, which verifies that the instruments are significantly
different from zero when regressed on bilateral migration. Angrist and Pischke (2009,
p. 213) point out that if the relationship of interest really exists, then it has to be
observed in the reduced-form of the dependent variable. Estimating this reduced-form
using OLS yields coefficients on the instruments that are highly significant and have the
expected sign.
The results reported in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 thus confirm the main results and suggest
48The Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic is the efficient first-stage statistic used to verify the relevance
of the instruments when non-i.i.d. disturbances are assumed. Rejection of the null hypothesis suggests
that the model is identified, that is, that the instruments are relevant.
49In the presence of i.i.d. disturbances, weak identification problems are detected with the Cragg-
Donald F-statistic, which is compared to the critical values published by Stock and Yogo (2005). However,
in case of non-i.i.d. disturbances, the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald statistic is the efficient statistic (Baum
et al., 2007; Kleibergen and Paap, 2006; Kleibergen and Schaffer, 2007). Thus far, no critical values have
been computed for this statistic. Therefore, in practice it is usually compared to the threshold number
of 10 recommended by Staiger and Stock (1997); see also Stock et al. (2002). As a further robustness
test, I compute the limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimates of regression (4.12) and
find that the size of the LIML coefficients as well as their statistical significance are very similar to the
IV estimates.
50The KP statistics verify whether any of the endogenous variables are identified while the AP statistics
are used in models with multiple endogenous variables as they verify whether a specific endogenous
variable is identified and sufficiently correlated with its instrument.
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that the instrumental variables are valid. However, this approach has two drawbacks.
First, it is exactly identified and it can therefore not be verified whether the instruments
satisfy the exclusion restriction. Yet, as mentioned previously, it is unlikely that a proxy
of religious similarity measured in 1900 has an effect on bilateral migration flows taking
place from 1970 to 2000, other than through religious similarity observed in those years.
Second, the IV approach does not account for the biases found in the previous section,
that is, biases caused by the high frequency of zero observations and the heteroscedas-
ticity of the data. Only an IV version of the PPML estimation approach (henceforth IV
PPML) can simultaneously account for these three types of distortions. Aware of this
challenge, Santos Silva and Tenreyro recently developed such an estimator.51 However,
when including a full set of time-varying destination and source country dummies in
equation 4.11, the IV PPML approach does not converge. This computational difficulty
is known by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2011b, 2010), who explain that it can mainly
happen for two reasons. The first is when the maximum likelihood estimator does not ex-
ist due to perfect collinearity between regressors or to dummy variables that always take
the value one when the dependent variable is positive. The second is that convergence
might not be achieved when the estimation approach encounters numerical problems that
follow from large values in the dependent variable, from collinear regressors with very dif-
ferent magnitudes, or from regressors that are extremely but not perfectly collinear. The
estimation including a full set of country-year dummies probably suffers from extremely
collinear regressors, as these are the only regressors leading to non-convergence that can-
not be identified and dropped. Therefore, in order to estimate the relationship of interest
using IV PPML, I replace destination-year fixed effects by nest dummies and re-scale the
problematic regressors. The results of this estimation are presented in Table 4.8.
Column (1) of Table 4.8 reports a positive coefficient on religious similarity that is
51The code is publicly available on their web page and is implemented in Stata
13. See the blog “The Log of Gravity Page” by Santos Silva and Tenreyro at
http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/∼jmcss/LGW.html.
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Table 4.8: Causal relationship between religious similarity and international migration
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Method IV PPML PPML PPML PPML
Stage 2nd 1st 1st Reduced
Dependent variable Mig. RS RS*Dia Mig.
Religious similarity (RS) 1.42***
(0.28)
RS*Diaspora -0.11***
(0.04)
Religious adherence 1900, (RA) 1.59*** 2.46*** 1.20***
(0.04) (0.07) (0.23)
RA*Diaspora -0.28 -11.35*** -8.84***
(0.78) (1.12) (3.12)
Diaspora 0.62*** 0.01 0.42*** 0.58***
(0.04) -0.01 -0.01 (0.04)
Distance (log) -0.52*** 0.08*** -0.07*** -0.50***
(0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08)
Common language 0.29* 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.36***
(0.15) (0.02) (0.03) (0.13)
Colony 0.57*** -0.06** -0.26*** 0.52***
(0.20) (0.03) (0.06) (0.20)
Common legal origin 0.27** -0.04*** 0.04* 0.25**
(0.11) (0.01) (0.02) (0.11)
Common border -0.09 0.12*** -0.50*** -0.03
(0.20) (0.05) (0.04) (0.18)
Constant -8.82*** -1.51*** -6.08*** -8.37***
(0.82) (0.16) (0.26) (0.87)
Observations 115,683 114,408 111,827 115,683
R-squared 0.58 0.68 0.57
Notes: This table reports the results of estimating the determinants of bilateral migration
rates using an IV PPML approach. Religious similarity is a dummy variable taking the value
one when the source and destination countries share the majority religion. It is instrumented
with a measure of religious adherence in 1900. Column (1) reports the IV/second-stage
results. Columns (2) and (3) report the first-stage estimates for religious similarity and its
interaction with the size of diaspora, respectively. Column (4) reports the results of estimating
the reduced-form equation of the dependent variable. All equations include time-varying
source-country dummies and destination-nest dummies. The estimated robust standard errors
reported in parentheses are clustered at the country-nest pair. Coefficients are statistically
different from zero at the ***1%, **5% and *10% level.
significant at the 1 percent level, revealing a positive causal relationship between reli-
gious similarity and international migration. This IV Poisson coefficient is larger than
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its PPML counterpart presented in Table 4.3, suggesting that endogeneity introduces a
downward bias. The coefficient on the interaction term is also slightly higher than its
PPML counterpart and still predicts that immigrants moving to countries with small
diaspora benefit most from the fact that the host countries share the majority religion
of the home countries. Apart from that, the coefficients on the control variables are very
similar to the ones found in section 4.6. They suggest that a 1 percent increase in the
size of diaspora increases bilateral migration rates on average by 0.62 percent. Moreover,
bilateral migration rates decreases with distance and increase when two countries share
the official language, a common colonial history, and when they have similar institutions.
Columns (2) to (4) report significant coefficients on the instruments in the first stages
and in the reduced-form, suggesting that they are relevant. Overall, the results presented
here suggest that religious similarity of country pairs has a causal effect on international
migration. This supports the hypothesis that religious similarity promotes cultural prox-
imity and provides immigrants with networks, thereby fostering bilateral migration by
facilitating integration and assimilation in the host country.
4.7.3 Efficiency of Alternative Estimators
In their studies, Santos Silva and Tenreyro explain that the PPML approach is to be
preferred over other estimation methods because it yields consistent estimates even when
the data is not Poisson-distributed. Indeed, the Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PML)
results published by Gourieroux, Monfort, and Trognon (1984) show that the estimates
of PML approaches are consistent, as long as the conditional mean is correctly speci-
fied.52 However, this condition does not give any indication of the performance of an
estimation approach. Its efficiency depends on second-moment information, that is, on
the relationship between the conditional mean and the conditional variance of the depen-
dent variable. To clarify this point, consider the following equation that generalises such
52See also Manning and Mullahy (2001) and Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006).
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a relationship (Manning and Mullahy, 2001; Head and Mayer, 2013a):
v(yi|x) = aE(yi|x)λ, (4.15)
where v(yi|x) and E(yi|x) are the conditional variance and mean of the dependent vari-
able, respectively.53 When λ = 0, the conditional variance is equal to the constant a
and does not depend on the explanatory variables. In other words, the disturbances
are homoscedastic and the corresponding model can be estimated efficiently using OLS.
PPML is the efficient approach when λ takes the value one, that is, when the conditional
variance is proportional to the conditional mean, which itself depends on the regressors
(x):
v(yi|x) = aE(yi|x),
where a = v(yi|x)
E(yi|x) . If λ differs from 1, PPML might still yield consistent estimates, but they
are not necessarily efficient anymore. For instance, if λ = 2, that is, when the standard
deviation is proportional to the mean, Manning and Mullahy (2001) provide evidence
that the data follows a Gamma distribution.54 However, when performing their Monte-
Carlo simulations, they only address problems due to different types of heteroscedasticity
and ignore biases caused by truncation and censoring. Santos Silva and Tenreyro try to
fill this gap by evaluating the consistency and efficiency of different estimators when the
dependent variable is measured with various types of errors. When these cause truncation,
they find that the PPML approach generally outperforms all other estimators. This is
because “models assuming that V [yi|x] is a function of higher powers of E[yi|x] might
give excessive weight to the observations that are more prone to measurement errors”
(Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006, p. 646). Therefore, they consider the PPML approach
53The country and time subscripts are suppressed in order to simplify the notation.
54To illustrate that the standard deviation is proportional to the mean in this case, set λ = 2 in
equation (4.15) and take the square root to obtain σ =
√
a E(y|x), where σ represents the standard
deviation.
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to be a “reasonable compromise” that should be applied even when the data does not
follow a Poisson distribution.55
In spite of the evidence provided by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), Head and
Mayer (2013a) warn against estimating a gravity-type equation using only PPML. Rather,
they suggest that a thorough analysis should systematically compare OLS, PPML and
GPML estimates. Moreover, they suggest estimating the parameter λ to further asses the
adequacy of the chosen estimation approach. This can be done with the modified Park
test presented in Manning and Mullahy (2001), where equation (4.15) is log-linearised
and v(yi|x) and E(yi|x) are replaced by their sample counterparts σˆ2 and yˆi, respectively,
to obtain:
log σˆ2 = log a+ λ ˆlog yi + u,
an equation that is estimated using OLS. Performing this test here yields an estimate of
the parameter λ equal to 2.03, which suggests that GPML is the approach that should
yield efficient coefficients. Unfortunately, GPML estimation does not converge when
fixed effects are included in equation (4.11).56 Therefore, if I want to perform the anal-
ysis suggested by Head and Mayer, I have to drop all fixed effects from the estimated
specification. Doing this will yield biased coefficients but allows to compare the different
estimation approaches. The results of this comparison are reported in Table 4.9, where
columns (1), (2) and (3) present the coefficients estimated using OLS, PPML and GPML,
respectively. This analysis is performed on the sub-sample including only observations
that report positive migration flows as this allows me to keep the sample constant across
columns.
55In the trade setting, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006, 645-6) argue: “Trade data for larger countries
(as gauged by GDP per capita) tend to be of higher quality (see Frankel and Wei, 1993; Frankel, 1997);
hence, models assuming that V [yi|x] is a function of higher powers of E[yi|x] might give excessive
weight to the observations that are more prone to measurement errors. Therefore, the Poisson regression
emerges as a reasonable compromise, giving less weight to the observations with larger variance than the
standard NLS estimator, without giving too much weight to observations more prone to contamination
by measurement error and less informative about the curvature of E[yi|x].”
56For an explanation of why a PML with fixed effects does not converge, see section 4.7.2.
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Table 4.9: Comparing alternative estimators
(1) (2) (3)
OLS PPML GPML
Religious similarity (RS) 0.49*** 0.64** 0.99***
(0.07) (0.32) (0.23)
RS*Diaspora -0.03 -0.01 -0.11***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Diaspora 0.54*** 0.37*** 0.44***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.04)
Distance (log) -0.63*** -0.22*** -0.50***
(0.04) (0.06) (0.11)
Common official language 0.86*** 1.12*** 0.83***
(0.08) (0.15) (0.20)
Colony 0.39** 0.53** 1.98***
(0.19) (0.26) (0.28)
Same legal origin 0.02 0.09 0.77***
(0.05) (0.19) (0.24)
Common border -0.05 -0.43** -0.01
(0.13) (0.20) (0.30)
Observations 42,184 42,184 42,184
R-squared 0.40 0.06
Notes: Column (1) reports the results of estimating equation (4.12) using OLS.
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the bilateral migration rates
(Global Bilateral Migration Database) for the years 1960, 1970, 1980 and 1990.
Columns (2) and (3), respectively, report PPML and GPML coefficients that result
from estimating the relationship of interest in its multiplicative form. In these
columns, the dependent variables are the bilateral migration rates. Only the sub-
sample of positive migration flows is included in order to make the results comparable
across columns. Religious similarity (World Religion Database) is a dummy variable
that takes the value one when two countries have the same majority religion. The
estimated robust standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at source-nest
pairs. Coefficients are statistically different from zero at the ***1%, **5% and *10%
level.
The Gamma coefficient on the religious proximity of country pairs reported in column
(3) of Table 4.9 is twice the size of its OLS counterpart and 50 percent larger than the
PPML estimate. According to Head and Mayer (2013a, p. 44), if both the PPML and
GPML coefficients are different from the OLS estimates, “then it is reasonable to conclude
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that heteroscedasticity is a problem and the OLS estimates are unreliable.” This confirms
previous findings that suggest that OLS estimates are biased due to heteroscedasticity.
Moreover, the results suggest that the Poisson estimates represent the lower bounds of
the true coefficients on religious similarity and its interaction with diaspora. However, as
the estimation results presented in Table 4.9 do not include fixed effects, this suggestion
should be considered with caution as the coefficients might be biased. Additionally,
Santos Silva and Tenreyro emphasise that the GPML approaches give excessive weight to
observations that are more likely to suffer from measurement errors, leading to estimates
that are more biased and less precise than the Poisson coefficients. Nevertheless, the
results presented in Table 4.9 justify the implementation of a PPML approach, a strategy
that has recently been criticised in the literature (Egger and Staub, 2014).57 In addition,
this sensitivity analysis again confirms that the religious similarity of country pairs has a
significant positive effect on international migration and that the significant coefficients
of interest are not just an artefact of an inadequate estimation approach.
4.8 Concluding Remarks
This chapter first investigated whether religious similarity between source and destination
countries affects international migration by promoting cultural proximity and providing
newcomers with networks that offer them practical, emotional, and spiritual support.
As ethnic-religious institutions embedded in diaspora also offer some of these services,
this chapter also analysed whether and how this effect depends on the size of immigrant
networks established in the host countries.
These questions were addressed using a utility maximisation model that assumes
that potential migrants only move abroad if expected migration benefits exceed expected
57See papers presented at the CESifo/ETH conference on Estimation of Gravity Models of Bilateral
Trade, which took place in May 2014 in Munich. More information and related publications can be found
at www.cesifo.org.
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migration costs. In addition to the standard explanatory variables of bilateral migration,
it includes a proxy for religious similarity of country pairs, a variable measuring the size
of the diaspora established in the host country, and an interaction of these two variables.
The equation derived from this model was estimated in its multiplicative form using a
PPML approach. In order to account for multilateral resistance to migration, a full set of
time-varying source- and destination-country dummies was included in the specification.
Alternatively, destination countries were grouped in different nests and destination-year
dummies were replaced by the corresponding nest dummies.
The Poisson estimates predict that, in the absence of a diaspora, immigration flows
are on average 136 percent larger between countries sharing the majority religion than
between countries with different religious backgrounds. This effect decreases with the
size of immigrant networks established in the destination country and becomes insignifi-
cant when the diaspora achieves 6,000 members. Yet, less than 2 percent of observations
included in the analysis report immigrant networks that reach this size. The empirical
results therefore suggest that religious similarity between country pairs plays an impor-
tant role in determining international migration flows in 98 percent of cases. Moreover,
the coefficient on the interaction term between religious similarity and the size of immi-
grant networks established in destination countries suggests that diaspora are particularly
important for potential migrants originating from countries that do not share the host
countries’ majority religion. These results are robust when including negative migration
flows and applying an IV approach in order to control for potential biases in the coef-
ficients of interest. Moreover, comparing OLS, PPML and GPML results suggests that
the econometric approaches chosen to estimate the relationship of interest are adequate.
Future research shall attempt to dismantle the effect that religious similarity can have
on male or female migration flows. It would also be interesting to discriminate between
religions, regions or countries. Future research might also include indicators of religious
independence and freedom provided by the Association of Religion Data Archives. This is
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because the role of religious similarity in international migration might also depend on the
intensity with which the religion is practised in the source and/or destination country. For
instance, religious similarity might be particularly important when destination countries
discriminate against individuals who do not adhere to the majority religion. On the other
hand, it might be negligible when destination countries guarantee religious freedom.
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Appendix to Chapter 4
Derivation leans heavily on Train (2009).
The density of a variable g with a Gumble distribution (iid extreme value) is
f(g) = e−ge−e
−g
and its cumulative distribution is
F (g) = e−e
−g
.
The difference between two iid extreme value variables g∗ follows a logistic distribution:
F (g∗) =
eg
∗
1 + eg∗
.
In our case, a migrant only moves to destination d if
Vsd + 
i
d > Vsj + 
i
j ∀ d 6= j,
where V is the observed utility and i is the unobserved idiosyncratic utility that follows
a Gumble distribution. Following McFadden (1974), the probability that migrant i born
in country s chooses destination d is
Psd = P (Vsd + 
i
d > Vsj + 
i
j ∀ d 6= j)
= P (ij < 
i
d + Vsd − Vsj ∀ d 6= j.
(4.16)
If id was known, then Psd|id could be computed by multiplying the individual cumu-
lative distributions. However, as id is the unobserved part of the utility that individual
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i gets from moving to country d, the choice probability can only be computed from
Psd =
∫ ∞
id=−∞
(Psd|id) f(id) did
=
∫ ∞
id=−∞
(∏
d6=j
e−e
−(id+Vsd−Vsj)
)
e−
i
de−e
−id did
=
∫ ∞
g=−∞
(∏
d6=j
e−e
−(g+Vsd−Vsj)
)
e−ge−e
−g
dg,
(4.17)
where, for notational convenience, I replaced id by g in the last step. To further simplify
the derivation, suppose that there are four alternatives where moving to destination d is
alternative d = 1, and k = 1, ..., K. I can then rewrite
Ps1 =
∫ ∞
g=−∞
(
e−e
−(g+Vs1−Vs2)e−e
−(g+Vs1−Vs3) . . . e−e
−(g+Vs1−VsK )
)
e−ge−e
−g+Vs1-Vs1
dg
=
∫ ∞
g=−∞
e−e
−g+Vs1-Vs1
e−e
−(g+Vs1−Vs2)e−e
−(g+Vs1−Vs3) . . . e−e
−(g+Vs1−VsK )e−g dg
=
∫ ∞
g=−∞
exp
(
−
K∑
k=1
e−(g+Vs1−Vsk)
)
e−g dg
=
∫ ∞
g=−∞
exp
(
−e−g
∑
k
e−(Vs1−Vsk)
)
e−g dg.
(4.18)
To derive the logistic distribution, I further simplify by defining a = exp(−g) and
hence da = −exp(−g)dg.58 When g goes to infinity, then a converges to zero. On the
58Recall
∫ b
a
f [u(x)]u′(x)dx =
∫ u(b)
u(a)
f(z)dz.
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other hand, when g goes to minus infinity, then a goes to infinity. I can hence rewrite
Psd =
∫ ∞
a=0
exp
(
−a
∑
k
e−(Vsd−Vsk)
)
(−da)
=
∫ 0
∞
exp
(
−a
∑
k
e−(Vsd−Vsk)
)
da
=
exp
(−a∑k e−(Vsd−Vsk))
−∑k e−(Vsd−Vsk)
∣∣∣∣∣
∞
0
=
1∑
k e
−(Vsd−Vsk)
=
eVsd∑
k e
Vsk
.
(4.19)
Chapter 5
Summary and Further Research
This thesis verified the robustness of the relationship between DtS trust and interna-
tional trade flows already analysed by Guiso et al. (2009), provided first insights into
the relationship between bilateral trust and (total, female, and male) international mi-
gration, and found a significant effect of religious similarity between country pairs on
international migration. It included different strands of literature in sociology, psychol-
ogy, and economics, developed international migration models using various distributional
assumptions, described the strengths and weaknesses of different econometric approaches
and opened many future avenues of research.
Chapter 2 highlighted the importance of performing a thorough sensitivity analysis.
First, when reconsidering the relationship between bilateral trust across countries and
international trade flows, it did not find robust evidence in favour of the hypothesis that
culturally rooted differences in bilateral trust are important determinants of international
trade, thereby contradicting the conclusions of GSZ.
Second, Chapter 2 provided first insights into the relationship between bilateral trust
and international migration. It suggested that StD trust affects the way expectations
about migration costs and benefits are formed, and that DtS trust could, for instance,
influence immigration policies towards specific countries or regions. However, these hy-
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potheses were not confirmed when estimating the migration regressions. Neither the coef-
ficients on StD trust nor those on DtS trust were statistically significant when regressing
total migration flows on them, in addition to traditional determinants of international
migration.
Yet, while StD trust might be insignificant for total migration flows, it could play a
role in female migration flows. This is because migration is a risky decision, and studies
in experimental economics repeatedly show that women tend to be more risk-averse than
men. Also, women are suspected to endure more stress than men when moving to a
foreign country. This point was addressed in Chapter 3 where female and male migration
flows were separately regressed on StD trust. These regressions were estimated using
five different econometric approaches in order to account for biases potentially caused
by endogenetiy, heteroscedasticity in the data, and sample selection. Overall, the results
did not provide evidence that StD trust is particularly important for potential female
migrants. Neither did the estimations yield significant trust coefficients when focusing
on male migration flows.
It is important to recall that Chapters 2 and 3 focused exclusively on bilateral trade
and migration flows within Europe, where countries share many cultural traits and have
similar historical and institutional backgrounds. I do not claim that the results found
in these chapters provide evidence in favour of the hypothesis that bilateral trust is
insignificant for international trade and migration in general. They only suggest that
bilateral trust does not matter for international trade and migration flows taking place
within Europe. Ideally, this analysis should be extended to flows taking place between
more diverse countries. Unfortunately, data on bilateral trust necessary for such an
analysis does not yet exist. This broader analysis therefore has to be left for future
research.
Moreover, it is possible that the measures of average trust that citizens from one
country place in those from another country, as elicited from the employed Eurobarometer
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surveys, are not appropriate measures of bilateral trust in the context of international
trade and migration. I therefore do not go as far as to challenge the view of Arrow (1972,
p. 357), who pointed out that “Virtually every commercial transaction has within itself
an element of trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a period of time. It can be
plausibly argued that much of the economic backwardness in the world can be explained
by the lack of mutual confidence.” Further, it would be very interesting in future research
to estimate similar relationships with alternative measures of bilateral trust to the one
provided by the Eurobarometer surveys.
Chapter 4 also opens many research questions. Estimating a migration model with
observations from approximately 230 countries over the years 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990,
I found that religious similarity between source and destination countries significantly
affects international migration. Religious similarity is suspected to decrease assimilation
and immigration costs by promoting cultural proximity and providing newcomers with
networks that offer them practical services and emotional, spiritual and psychological
support. As some of these services and supports are also provided by immigrant networks
established in destination countries, the migration-promoting effect of religious similarity
might depend on the size of the diaspora. Performing a thorough analysis, the results
provide evidence that migration flows are significantly larger between countries sharing
the majority religion. Moreover, they suggest that this effect indeed depends negatively
on the size of diaspora. In other words, the results predict that migrants with different
religious backgrounds are more likely to migrate to destination countries that provide
them with large immigration networks.
These results open many future avenues of research. For instance, additional work
could dismantle the effect that religious similarity has on male or female migration flows.
It would also be interesting to discriminate between religions, regions, or countries. Future
research might include indicators of religious independence and freedom provided by the
Association of Religion Data Archives. Alternatively, the GBMD could be replaced by the
154 CHAPTER 5. SUMMARY AND FURTHER RESEARCH
Global Religion and Migration Database proposed by the Pew Research Centre’s Forum
on Religion and Public Life, which classifies bilateral migration flows for the year 2012
by religious denomination. The results in Chapter 4 could also be of some interest to
policymakers. For instance, potential losses in the competitiveness of European countries
are expected due to critical shortages of nurses and engineers. Such shortages might
be mitigated by international migration, but to attract individuals who could fill these
open positions, policymakers need to be aware of the factors affecting the decisions of
potential migrants to move abroad. In addition to traditional factors such as income
and moving costs, Chapter 4 suggests that religious similarity might affect these location
choices. Of course, it is hard to change a country’s religious background without incurring
enormous costs. Think, for instance, of the recent events taking place in Iraq, where
groups like the Islamic State and the Nusra Front persecute all individuals adhering
to different beliefs than theirs. Fortunately, the results in Chapter 4 also suggest that
policy makers could attract workers from countries with different religious backgrounds
by promoting immigrant networks. Obviously, such decisions need to be preceded by
thorough analyse of the dynamics of these networks within destination countries in order
to avoid segregation and potential social unrest.
More generally, this thesis addresses interesting questions that are part of the branch
of literature analysing the cultural determinants of economic outcomes. This literature
increases in importance in the light of recent events, such as the financial crises, the
revolutions in the Middle East, the appearance of Islamic fundamentalism in some regions
of the world and the conflict in Ukraine. Such events are often accompanied by migration
flows that increase the cultural diversity in host countries. In order to benefit from this
diversity, future research should increasingly take cultural factors into account. There
is a lot of work for researchers interested in culture and its consequences on economic
behaviour. They might benefit from the inclusion of sociological and psychological studies
that often provide interesting insights into human decisions. This is a promising avenue
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of research that can contribute to the improvement of economic and social conditions in
many countries.
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